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Jurisdiction of Utah Court of Appeals 
The Court entered its final order dismissing all of the Appellants Dennis and 
Linda Spencer's claims on October 30, 2001. A Notice of Appeal was filed on 
November 19, 2001. The Utah Supreme Court took initial jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(j). Subsequently, the Utah Court of Appeals assumed 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
Standard of Review 
Appellants ("Spencers") appeal the trial court's granting of summary judgment 
for the Appellee ("City") and denial of their motion for partial summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when 'there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and .. .the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.' . . .Whether the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment is a question of law that we review for correctness, according 
no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. . . . Additionally, 
when reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 'we view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party.'1 
Issue on Appeal 
After the City (1) tendered Spencers approval to build two residences, (2) 
agreed the tender could be incorporated into an order of the trial court, and (3) later 
provided a refund to Spencers of fees charged for the City's outside counsel review 
of Spencers' development proposals, were there sufficient facts in the record to 
require the trial court to hold that Spencers were a prevailing party for purposes of 
1 
42 U.S.C. § 1988, and set for further hearing both Spencers' claims for damages 
and an award of attorney fees and costs? 
Determinative Law 
The following provisions of law are determinative of issues raised in the 
Spencers' appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4): "Variances run with the land." 
Utah Code Ann. $ 10-9-1001 (2)(a): 
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of 
the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the 
decision with the district court within 30 days from the date the decision 
is rendered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the 
recovery of any property real or personal or for the possession thereof 
or to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens thereon 
or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or to secure any 
adjudication touching any mortgage or other lien said entity may have 
or claim on the property involved. 
Utah Const. Article I § 7: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law" 
Utah Const. Article I § 14: "The right of people to be secure in their persons. . . 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated[.]" 
Utah Const. Article I § 22: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation." 
1
 Low v. City of Monticello. 2002 UT 90 f l 4 ; 455 Utah Adv. Rep. 43. 
2 
42U.S.C. §1983: 
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the injured party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.] 
42U.S.C.S1988: 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977, 
1977A, 1978,1979,1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 USCS 
§§ 1981-1983,1985,1986].. .the court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's 
fee as part of the costs. 
United States Constitution. Fifth Amendment: . . ."[N]or shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." 
United States Constitution. Fourteenth Amendment: "No state shall.. .deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." 
Statement of the Case 
This appeal seeks vindication of the right of a property owner to seek damages, 
attorney fees and costs against a City that has illegally, capriciously, or arbitrarily (1) 
delayed or impeded the granting of building permits authorized either pursuant to 
previously granted variances or available under the existing City ordinances, (2) 
restricted access to the City Planning Commission and Board of Adjustments for the 
benefit of other private parties, and (3) after extended litigation, without admitting 
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fault of any kind, tendered to the Court the requested building approvals and a 
refund of some of the objected to, unnecessary processing fees in an effort to moot 
the property owners' request for injunctive relief and all of the damage claims arising 
out of the delay to issue the building permits. 
Nature of the Case 
The trial court reviewed this case as appeal brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
10-9-1001 (2)(a) from the City's Board of Adjustment decision that denied the 
Spencers' request for a variance needed to develop their property. In addition to the 
statutory claim of illegal, arbitrary and capricious action, the Spencers brought 
several federal civil rights claims, with related state constitutional and statutory 
claims, against the City. Because the City eventually tendered the two desired 
building permits and a refund on what Spencers claimed were improperly paid 
processing fees, the trial court found the key issues in the case were moot, and 
dismissed all of Plaintiffs' remaining constitutional and civil rights claims as being 
premature and not supported by fact or law. On appeal to this Court, Spencers 
claim that the trial court improperly failed to recognize Spencers as a prevailing party 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and seek remand for evidentiary hearings on attorney fees, 
costs, and damages. 
Appellate Court Proceedings 
Except for participation in the Utah Appellate Court's mediation program, there 
have been no prior appellate court proceedings. 
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Disposition of the Case 
The trial court dismissed all of the Spencers' claims for damages, attorney fees and 
costs with prejudice. 
Material Facts 
This case focuses on the relationship of the City and the Spencers during the many 
years the Spencers tried to develop their property as building lots. The property in 
question is shown in Figure 1. 
(Record at 266) The West Parcel (on the left) contains two parcels with tax 
5 
identification numbers 16-023-0040 and 16-023-0042. The East Parcel (on the right) 
contains the parcel with tax identification number 16-023-0004. 
About 1980, in violation of City ordinances prohibiting half-roads in the City, 
the City allowed the road identified by 0021 to end part way through parcel number 
16-023-0025. This had the effect of land locking Spencers' East and West parcel. 
(Record at 265-266) Nonetheless, on May 10, 1983, Spencers obtained a "non-
exclusive right-of-way" across the land immediately south of their property that joined 
the undeveloped City right-of-way above public road 0021. (Record at 266) 
On July 11,1983 a variance was granted to the Spencers and their successor-
in-interest that allowed a right to build on the West parcel. This variance used the 
right-of-way across both the East and West parcels. (Record at 267) Building on the 
right-of-way instead of a public street required conformance with the following four 
requirements: 
(1) The building lot be 20,000 square feet, without consideration of the 
right-of-way; 
(2) The buildings be set back at least thirty (30) feet from the edge of 
the right-of-way; 
(3) The engineer's designs be provided to the City showing cuts for 
utilities, grades for roads, and the design of the right-of-way for future 
development in the area; and 
(4) Should any future development be made, the Spencers would 
participate in hard surfacing the road, installing curb, gutter and 
sidewalk, and that [the Spencers would] provide an escrow in the 
amount determined by the City engineer for improvement to his 
property. 
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(Record at 268) On March 31,1986 a variance was granted to the Spencers that 
allowed a building to be placed on the East Parcel, using the right-of-way instead of 
a public street. The same requirements to obtain a building permit that were 
imposed on West Parcel in 1983 were imposed on the East Parcel in 1986. (Record 
at 276-77) The requirement to join in hard surfacing the road, curb, gutter and 
sidewalk "should any future development be made" indicated some potential that the 
right-of-way would become a public road. 
Beginning in 1988, and increasing after the death of Paul Cragun, some 
members of the extended Cragun family increased pressure on the Spencers to sell 
their property to them. Ray Johnson, a son-in law to [Earl] Cragun, a developer of 
Cherrywood Condominiums, Inc. and Gordon Cragun, son to Paul Cragun, wanted 
the Spencers property to be included in the Cherrywood development and, thereby 
eliminate the right-of-way. Their offer to purchase Spencers' property for $7,500 
was refused because Spencers had been offered considerably more for the same 
property by others if a building permit was available. (Record at 271, 278) 
On May 24,1990 the City of Pleasant View approved as "Hi Jolley, Lane Patio 
Home Subdivision" a proposed development south of the Spencers' property. After 
City Council approval on May 14, 1991, the City recorded Phase I of this 
development, which would later be called Cherrywood Manor. (Record at 271) 
During the construction of the first phase, the Spencers were threatened by Ray 
Johnson that if they did not sell to Craguns, (the developers of Cherrywood), that the 
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Craguns would make sure the property was landlocked and could never be sold as 
residential property. (Record at 271-72; 278-79) 
On May 25, 1992, the City approved Phase III of the Cherrywood 
development. It was recorded by the City on September 18,1992. The City allowed 
the platted development to overlay the recorded right-of-way owned by Spencers 
(and others) that the City had previously given variance approval to temporarily 
serve in place of a public road. (Record at 272, 279) Thereafter, because the 
Cherrywood was allowed to create a private road bordering the Spencers' property in 
lieu of further developing the public road and thoroughfare already partially built, the 
right-of-way did not become part of a public road as some may have anticipated. 
(Record at 271) 
The variances previously granted by the City allowing Spencers to use the 
right-of-way rather than a public road were revoked without hearings in 1993 and 
1995. (Record at 699, page 39 line 25 - page 40, line 2) As to the West Parcel, five 
months after the recording of Cherrywood Phase III, on February 8,1993 the City, 
through its mayor, and on advice of counsel, told the Spencers' successor-in-interest 
that a building permit would not be issued because the surrounding property use had 
changed, ten years was not a reasonable time to wait to develop after receiving a 
variance, and none of the stipulations were followed. (Record at 273) From August 
through November of 1993, Spencers tried to close on a sale but could not because 
of the inability to obtain a building permit. (Record at 273-74) As to the East Parcel, 
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on May 19,1995, counsel for the City returned to the Spencers their application to 
the Board of Adjustment for a renewal of the original variance granted in 1986 
because even though Board of Adjustment authority to grant "special exceptions" 
was allowed by the City Code, the City had not adopted any standards to determine 
what was a "special exception." Spencers were also told that "the [original] action 
taken over eight years ago by the board of adjustment has no bearing on what the 
current board of adjustment may do." (Record at 281, 304) 
After their variances were revoked, Spencers were unable to secure leave 
from the City to develop their property. Their efforts were hampered by the City in at 
least three ways. 
First, the City conditioned Spencers' right of access to the City for approval of 
future development upon Spencers' resolution of a title problem that had been 
created when the City recorded the approved plat for Cherrywood Phase III. Prior to 
allowing Spencers to be heard on their request for issuance of building permits, 
ministerial or policy making bodies of the City imposed on Spencers the affirmative 
burden of resolving vis-a-vis Cherrywood the problems caused by the City's 
recording of Phase III of Cherrywood over the Spencers' right-of-way. This occurred 
on May 11,1993, (Record at 274), May 19,1995 (Record at 274), October 21,1966 
(Record at 281), November 21, 1996 (Record at 274), and January 16, 1997 
(Record at 282). During these time periods, both parties took action they deemed 
appropriate in an effort to address the problem of the Cherrywood Phase III overlay 
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of Spencer's right-of-way. 
For example, the Spencers prepared a plan with a turn-a-round specifically at 
the City's suggestion. Nonetheless, on September 30, 1994, the City denied the 
request to develop with a turn-a-round. (Record at 280). 
Thereafter, between the November 1996 and January 1997 directives placing 
the burden on the Spencers to resolve the City induced Cherrywood conflict on the 
Spencers, Dennis Spencer had met with counsel for the City and thought he had 
resolved matters to the City's satisfaction. 
In addition, a week or ten days prior to the January 16, 1997 Planning 
Commission meeting, the Spencers met with Frank Maughan, a Planning 
Commission member, to discuss their concern over the actions of Teri Cragun 
relative to the development of their property. Spencers understood Mr. Maughan to 
agree that it seemed a conflict of interest existed because of the family connections 
to Cherrywood and it would be appropriate to have another city employee make the 
decisions on Spencers' development. Believing he could make the request at a 
public meeting, at the January 16, 1997 Commission meeting, Dennis Spencer 
asked to have Teri Cragun removed from decision-making authority over his property 
because the "City had allowed Teri Cragun to use her official position to benefit her 
family's development of the Cherrywood development at [Spencers'] expense." The 
Spencers' understanding of their discussion with outside counsel for the City and 
Frank Maughan either was erroneous or the relative positions of each had changed 
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in the interim. This is most evident by what occurred at the January 16, 1997 
Planning Commission meeting: the Planning Commission still imposed on Spencers 
the burden of resolving the City induced Cherrywood conflict; Frank Maughan 
publicly denounced Dennis Spencer for his statements regarding Teri Cragun; and 
Teri Cragun remained unwilling to define with clarity what Spencers had to do to 
qualify for the issuance of building permits. (Record at 282-285) 
Making the challenges needed to be worked out with Cherrywood worse, in 
June of 1997, City Engineer O. Neil Smith wrote to Teri Cragun, stating that the 
drawings submitted by Spencers with a retention pond would discharge water onto 
the Cherrywood development and require an easement and signed agreement with 
Cherrywood. In fact, there was no City requirement that a retention pond be 
provided for a lot or lots the size and slope of the Spencers' property. Furthermore, 
the natural stream bed to which the retention pond would direct water exits 
Spencers' property to the west and not the south towards Cherrywood. (Record at 
286) 
Finally, not only was there conflict between Spencers and City officials and 
staff in public meetings and internal memos, but there was conflict outside public 
meetings as well. On November 8,1995, the City police arrested Dennis Spencer for 
vehicular trespass on the right-of-way. Despite the actual knowledge of and prior 
receipt by Police Chief Rex Cragun of Spencers' recorded right-of-way, this arrest 
had the knowledge and approval of Chief Cragun. Later, Dennis Spencer was 
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required to appear in Justice Court before the charges were dismissed by the City 
prosecutor. No other City resident had been subjected to such treatment by the 
police force. (Record at 289-91) Regardless of the source or intent of the conflict, 
the Cherrywood conflict with the Spencers' right-of-way remained unresolved. 
(Because of these difficulties, Spencers' former legal counsel filed an action against 
the City on May 2, 1996, alleging many of the legal claims made in this litigation. 
The case was dismissed without prejudice on January 15, 1999. (Record at 276, 
281)) 
Second, notwithstanding the previous 1984 determination that the Spencers 
development of the West Parcel did not have to comply with the subdivision 
ordinances, (Record at 269), with an earnest money agreement in hand, on October 
23, 1993, Spencers were told by the City that no building permit would be issued 
because the access to the property was by right-of-way rather than a public road. As 
a result of the conduct of the City, the sale was lost. (Record 273-74) Thereafter, on 
February 17,1997, Teri Cragun notified Dennis Spencer that until the access way to 
the two lot development was a dedicated city street, the proposed subdivision would 
not be placed on the Planning Commission Calendar. (Record at 285.) Because a 
private rather than public road was used in and to Phase III of Cherrywood, and that 
the private, residential development around Spencers' property were accessed by 
other means than a public road that had the capability to access Spencers' property 
without infringing on other private property, it was impossible to comply with this 
12 
requirement. (Record at 699, page 32, line 8 - page 34, line 8.) 
Third, on January 16,1997, the Spencers were facing a myriad of undefined 
and changing requirements by the City for development. For example, the Spencers 
prepared a plan with a turn-a-round specifically at the City's suggestion. 
Nonetheless, on September 30,1994, the City denied the request to develop with a 
turn-a-round. (Record at 280). At the January 16, 1997 Planning Commission 
meeting, even when asked by a member of the Commission, Teri Cragun refused to 
specify with finality what the Spencers had to do to comply with the ordinances to be 
allowed to develop their property. (Record at 283-84) Thereafter, contrary to earlier 
representations, on March 11, 1998 and May 14, 1998, the City Engineer Mark 
Miller, advised the City that no building lot could be approved on Spencers' land. 
(Record at 286) 
Finally, on June 16, 1998, the Planning Commission held a hearing on 
Spencers' requests, approved issuance of building permits subject to the approval of 
the Board of Adjustments to use the right-of-way instead of a public road. (Record 
at 287) After a hearing on July 14,1998, on July 28,1998 the Board of Adjustment 
denied the variance because it (1) disagreed with a factual finding made by the 
Planning Commission and (2) found there was no reason why a public street could 
not be built to access and provide frontage to the Spencers' property. (Record at 
239-40.) 
On August 6, 1998 an appeal was filed with the Second District Court 
13 
challenging the illegal, arbitrary and capricious nature of the City's conduct. The 
complaint also made various constitutional and common-law claims under state and 
federal law, reserving the right to file a notice of claim under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. (Record at 1-82) On May 28,1999 the Spencers' filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment asserting that their rights to the original variances were 
protected as a matter of federal law. (Record at 101-103; 106-121.) On July 27, 
1999 a Notice of Claim was filed on behalf of the Spencers with appropriate City 
officials and their counsel. (Record at 594.) On December 20,1999, the City gave 
notice of its tender of two building permits to the Spencers and suggested mootness. 
In this notice, the City specifically disclaimed a legal duty to issue the building 
permits or any liability for not having done so in the past. (Record at 196.) 
Thereafter, both the Spencers and the City filed cross motions for summary 
judgment. On July 12,2000, during oral argument, counsel for the City stated that 
"the issuance of the two transferable building permits for the two parcels can be 
incorporated in an order to the court." (Record 699, page 20, lines 7-11; see also 
page 5, line 23 - page 6, line 7.) Counsel for Spencers specifically requested that 
the Court incorporate the building permit question into the trial court's ruling or order. 
(Record 699, page 50, line 5 - page 51, line 2) Post-hearing information was 
submitted in support of and against the claim of the Spencers to a refund of $1,260 
from the City that had been tendered as a fee for outside counsel review of 
Spencers' submissions to the City after the variances had been vacated. (Record at 
14 
487-502.) The City agreed to a refund of those monies as well. (Record at 496-502.) 
On November 28,2000, the City's motion for summary judgment was granted 
and Spencers' remaining claims dismissed. In the court's decision, the trial court 
addressed the issuance of the building permits as follows: 
The first issue, in both motions, is Plaintiffs' request for the issuance of 
two building permits. Since the Defendant has agreed to issue the 
requested building permits, that issue is now moot. 
As to the refund of $1,260.00, the trial court said as follows: 
The eighth issue, raised in the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, is that Plaintiffs' were inappropriately required to pay 
$1,260.00 in attorney fees on behalf of the Defendant. The Defendant, 
although critical of Plaintiffs scarcity of proof on the issue of payments 
and receipts, has agreed to reimburse the Plaintiffs the $1,260.00. 
Therefore, the issue is moot. 
Finally, as to Spencers' constitutional claims, the trial court found that they "are 
premature and have no factual or legal basis to support them." The Entry of 
Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal entered on November 28, 2000 
incorporated the Court's Decision of October 2, 2000. (Record at 508-511) 
As the November 28,2000 order did not dispose of all parties to the litigation, 
on March 5, 2001, Spencers filed a motion to revise the Court's previous entry of 
summary judgment. On September 28,2001, the trial court filed a decision denying 
Spencers' motion. 
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While addressing this motion to revise the earlier decision, the trial Court 
clarified various aspects of its original opinion. While the trial court recognized that 
the Spencers' due process and equal protection claims arose from Pleasant View 
City's refusal to issue building permits, the trial court said the tendering of the 
permits by the City made "the plaintiff's constitutional claims now premature," and 
eliminated the requirement to address the impact of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4) 
on the variances previously granted by the City to the Spencers. 
The trial court also found that "[s]ince the City of Pleasant View offered to 
issue the permits to the plaintiffs, there was no evidence alleged that would support 
a finding that the plaintiffs had been otherwise damaged." In doing so, the Court 
overlooked the pleadings, Affidavit of Dennis Spencer, and memoranda that 
specifically recited damages that arose because of the conduct of the City and their 
employees. 
Besides alleging that "numerous sales were lost for all of the parcels in 
question because of the inability to obtain building permits and the specific 
representations of City employees that no building permit would ever be issued," 
(Record at 292), the Spencers specifically identified two sales that were lost because 
of the City's revocation of the original building permits. On or about October 16, 
1993, the Spencers had a written earnest money agreement to sell a portion of 
parcel 16-023-0004 for $24,900. On October 23,1993, a special meeting was held 
with the City and Spencers. The City indicated that no building permit would be 
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issued because the access to the property was by a private right-of-way rather than 
a public road. As a result of the conduct of the City, the sale was lost. (Record at 
273-74) Thereafter, in 1996, Spencers were orally offered $148,000 for the 
properties. The sole requirement to memorialize the offer in writing was a 
representation by the City that a building permit could be obtained. "The failure of the 
City to allow that any person owning the property could comply with the terms of the 
variance that had been previously granted cost me the sale." (Record at 292) 
In addition, the Spencers documented the following special and general 
damages: 
[0]ver [$15,000] in legal fees and $390.00 in court costs trying to clear 
title and protect our property interests to the variances previously 
granted by the City to the parcels in question but subsequently 
slandered to the Spencers, Parkers, and prospective builders of 
purchasers by the City, its staff, their counsel and other employees; 
[R]epurchas[ing] of both parcels originally purchased by Parkers on the 
reliance of the City's promised building permit for Parcel # 1, at a cost 
of approximately $10,000 more than we had sold the original parcel for, 
all because of the inability to obtain a permit for the same from the City. 
[Spencers] are paying principal and interest at this time for this 
obligation; 
$1,260 under protest to the City for additional time [the City's] attorney 
spent creating obstacles to our efforts to overcome the City's post-
variance slandering of our property; 
[0]ver $8,700 in engineering costs [above the $1,000 that would have 
been spent in securing normal course of approval] trying to comply with 
repeated changes requested by the City and its post-variance staff; and 
[Thousands of hours of time, thousands miles [of travel], in addition to 
experiencing significant emotional distress as a couple and family, all 
because of a fifteen year inability to develop property on which a 
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variance had already been granted, which inability has damaged us in 
an amount to be shown at trial. 
(Record at 291-93). 
As to a claim for equitable relief to force the City to issue the permits on 
grounds of denial of due process and equal protection, the trial court found "[o]nce 
those permits were issued, those claims became moot." The Court overlooked 
Spencers' assertion that the tender and claim of mootness "is not applicable 
because the Spencers have not yet received the two building permits indicated in the 
City's filings." (Record at 238) Relying on the prior determination that there was no 
factual or legal basis to support Plaintiffs' constitutional claims, "there were no 
constitutional claims to be addressed that arose from the variance issue." 
Attorney fees were not applicable because the Spencers were "not prevailing 
parties." 
A final order again dismissing Spencers' claims was filed October 30, 2001 
and incorporated by reference the trial court's memorandum decision of September 
28, 2001. (Record at 677-79.) 
On November 19, 2001, this appeal was filed by the Spencers. (Record at 
687-91) 
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Legal Analysis 
Notwithstanding the trial court's determination that claims for damages, 
equitable relief, attorney fees, and costs were not applicable because of the City's 
tendering building permits and monies to the Spencers, a careful examination of the 
record shows that (1) the court documents provided a "material alteration in the legal 
relationship of the parties", (2) it is not clear that the trial court will not yet have to 
enforce the agreement of the parties, and (3) Spencers' claims for damages are 
valid as a matter of federal and state law. As a result, as prevailing parties, 
Spencers are entitled to fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and an opportunity 
to present evidence as to their damages. 
I. Spencers Are Prevailing Parties Because of the 
Material Alteration In the Legal Relationship 
Of the Parties2 
The United States Supreme Court has allowed award of attorney fees to be 
made under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when there is a "material alteration of the legal 
relationship of the parties".3 Where there is no judgment on the merits, the Court 
has held 
that settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may be 
the basis for an award of attorney fees... .Although a consent decree 
does not always include an admission of liability by the defendant, ...it 
2
 This issue was referred to in the Spencers response to the City's post-
argument citation of the Buckhannon Board and Care Home case, infra, footnote 
3. (Record at 592-93.) 
3
 Buckhannon Board and Health Care Home. Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Services, 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001). 
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nonetheless is a court-ordered "change in the legal relationship 
between [the plaintiff] and the defendant."4 
At oral argument before the trial court, the City specifically agreed that "the issuance 
of the two transferable building permits [approvals] for the two parcels can be 
incorporated in an order to the court." (Record 699, page 20, lines 7-11; see also 
page 5, line 23 - page 6, line 7) Counsel for Spencers specifically requested that 
the Court incorporate the building permit question into the trial court's ruling or order. 
(Record 699, page 50, line 5 - page 51, line 2.) 
On November 28,2000, the City's motion for summary judgment was granted, 
dismissing Spencers' claims. However, in the court's decision, the trial court 
addressed the issuance of the building permits as follows: 
The first issue, in both motions, is Plaintiffs' request for the issuance of 
two building permits. Since the Defendant has agreed to issue the 
requested building permits, that issue is now moot. 
As to the refund of $1,260.00, the trial court said as follows: 
The eighth issue, raised in the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, is that Plaintiffs' were inappropriately required to pay 
$1,260.00 in attorney fees on behalf of the Defendant. The Defendant, 
although critical of Plaintiff's scarcity of proof on the issue of payments 
and receipts, has agreed to reimburse the Plaintiffs the $1,260.00. 
Therefore, the issue is moot. 
The Entry of Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal entered on November 28, 
2000 incorporated the Court's Decision of October 2, 2000. Thus, at this stage of 
the litigation, by reference in the order of the trial court, the City's tendering of the 
4 jd. 
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building permits and refund of certain monies as explained in the October 2, 2000 
memorandum were made part of the order of the trial court. 
As the November 28,2000 order did not dispose of all parties to the litigation, 
on March 5, 2001, Spencers' filed a motion to revise the Court's previous entry of 
summary judgment. In the trial court's decision of September 28, 2001 addressing 
this motion to revise the earlier decision, the trial Court continued to base significant 
portions of its rulings on the agreement of the City to tender the building permits and 
disputed funds. The trial court said the tendering of the permits and funds by the 
City made "the plaintiff's constitutional claims now premature," and eliminated the 
requirement to address the impact of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4) on the 
variances granted by the City to the Spencers. "Since the City of Pleasant View 
offered to issue the permits to the plaintiffs, there was no evidence alleged that 
would support a finding that the plaintiffs had been otherwise damaged." As to a 
claim for equitable relief to force the City to issue the permits on grounds of denial of 
due process and equal protection, the trial court found "[o]nce those permits were 
issued, those claims became moot." A final order again dismissing Spencers' claims 
was filed October 30, 2001 and incorporated by reference the trial court's 
memorandum decision of September 28, 2001. 
Thus, (even though for reasons cited below, the trial court erroneously 
concluded that Spencers had not stated a federal constitutional claim for equitable 
or monetary relief,) because both orders of the trial court relative to Spencers' claims 
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incorporated by reference the memoranda of the trial court where the agreement to 
tender the building permits and the reimbursement of the disputed monies was 
judicially acknowledged, the Spencers obtained a material alteration in their legal 
relationship with the City that was not present when the litigation began. 
As such, they are "prevailing parties" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
II. The Spencers' Request For Equitable Relief Under Federal Law 
Is Not Moot By Reason of the City's Tender of the Right to Submit 
"Appropriate and Sufficient Applications" for Building Permits5 
In 2000, the United States Supreme Court reviewed as a matter of federal law, 
how cessation of a challenged practice may moot a present proceeding: 
It is well settled that 'a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged 
practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the 
legality of the practice.' . . .'If it did, the courts would be compelled to 
leave 'the defendant.. .free to return to his old ways.' In accordance 
with this principle, the standard we have announced for determining 
whether a case has been mooted by the defendant's voluntary conduct 
is stringent: 'A case might become moot if subsequent events made it 
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not 
reasonably be expected to recur.'.. The 'heavy burden of persuading' 
the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to 
start up again lies with the party asserting mootness.6 
The trial court's assumption that "[sjince the Defendant has agreed to issue 
the requested buildings permits, that issue is now moot" overlooks three things. 
5
 This issue was referred to in the Spencers response to the City's post-
argument citation of the Buckhannon Board and Care Home case, supra, 
footnote 3. (Record at 592-93.) This case reviews Friends of the Earth as binding 
precedent when no damages have been claimed by a plaintiff and the defendant 
ceases the complained of practices. See footnote 3, supra, at 609. 
6
 Friends of the Earth. Incorporated vs. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(TOO. Inc., 528 U.S. 167,189 (2000). 
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First, the City "decided to grant Spencers permission to build on the two parcels and 
to obtain the necessary building permits upon submission of appropriate and 
sufficient applications." (Record at 197-98) Second, the Spencers specifically 
raised the issue that the Notice, Tender and Suggestion of Mootness was not 
applicable at all because "the Spencers have not yet received the two building 
permits indicated in the City's filings." (Record at 238) Third, a case can only 
become moot when it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could 
not reasonably be expected to recur." Based on (1) the prior claims by Spencers of 
the illegal, arbitrary and capricious conduct of the City, and (2) the trial court's failure 
to either set the matter for evidentiary hearing or find a legal basis for equitable 
relief, and the City has not met its "heavy burden of persuasion" to show that it is 
"absolutely clear" that illegal, arbitrary or capricious conduct of the City could not 
begin anew. 
For all of the foregoing, the Spencers' claims for relief under federal law are 
not moot by reason of the City's tender of the permits only after receipt of 
"appropriate and sufficient applications". 
III. Spencers' Damages Arising From Violation 
of Federally Protected Rights Are Not Moot 
The trial court erroneously concluded that because the City's conduct may 
have mooted equitable relief sought by the Spencers that damages were also not 
shown. "[S]o long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, a defendant's 
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change in conduct will not moot the case."7 "To make a claim for deprivation of 
property without due process of law under the United States Constitution, a plaintiff 
must both show a property interest and a deprivation of that interest by the State 
without the required legal process."8 
A. The Spencers Had Property Interests Protected 
By Federal Law 
The Spencers were entitled to protection under the United States Constitution 
for both their property interest in the original variances as issued as well as their 
interest in the property that the variances were to serve. 
1. Spencers' Original Variances Merit Federal Protection 
To show entitlement to protection under the United States Constitution, the 
Spencers must show that the City was limited in what it could do after having granted 
the original variances to Spencers. 
A property interest protected by the due process clause results from a 
legitimate claim of entitlement created and defined 'by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source, such as state 
law. ' . . . When analyzing whether a plaintiff presents a legitimate claim 
of entitlement, we focus on the degree of discretion given the decision 
maker and not the probability of the decision's favorable outcome 
Appellants must therefore demonstrate that there is a set of conditions 
the fulfillment of which would give rise to a legitimate expectation.... 
Otherwise, the city's decision making lacks sufficient substantive 
limitations to invoke due process guarantees.9 
7
 Id 
8
 Harper v.Summit County. 2001 UT 10 f30; 26 P.3d 193 
9
 Jacobs. Vosconsi & Jacobs Co. V. City of Lawrence. 927 F.2d 1111, 
1115-1116(10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted.) 
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Spencers can show these "substantive limitations" in two ways. First, the variances 
contained no limitation to their use. Second, intervening state law provided that 
variances would "run with the land." 
a. As Written, Spencers' Variances Were Not Subject to Revocation10 
On the face of the granted variances, there are no time or performance 
constraints limiting their application to the Spencers' property. No City ordinance, 
state statute, or judicial opinion indicated a City was required to place a time 
limitation on a variance that was being granted. 
[Bjecause zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's 
common law right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions 
therein restricting property uses should be strictly construed, and 
provisions permitting property uses should be liberally construed in 
favor of the property owner.11 
Because the need to request a variance was in derogation of the Spencer's common 
law rights, the granting of the same and its terms should be strictly construed against 
the City. Since the City imposed no time limit on the variances, none should have 
been imposed unilaterally by the City at a later date. 
b. Spencers' Variances Were Protected by Subsequent 
Statutory Enactment12 
In 1991, the State of Utah revised the state statutes that governed the Board 
10
 This argument was made in Record 239-41 and 545-56. 
11
 Brown v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah Ct. 
App.), (citation omitted), cert, denied 982 P.2d 88 (1998). 
12
 This argument was made in Record 239-242. 
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of Adjustments. In the statutory amendments, a provision was included which stated 
"[vjariances run with the land."13 At no time prior to the effective date of the statute 
did the City indicate to Spencers that their variances would have to be re-applied for. 
There is no case law in Utah determining whether or not the legislative 
judgment that "variances run with the land" applies to variances that were in force at 
the time of its effective date. However, in this case, there is a "clear and unavoidable 
implication that the statute operates on events already in the past,"14 i.e. there is no 
distinction made between variances presently in existence and those that are 
allowed after the adoption of the amendments. The statement that "[vjariances run 
with the land" states a principle: any variance in effect at that time or granted in the 
future ran with the land. 
This interpretation finds support in precedent that that broadly interprets 
statutes that directly or impliedly limit the authority of a City to take action. 
[A]ny fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of the 
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation (city) and the 
power denied; grants of power to the cities are strictly construed to the 
exclusion of implied powers [T]he state may always invade the field 
of regulation delegated to the cities and supercede, annul, or enlarge 
the regulation which the municipality has attempted. It may modify or 
recall the police power of the city as it may abolish the city itself.15 
13
 Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4). Similar language was included with the 
provisions governing variances granted on a county level. See Utah Code Ann. § 
17-27-707(4). 
14
 Evans and Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.. 953 
P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997). 
15
 Allqood v. Larson. 545 P.2d 530, 531-532 (Utah 1976). 
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"If there is a reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a particular power, that 
doubt should be resolved against the city, and the power should be denied."16 
As state law established that variances were to run with the land, the City's 
conduct in revoking the previously granted variances to the West and East Parcels 
not only violated Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4) but also violated the provisions of 
the Supremacy Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article XI § 5. (Because the City 
violated a mandatory statute that directly impacted a property interest of Spencers, 
the Spencers had standing to seek equitable enforcement of Article XI § 5 against 
the City.)17 
Based on all of the foregoing, the City's discretion to unilaterally revoke the 
variances granted to the West and East Parcels was non-existent under state law. 
2. The Spencers Right of Access for Subsequent Development 
Was Protected As a Matter of Federal Law 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right to a variance 
without requiring a "taking" of one's property.18 Unfortunately, the conduct of the City 
after the revocation of the original variances demonstrated direct interference with 
Spencers' due process rights regarding their recorded right-of-way and their right to 
16
 Nance v. Mayflower Tavern. Inc.. 106 Utah 517, 520; 150 P.2d 773, 774 
(1944). 
17
 See cases cited in footnotes 15-16, supra. 
18
 See Dolanv. Citvof Tiqard. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
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have access to the City entities charged with supervising the development of the 
West and East parcels. This can be shown in three ways. 
a. The City Denied Spencers' Due Process By Conditioning 
Their Right to Apply for Development on Their 
Resolution of a City Created Problem 
On May 25, 1992, the City approved Phase III of the Cherrywood 
development. It was recorded by the City on September 18,1992. The City allowed 
the platted development to overlay the recorded right-of-way owned by Spencers 
(and others) to which the City had previously given variance approval to serve in 
place of a public road. Because of the use of a private road by Cherrywood, the 
anticipated public road over Spencers' right-of-way did not materialize. 
Once the original variances were unilaterally revoked by the City, prior to 
allowing Spencers to be heard on their request for issuance of building permits, 
ministerial staff or policy making bodies of the City imposed on Spencers the 
affirmative burden of resolving vis-a-vis Cherrywood the problems caused by the 
City's recording of Phase III of Cherrywood over the Spencers' right-of-way. This 
occurred officially at least five times between May of 1993 and January of 1997, and 
indirectly through the conduct of Police Chief Rex Cragun, a policy maker for the 
19
 Chief Cragun is a policy maker for the City because he maintains the 
same authority as a county sheriff within City limits. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-913. 
The authority of a county sheriff has been interpreted as making the Sheriff a 
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Thus, whether the City would have granted Spencers a variance or not, or 
approved a proposal for development, the Spencers were denied procedural due 
process of law in that their right of access to the City procedures for approval was 
denied until the Spencers resolved the City-created problem between their property 
and that of Cherrywood. 
b. The Arbitrary and Capricious Action of the City 
Violated Substantive Due Process Rights 
Besides being illegal, the Spencers objected to the arbitrary and capricious 
actions of the City that denied them substantive due process of law.20 This can be 
shown in at least two ways. 
(i). Actions Were Undertaken for Private Rather Than Public Good 
Spencers were consistent in their claim that the "City had allowed Teri Cragun 
to use her official position to benefit her family's development of the Cherrywood 
development at [Spencers'] expense." (Record at 284.) The City's requirement that 
Spencers resolve the City's error of platting over Spencers' right-of-way - and 
denying them the right to be heard until they did - denied them due process of law 
by limiting their access to the City procedures for securing developmental approval. 
The same conduct, however, also infringed on Spencer's right to use their deeded 
policy maker of the County. See J.B. v. Washington County. 127 F.3d 919, 924 
n.5 (10th Cir. 1997). 
20This claim is stated in the complaint because Count II alleging a denial of 
due process under the United States and Utah constitutions incorporates by 
reference the allegation in Count I, of arbitrary and capricious decision-making by 
the City. (Record at 13) 
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and recorded right-of-way solely because the City had allowed the Phase III plat t< 
be recorded over Spencers' property interest, all for the benefit of private rather thai 
public purposes. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[a] purely private taking cou| 
not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimati 
purpose of government and would thus be void."21 "[0]ne's person property may nc 
be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose 
even though compensation be paid."22 Not only was no compensation paid, but th 
nullification of Spencers' right-or-way (without or without the variance approval) wa. 
null and void because it benefited a private rather than public purpose. 
(ii). Actions Were Not Related to Rationale Proffered for Conduct23 
After unilateral revocation of the variances, the Spencers were required to n 
submit a variety of alternate proposals for development. Besides the constar 
requirement that the Cherrywood Phase III plat problem be resolved prior to ar1 
hearing on Spencers' requests, the additional requirements were impossible 
perform or were and are arbitrarily ever changing. 
For example, directives were given to Spencers that they had to put a publ 
road in for their development even though all of the adjoining properties were eith< 
accessed by a private road or the entrance to the property was from a different sic 
21
 Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 220, 245 (1984). 
22
 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937). 
23
 This argument was made in the Record at 248. 
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of the property than that available to Spencers. Not only was the requirement 
inconsistent with the area, but with existing development, it was impossible. 
Furthermore, changing and undefined standards for development are by their 
nature arbitrary and capricious. In January 1997, even when asked by a Planning 
Commission member too do so, Teri Cragun refused to specify with finality what the 
Spencers had to do to comply with the ordinances to be allowed to develop their 
property. Thereafter, in the spring of 1998, contrary to earlier representations, the 
City Engineer advised the City that no building lot could be approved on Spencers' 
land. By the summer of 1998, the Board of Adjustments acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously when it sought to reverse a factual finding of the Planning Commission, 
(an act outside its authority), and again imposed the burden of an impossible act on 
the Spencers. 
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court upheld damages awarded by a jury 
to a developer that repeatedly submitted plans, and modified plans, and re-submitted 
them to meet the changing demands of the City when all of the efforts over a period 
of years resulted in no issuance of any building approval. 
[T]he jury. . .was not asked to evaluate the city's decision in 
isolation but rather in context, and, in particular in light of the tortuous 
and protracted history of attempts to develop the property. . . .[T]he 
question submitted to the jury on this issue was confined to, whether in 
light of all the history and context of this case, the city's particular 
decision to deny Del Monte Dunes' final development proposal was 
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reasonably related to the City's proffered justifications. 
Like the developers in Del Monte Dunes, the Spencers similarly qualify for a factual 
evaluation by a trier-of-fact of their efforts and the City's illegal, arbitrary and 
capricious refusal to issue them a building permit under any condition. 
B. Spencers' Demonstrated Sufficient Damages By Violation of Their 
Federally Protected Interests In Variances, Right-of-Way and Access 
to the Opportunity to Develop, to Withstand Summary Judgment 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that nominal damages are 
appropriate when no evidence of damages has been submitted25 or a violation of 
duty occurred without causing actual damage.26 Nominal damages are available for 
due process violations of the United States Constitution when there is no evidence of 
actual injury.27 Because the record showed the City violated Spencers state and 
federal constitutional rights, nominal damages were available to the Spencers. A 
litigant can be a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 with only a showing of 
"nominal damages."28 
The $1,260 repaid by the City was a portion of the damages claimed by 
Spencers, damages which never would have arisen had not the City denied 
24
 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 706 
(1999). 
25
 In re Estate of Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d 969, 961 (Utah 1996). 
26
 Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurrav & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 n.7 
(Utah 1978). 
27
 Carey v. Piphus. 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978). 
28
 See Farrarv. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103,113 S.Ct. 556121 L.Ed.2d 494, 
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Spencers their federally protected right to the original variances. 
Besides alleging that "numerous sales were lost for all of the parcels in 
question because of the inability to obtain building permits and the specific 
representations of City employees that no building permit would ever be issued," the 
Spencers specifically identified two sales in 1993 and 1996 that were lost because of 
the City's revocation of the original building permits. Spencers also alleged the 
various specific and general damages flowing from the City's illegal, arbitrary and 
capricious conduct. All are sufficient to show the existence of damages that the 
Spencers suffered by reason of the City's revocation of and subsequent refusal to 
issue the variances that were needed to develop Spencers' property. 
IV. Spencers Are Entitled to Claim Damages Under 
the Utah Constitution 
The trial court found that the City had not raised governmental immunity as a 
defense to the Spencers' claims of violation of the Utah Constitution. (Record at 
598.) 
A. Spencers Satisfy the Criteria for Damages 
Under Article I § 7 
"Utah's constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially the same as 
the due process guarantees contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution."29 
(1992). This issue was raised at Record at 699, page 42, lines 14-19.) 
29
 In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996). 
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Due process of law in each particular case means such an exercise of 
the powers of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and 
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual 
rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the 
one in question belongs.30 
In 1999, the Utah Supreme Court determined that those seeking to show a failure of 
a City to follow mandatory law must also show that 
they were prejudiced by the City's noncompliance with its ordinances 
[or state law] or, in other words, how, if at all, the City's decision would 
have been different and what relief, if any, they are entitled to as a 
result.31 
In denying the Spencers or their predecessors in interest building permits when they 
were requested, Spencers were damaged by reason of loss of sales, the expenses 
of re-petitioning and seeking redress from the City and this litigation, as well as the 
emotional trauma that they were required to go through. 
In 2000, the Utah Supreme Court announced a three part test to obtain 
damages under the due process clause of the Utah Constitution. First, there must 
be a "flagrant" violation of 'clearly established' constitutional rights. Second, 
equitable remedies do not address injuries suffered. Third, equitable relief was and 
is wholly inadequate to protect plaintiffs' rights or redress his or her injuries.32 
30
 Trade Commission v. Skaqqs Drug Center, Inc., 446 P.2d 958, 965 
(Utah 1968) (footnote omitted). 
31
 Sprinqville Citizens for A Better Community v. City of Sprinqville. 979 
P.2d 332 (Utah 1999). 
32
 See Spackman v. Board of Education of Box Elder School District. 2000 
UT87;16P.3d533(2000). 
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Spencers have satisfied all three tests. First, previous citations to federal and 
state case law and statute that prohibit the actions of the City vis-a-vis the Spencers, 
demonstrate a "flagrant" violation of 'clearly established' constitutional rights. 
Second, the evidence of specific and general damages suffered by Spencers show 
that equitable remedies do not address injuries suffered. Third, as shown by the 
"tortuous and protracted history of attempts to develop the property,"33 equitable 
relief was and remains wholly inadequate to protect Spencers' rights and redress 
their injuries. 
B. Spencers Satisfy the Criteria for Damages Under 
Article I § 22 
In 1990, the Utah Supreme Court found that the provisions of Article I § 22 
were self-executing.34 The protections afforded by Article I § 22 afford "perhaps even 
more [protection than its federal counterpart] due to its more expansive language."35 
Spencers satisfy the two step analysis required under Article I § 22. 
First, the Spencers demonstrate "some protectible interest in property."36 As 
noted heretofore, the Spencers have an ownership right in the West and East 
Parcels and the variance that allowed the use of a right-of-way instead of a public 
33
 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, supra, at 526 
U.S. at 706. 
34
 See Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). 
35
 Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 
877 (Utah 1996). 
36Qfi.cit. at 625. 
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road directly south of their property. As an easement qualifies as property subject to 
constitutional protection,37 a variance to use a right-of-way should similarly be 
protected. 
Second, 
the [Spencers] must show that the interest has been "taken or 
damaged" by governmental action. A "taking" is "'any substantial 
interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens 
its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in 
any substantial degree abridged or destroyed.'"38 
The City's on-going refusal to issue a building permit has constituted a "permanent 
or recurring interference with property rights." This has occurred because instead of 
correcting its erroneous platting of Phase III of the Cherrywood development, (as 
allowed by Utah Code Ann. § § 10-9-808 - 810), the City has chosen to impose on 
Spencers the burden of correcting the errors. As Dennis Spencer told the Planning 
Commission, such conduct has the effect of benefiting the Cherrywood development 
and its owners, the Cragun family, at the expense of the Spencers. In addition, the 
City has imposed a requirement of a public road when the City's prior approvals of 
development in the area have made Spencers' fulfillment of such a requirement 
impossible to perform. Finally, the ever changing nature of requirements imposed 
on the Spencers prevented the development of both their right-of-way and residential 
37
 Twenty-Second Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. Oregon Short Line R.R.. 36 Utah 238, 247,103 P. 243, 246 (1909). 
38
 Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City, supra. 918 P.2d 
at 876 (citations omitted.) 
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properties. 
V. Spencers Properly Claim Damages for Slander of Title 
A. Compliance with Governmental Immunity Act 
In addition to violating Spencers' rights under the Utah Constitution, the 
Spencers claim that the City slandered the title of their variances and their right-of-
way and their variances. To bring this claim, Spencers need to give the City proper 
notice by filing a timely claim and allege conduct that regarding which immunity is not 
preserved. 
1 . Spencers Gave Proper Notice to the City 
By statutory constraint, the Spencers are compelled to file an appeal from a 
municipal land use decision within thirty days. (See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001). 
When Spencers filed their complaint appealing the decision of the Board of 
Adjustments requiring them to have a public road as frontage to their property, the 
complaint pled that the actual notice of the claim would be filed within the one-year 
deadline. It was alleged in the complaint that the City acted negligently. Notice to the 
City was given within the one-year time limitation. No response was given by the City 
within the ninety-day period or thereafter. The parties proceeded to brief the 
Plaintiffs' slander of title claim. No claim of non-compliance with the notice 
requirement was made. 
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After the briefs were submitted on the trial level, in the case of Hall v. Utah 
State Department of Corrections, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the 
Governmental Immunity Act as requiring that 
[o]nce a plaintiff's notice of claim is filed, the Act continues to bar its 
initiation in court until the state either denies the claim in writing or fails 
to act for ninety days. . . .[Failing to do so,] deprive[s] [the City] of the 
opportunity to assess his allegations, and to decide, as required by the 
statute, whether to approve or deny the claim.39 
Unlike the time frame allowed in Hall where the Plaintiff could have both filed a 
notice of claim and pursued judicial redress under the six month filing requirement of 
the Whistleblower's Act, the Spencers had to file their litigation within thirty days. 
Were Spencers' to file Notice of their Claim, wait the ninety days for the City to 
respond, and then file their complaint, the thirty day statute of limitations under Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 would have expired, and the City's decision would have 
been unchallengeable. The procedure followed in this case preserved the policy 
reasons advocated in Hall and at the same time met the practicalities of the limited 
scope and nature of review afforded appellants from municipal land use decisions. 
2. Governmental Immunity Is Statutorily Waived For Quiet Title Actions 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6 provides that "[i]mmunity is waived for. . .any 
property real or personal.. .to quiet title thereto." 
3. Spencers Have Demonstrated A Prima Facie Case of Slander of Title 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that 
Hall v. Utah State Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 45 fflj 22, 26; 24 
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[t]o prove slander of title, a claimant must prove that (1) there was a 
publication of a slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title, (2) 
the statement was false, (3) the statement was made with malice, and 
(4) the statement caused actual or special damages.40 
The Spencers have shown that many times the City, its officials, counsel, or 
staff denigrated the validity of the Spencers' right to use the non-exclusive right-of-
way south of their property, the variance granted by the City as a pre-condition to the 
obtaining of a building permit, and any future right to obtain a building permit. 
Together, these "collective City statements" denigrated the validity of Spencers' real 
property. 
The collective City statements that Spencers could not use the recorded right-
of-way, obtain a building permit, and that their variance was invalid were false. 
Taken in context, the collective City statements that Spencers have identified 
raise the likelihood that the statements were made maliciously. 
Malice may be affirmatively proven or implied. Affirmative proof 
requires a showing that the wrong was done with an intent to injure, vex 
or annoy. Malice may be implied when a party knowingly and wrongfully 
records or publishes something untrue or spurious or which gives a 
false or misleading impression adverse to one's title under 
circumstances that it should reasonably foresee might result in damage 
to the owner of the property.41 
Finally, Spencers have shown special damages have arisen by reason of the 
P.3d 958 (2001). 
40
 First Security Bank v. Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253,1256-1257 
(Utah 1989). 
39 
false, collective statements of the City regarding their real property. 
Special damages are ordinarily proved in a slander of title action by 
evidencing a lost sale or the loss of some other pecuniary advantage... 
[or] a specific monetary loss flowing from a slander affecting the 
saleability or use of the property.. . . 
Spencers have claimed the conduct of the City has cost them "numerous sales" and 
specifically one in 1995 for one of the three parcels in the amount of $27,000 and 
one in 1996 for all three parcels in the amount of $138,000. As the litigation in both 
1996 and 1998 were filed to remove the cloud the City had placed on Spencers' 
ability to use their variances and right-of-way, attorney fees are recoverable as 
special damages.43 
CONCLUSION 
The City's tender to Spencers of the right to obtain two building permits for the 
West and East Parcels and partial refund of fees paid to the City does serve to moot 
some claims of the Spencers, it does not prevent Spencers from being a prevailing 
party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or prevent Spencers from a being entitled to a hearing 
on their claims for damages, attorney fees and costs. 
Because the City's tender was incorporated into the decisions and orders of 
41
 id-at 1257. 
42
 Bass v. Planned Management Services. Inc.. 761 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 
1988). 
43
 Dowse v. Doris Trust. 116 Utah 106,111 -112, 208 P.2d 956, 958-59 
(1949). 
40 
the Court, the Spencers are prevailing parties for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
Because the City failed to carry its burden to show that it was clearly evident 
there would not be a repeat of previous problems between the Spencers and the City 
as Spencers secured the proffered building permits, the Spencers' request for 
equitable relief is not moot. 
Because the Spencers property rights in the right-of-way, variances and the 
West and East Parcels were protected by non-discretionary constraints on the City, 
their property rights were protected by the United States Constitution's due process 
clause. They were also protected from arbitrary and capricious conduct regarding 
their property, such as conditioning their right of future development on their 
resolution of a problem caused by the City with Cherrywood, engaging in conduct 
that benefited private rather than public parties, and being free from years of an ever 
changing set of criteria and plans. 
Because Spencers placed in the record sufficient material facts to show 
nominal, special and general damages they incurred by reason of the conduct of the 
City that violated their federally protected rights, those protected by the Utah State 
Constitution, and properly pursued a claim against the City for slander of title, their 
claim for damages should not have been dismissed. 
Based on all of the foregoing, the trial court should be reversed and Spencers' 
claims for damages, attorney fees and costs should be heard. 
41 
t^h DATED and EXECUTED this 9xn day of October, 2002. 
DEXTER & DEXTER 
r. Matthew Hilton By: 
Attorneys for Spencers 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 9 day of October, 2002, under my direction the 
foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was hand delivered in appropriate 
quantity to the following persons: 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230 
(Seven copies and one original) 
Jody K. Burnett 
WILLIAMS & HUNT, PC 
257 East 200 South, #500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
(Two Copies) 
DATED and EXECUTED the 9th day of October, 2002. 
DEXTER & DEXTER 
By: Matthew Hilton 
Attorneys for Spencers 
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Matthew Hilton (#3655) 
MATTHEW HILTON, PC 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1220 North Mam Street # 5A 
P O Box 781 
Spnngville, UT 84663 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
2549 Washington Blvd 
Ogden, UT 84401 
bUG 0 j 
—oooOooo— 
DENNIS V SPENCER AND 
LINDAS SPENCER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, a 
Utah municipality, CHERRYWOOD 
MANOR, INC , a Utah Corporation, 
CHERRYWOOD MANOR HOME 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC , a 
Utah corporation, JOHN AND JANE 
DOES l-XX, individual defendants in 
their private capacities, 
Defendants 
COMPLAINT 
Case No C\%QC\C^3Z'S ^ 
Judge _ 
JURY TRIAL REQUESTED 
—oooOooo— 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, and complain of 
the Defendants as follows 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1 This is a dispute that has arisen because of the Pleasant View City, its official 
members of the City Council, Planning Commission Board of Adjustment, unidentified 
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official employees, (hereinafter referred to as "City"), have refused to allow a building 
permit to be issued pursuant to lawfully granted variances for development of specific 
property within the confines of the City and damaged Plaintiffs in other ways. Plaintiffs 
allege that the City has failed to apply its ordinances in accordance with the black letter 
of law of the City Code, the statutory and constitutional requirements of the State of Utah 
and the United States of America, and has sought to hold Plaintiffs responsible for major 
mistakes and errors the City has made in their development plans. 
2. This action has been filed within thirty days of July 28, 1998 when the City 
denied the appeal of the Plaintiffs to be allowed to develop their property in accordance 
with requirements of law and variances allowed by the City to other property being 
developed within City limits. 
3. This action is filed seeking de novo review because Plaintiffs contend that as a 
matter of city, state and federal law the action of the City was arbitrary, capricious and 
illegal and the individually named Defendants need to be enjoined and restrained from 
such further conduct. Where relevant, all of the Defendants need to be required to pay 
Spencers' for the damages, costs, and attorney fees incurred by reason of their illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct. 
II. JURISDICTION 
4. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under the statutory provisions of § 78-33-
1 et. seg. U.C.A. and Article I, §§ 1 and 11 of the Utah Constitution that allow citizens to 
petition courts for a redress of their grievances, and Article VIII § 5 of the Utah Constitution 
which provides this court is a court of general jurisdiction, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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III. VENUE 
5 The property that the Plaintiffs have sought for years to develop is located in the 
City, Weber County, Utah Upon information and belief, all Plaintiffs and all Defendants 
reside in this judicial district All claims arose in this judicial district, where venue of this 
proceeding properly lies 
IV. PARTIES 
6 Plaintiffs Dennis V Spencer and Linda S Spencer, (hereinafter referred to as 
"Spencers") own real property located in the municipal boundaries of the City of Pleasant 
View, Weber County, Utah They are also residents and taxpayers of Weber County 
7 The City of Pleasant View (hereinafter referred to as the "City") is a municipality 
recognized under Utah law and is located in Weber County 
8 Cherrywood Manor, Inc, a Utah corporation, and Cherrywood Manor 
Homeowner's Association, Inc, a Utah corporation, are owners of properties directly south 
of Spencers' properties and have interfered with Spencers' duly recorded right of way 
These entities and their members have slandered the title of Spencers' to their right of 
way 
9 John and Jane Does I - XX are those individuals that will be named for civil rights 
violations and injunctive relief if it is found that private persons and officials or employees 
of the City have been acting in violation of federal or state constitutional law, or with fraud 
and malice as to the Spencers or their property during the time periods in question 
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V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND REGARDING LACK OF DEVELOPMENT 
OF SPENCERS' PROPERTIES IN THE CITY 
10 The property of the Spencers in the City that the City has refused to allow a 
building permit to be issued are identified on plat map attached hereto as Exhibit A and 
incorporated herein by this reference "West Parcel" is tax identification number 16-023-
0040 and 16-023-0042, and "East Parcel" is tax identification number 16-023-0004, all 
located in the City 
A. History of the West Parcel1 
11 On the 5th day of May 1971, Spencers obtained ownership of the West Parcel 
12 On May 10, 1983, from the property owner to their south the Spencers received 
a conveyance a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress and egress and utility installation 
to the south of the West Parcel This document was recorded with the Weber County 
Recorder on or about May 17, 1983 at Book 1424, Page 2443, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this reference 
13 In 1983, the Spencers sold the eastern one-half of the West Parcel to John R 
and Lola P Parker contingent upon the purchasers being able to obtain a building permit 
On or before July 11, 1983, John Parker and Dennis V Spencer approached the City of 
Pleasant View and the Board of Adjustment to obtain a vanance and right to build on 
1
 The West Parcel is made up of identifiable tax parcels The parcel on the west 
of the west parcel was purchased by Spencers in 1971, conveyed to Winwards in 1981, 
conveyed to Perkins in 1989, and back to Spencers in 1996 These conveyances are 
not material to the issues raised in this litigation as no Board of Adjustment approval 
was given for this portion of the West parcel independent of the eastern parcel of the 
West Parcel 
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eastern one-half of the West Parcel. At that time, a variance was granted to Mr. Parker 
and Mr. Spencer with four (4) provisions: 
A. Mr. Parker have a twenty-thousand (20,000) square foot lot left without 
consideration of the right-of-way. 
B. That the buildings be set back at least thirty (30) feet from the edge of the right-
of-way. 
C. That engineer's designs be provided to the City showing cuts for utilities, grades 
for roads, and the design of the right-of-way for future development in the area. (The 
necessary designs were prepared for this criteria thereafter.) 
D. That Pleasant View City was going to secure a legal opinion from their City 
Attorney as to whether the City could control future requests for variances on undedicated 
roads. This perspective did not place a burden on the Parkers or Spencers; nor did it 
negate the past and future approvals by the Board of Adjustments allowing future 
development for building on private roadways or right-of-ways in the City. 
E. Should any future development be made, the Parkers and Spencers would 
participate in hard surfacing the road, installing curb, gutter and sidewalk, and that Mr. 
Spencer was to provide an escrow in the amount determined by the City engineer for 
improvement to his property. 
A copy of the minutes from the July 11,1983 meeting is attached hereto as Exhibit C and 
is incorporated herein by this reference. 
14. The sale of the West Parcel to the Parkers from the Spencers closed when the 
Board of Adjustments approval was given. 
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15. Between July 28, 1983 and February 21, 1984, the City studied and thereafter 
determined in accordance with the requirements of law that the division of Spencer's lands 
in the City that led to the creation of the West and East Parcel was not a subdivision and 
did not have to comply with the laws governing the creation the of a subdivision. The 
records of the City regarding this decision are attached hereto as Exhibit D and are 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
16. From July 28, 1983 through February 21, 1984, the City refused to issue the 
a building permit for East Parcel on the erroneous grounds that a subdivision ordinance 
applied. On or about February 21, 1984, the Planning Commission voted to allow the 
building permit to be issued on West Parcel as previously approved by the Board of 
Adjustments. 
17. Some time after May 24, 1990, the City approved the development of a 
development commonly known as the Cherrywood Condominiums ("development") to the 
south of this property. Phase 3, which adjoins the Spencers property, was recorded on 
September 18, 1992. Among other things, the City erroneously: 
A. Allowed the development to overlay the right-of-way held by Spencers (and 
others) that bordered the south of West Parcel; 
B. Allowed the placement of a private road for the development to infringe on the 
property located in West Parcel; 
C. Did not require curb and gutter to be placed by the development when placing 
the private road on the south of West Parcel; 
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D. Did not require the development density plan to follow the twenty-thousand 
(20,000) square feet per residence requirement. 
18. On January 7, 1993, the Parkers were represented before the Planning 
Commission and requested a building permit prior to placing the land on the market. 
19. On February 9, 1993, the City responded indicating that no building permit 
would be issued. A copy of the denial of this request is attached hereto as Exhibit E and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
20. On October 23, 1993, a special meeting was held with the City and the 
Spencers. After initially advising Spencers the issue over development was the issue 
regarding subdividing (resolved nine years earlier), the City indicated that no building 
permit would be issued because the access to the property was by a private right-of-way. 
21. On February 16, 1995, Parkers request for a building permit was denied by the 
Planning Commission of the City on the alleged grounds of the subdivision issue. 
22. On May 11,1995, the Spencers made an application for an appeal to the Board 
of Adjustments asking for recognition of the variance previously granted in 1983. On May 
19, 1995, the Spencers were advised in a letter from the City that the earlier granting of 
the variance of the Board of Adjustment would not be recognized due to an alleged failure 
of the City to provide adequate standards to the Board of Adjustment to take such action. 
A copy of the letter received by the Spencers is attached hereto as Exhibit F and 
incorporated herein by this reference. No action was taken by the City to repeal or require 
conformance of others that had been granted variances under the same ordinance in the 
7 
past.2 It is significant that the City sought to make Spencers responsible both legally and 
financially to correct the City's previous errors in approving the Cherrywood Manor plat 
that failed to conform with City ordinances. A copy of the correspondence sent to Spencers 
by counsel for the City is attached hereto as Exhibit G and is incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
23. In 1996, Parkers conveyed the eastern one-half of the west parcel that they 
owned to Spencers. 
B. History of the East Parcel 
24. On the 5th day of May 1971, Spencers obtained ownership of East Parcel. 
25. On May 10, 1983, from the property owner to their south the Spencers received 
a conveyance a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress and egress and utility installation 
to the south of East Parcel. This document was recorded with the Weber County Recorder 
on or about May 17, 1983 at Book 1424, Page 2443, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this reference. 
2
 Before July of 1983 when Mr. and Mrs. Parker were granted a variance to build 
a home on a right of way, four other interested parties were granted building permits on 
private roads or right-of-ways. On June 26, 1978, Timothy Blackbyrn was allowed a 
variance for a building permit on a home built upon a right-of-way. On July 28, 1980, 
Mr. and Mrs. Rod Cragun were granted approval for a building permit on a private, 
undedicated road. On August 17, 1981, Mike Humphries was granted a variance for a 
building permit on a right-of-way. On February 17, 1983, Mr. Tony Cross was granted 
a building permit. After variance was granted to the Parkers, on February 1, 1988, Neal 
Ballif and Floyd Barrett were granted approval and variances for building permits on a 
private road. On September 29, 1989, Mr. Leonard Grassli was given authority to have 
a building permit of property existing on an undedicated roadway. On February 3, 
1992, Mr. Richard Diamond was given building permits even though the only access to 
his property was by private road. 
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26. Between July 28, 1983 and February 21, 1984, the City studied and thereafter 
determined in accordance with the requirements of law that the division of Spencer's lands 
in the City that led to the creation of this Parcel was not a subdivision and did not have to 
comply with the laws governing the creation of a subdivision. The records of the City 
regarding this decision are attached hereto as Exhibit A and are incorporated herein by 
this reference. 
27. On March 31,1986, the Spencers were granted a variance for a building permit 
under the following conditions: 
A. Spencers have a twenty-thousand (20,000) square foot lot left without 
consideration of the right-of-way. 
B. That the buildings be set back at least thirty (30) feet from the edge of the right-
of-way. 
C. That engineer's designs be provided to the City showing cuts for utilities, grades 
for roads, and the design of the right-of-way for future development in the area. (The 
necessary designs were prepared for this criteria thereafter.) 
D. Should any future development be made, Spencers would participate in hard 
surfacing the road, installing curb, gutter and sidewalk, and that Mr. Spencer was to 
provide an escrow in the amount determined by the City engineer for improvement to his 
property. 
28. Some time after May 24, 1990, the City approved the development of a 
development commonly known as the Cherrywood Condominiums ("development") to the 
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south of this property. Phase 3, which adjoins the Spencers property, was recorded on 
September 18, 1992. Among other things, the City erroneously: 
A. Allowed the development to overlay the right-of-way held by Spencers (and 
others) that bordered the south of East Parcel; 
B. Allowed the placement of a private road for the development to infringe on the 
property located in East Parcel; 
C. Did not require curb and gutter to be placed by the development when placing 
the private road on the south of East Parcel; 
D. Did not require the development density plan to follow the twenty-thousand 
(20,000) square feet per residence requirement. 
29. On October 23, 1993, a special meeting was held with the City and the 
Spencers. After initially advising Spencers the issue over development was the issue 
regarding subdividing (resolved nine years earlier), the City indicated that no building 
permit would be issued because the access to the property was by a private right-of-way. 
30. On May 11, 1995 Spencers requested that the variance previously issued be 
granted. On May 19, 1995, Spencers were notified by counsel for the City that their 
request would be denied because the Board of Adjustments had no standards to hear the 
request of the Spencers. A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
VII. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF RELATED CITY CONDUCT 
AGAINST SPENCERS 
31. On November 8, 1995, the City officials including the Chief of Police and other 
officers facilitated a citizen's complaint for trespass against Dennis Spencer when he was 
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using the recorded right-of-way. After being ordered by the City to appear at City Offices 
and accept the citation under threat of arrest and placement in jail, on November 22, 1995 
Dennis Spencer appeared at the Justice of the Peace court at the assigned time when the 
charges were dismissed. 
32. Thereafter, after negotiations during 1996 between the counsel for the 
Spencers and the City failed to bring any matters to resolution, Dennis Spencer appeared 
before the Planning Commission on January 16, 1997, requesting action on his request 
for approval filed the previous November. (A copy of the minutes of the -Planning 
Commission Meeting of January 16, 1997 is attached hereto as Exhibit F and is 
incorporated herein by this reference.) After the Terri Cragun refused to provide a binding 
list of what had to be done to complete development on the property, Dennis Spencer 
stated that Ms. Cragan should be removed from consideration of his development because 
of personal animosity towards him over the previous five years and family ties to the 
development in the Cherrywood development. The Planning Commission refused to do 
so on the grounds that declaration of ethical conflicts could only be initiated by the 
government official involved. Commission member Frank Maughan censured Dennis 
Spencer for criticizing Terri Cragun and indicated that the only proper place for such action 
was in a court of law. (Ever amicable, the Spencers have followed through on Mr. 
Maughan's directive.) 
33. In the same meeting, the Planning Commission refused to grant approval to 
develop Spencers' property on the grounds that it failed to comply with the subdivision 
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ordinances, and a number of requirements outlined in various letters, all of which are 
attached hereto as Exhibit G and incorporated herein by this reference. 
34. Thereafter, after continued efforts to resolve matters through the retention of 
private counsel were fruitless, Spencers went to Craig M. Call, the private property 
Ombudsman for the State or Utah, for assistance. After extended correspondence, the 
Planning Commission forwarded on the request of Spencers for approval to the Board of 
Adjustments so that the right-of-way could be approved. 
35. On July 28, 1998 the Board of Adjustments notified Spencers their request to 
develop their property and use the right-of-way of record was denied. A copy of this notice 
is attached hereto as Exhibit I and is incorporated herein by this reference. A copy of the 
minutes of the meeting is attached hereto as Exhibit J. 
36. The basis for the denial by the Board of Adjustments was that (1) the Board did 
not feel that the evidence submitted by Dennis Spencer to the Zoning Commission had not 
demonstrated to the Zoning Commission that the development of his property was in the 
best interest of the "public welfare" and (2) there were no physical restrictions that 
prevented Spencers from including a "dedicated public street" on his land, thereby not 
causing unnecessary hardship on other unidentified property. No complete recording was 
kept of the meeting. 
37. A timely appeal to the Second Judicial District Court followed this decision. 
38. Plaintiffs will file a claim under the Governmental Immunity Act after this 
complaint is filed. 
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COUNT I 
APPEAL DE NOVO FROM THE CITY'S ACTION 
39. Paragraphs 1-38 are incorporated herein by this reference. 
40. The actions of the City in denying Spencers the right to use or develop their 
property has been arbitrary, capricious, and illegal, damaging the Spencers in an amount 
to be shown at trial and indicating the need to restrain the City from further prohibited 
action. 
COUNT II 
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
41. Paragraphs 1-40 are incorporated by this reference. 
42. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City has denied the Spencers due 
process of law as required by Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, damaging the Spencers in an amount to be 
shown at trial and indicating the need to restrain the City from further prohibited action. 
COUNT III 
DENIAL OF UNIFORM OPERATION AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
43. Paragraphs 1-42 are incorporated by this reference. 
44. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City has denied the Spencers the 
benefit of uniform operation or equal protection of the laws as required by Article I § 24 of 
the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
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damaging the Spencers in an amount to be shown at trial and indicating the need to 
restrain the City from further prohibited action. 
COUNT IV 
DENIAL OF RIGHT TO PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 
AND EXERCISE OF FREE SPEECH 
45. Paragraphs 1-44 are incorporated by this reference. 
46. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City has either denied or interfered 
with the Spencers the right to petition government for redress of grievances, all as 
protected by Article I, §§ 1 and 15 of the Utah Constitution and the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, damaging the Spencers in an amount to 
be shown at trial and indicating the need to restrain the City from further prohibited action. 
COUNT V 
CONDUCT IN VIOLATION OF STATE SUPREMACY CLAUSE 
47. Paragraphs 1-46 are incorporated by this reference. 
48. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City has violated state law, all in 
violation of Article XI § 5 of the Utah State Constitution, damaging the Spencers in an 
amount to be shown at trial and indicating the need to restrain the City from further 
prohibited action. 
14 
COUNT VI 
FALSE ARREST AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 
49. Paragraphs 1-48 are incorporated by this reference. 
50. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City violated Article I § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, 
damaging the Spencers in an amount to be shown at trial and indicating the need to 
restrain the City from further prohibited action. 
COUNT VII 
TAKING AND DAMAGING OF PROPERTY 
51. Paragraphs 1-50 are incorporated herein by this reference. 
52. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the City violated Article I § 22 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, 
taking and damaging the Spencers' property in an amount to be shown at trial and 
indicating the need to restrain the City from further prohibited action. 
COUNT IX 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND 
UNETHICAL CONDUCT 
53. Paragraphs 1-52 are incorporated herein by this reference. 
54. The provisions of City Code § 17.20.021 provides that attorney fees and other 
professional costs are to be paid by the subdivider seeking approval of a subdivision. 
Notwithstanding the City's decision on February 21, 1984 that building on Spencers' 
property was not subdivision, the City has charged, and required Spencer to pay 
15 
significant amounts of attorney fees, engineering fees and other professional costs, all in 
an amount to be shown at trial. 
55. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the Plaintiffs may raise what they believe 
are ethical violations of City employees in relevant meetings and that requiring Spencers 
to pay the attorney fees of City attorneys involved in approving an allegedly labeled 
subdivision application violates the due process, conflict of interest rule approved by the 
Utah State Bar, damaging the Spencers in an amount to be shown at trial and indicating 
the need to restrain the City and their professional agents from further prohibited action. 
COUNT X 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
56. Paragraphs 1-55 are incorporated herein by this reference. 
57. Because of the written and public statements slandering the title of Spencers 
to their right-of-way and the West and East Parcel made by Defendants Cherrywood 
Manor, Inc. and Cherrywood Manor Homeowner's Association, Inc., and its members, and 
the City, and its officials, employees, and agents, the Spencer's ability to receive approval 
from the City was delayed, the title to their right-of-way has been slandered, and ability 
to market their property seriously injured, all damaging the Spencers in an amount to be 
shown at trial and indicating the need to restrain Defendants from further illegal action. 
COUNT XI 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING 
MUNICIPAL OFFICERS' AND EMPLOYEES' 
ETHICS ACT 
58. Paragraphs 1-57 are incorporated herein by this reference. 
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59. Because Dennis Spencer was censured because of a City claim that the only 
way a refusal to continue because of ethical concerns could be made would be a claim 
disclosed by the City employee, Spencers desire a declaratory ruling that such objections 
to the ethics of any employee may be raised in writing by any person under U.C.A. § 10-3-
1311 or raised in any public meeting pursuant to rights guaranteed by Article I, §§ 1 and 
15 of the Utah Constitution. 
WHEREFORE, FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING, 
1. Plaintiffs pray that they will be awarded against Defendants damages in an 
amount to be shown at trial for the taking and damaging of their property by Defendants, 
for unlawful and unnecessary expenses they have had to incur because of the conduct of 
Defendants, and for the emotional and mental harm suffered by the Plaintiffs; 
2. Plaintiffs pray that the Defendants will be enjoined from continuing their unlawful 
and unethical conduct; 
3. Plaintiffs pray for an award of award of attorney fees, costs, and damages under 
whatever theory, statute or relevant law would allow for the same; and 
4. Plaintiffs pray for any other equitable relief allowed by this court. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 1998. 
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C. 
J 
Matthew Hilton 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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N. Ogden, U t . 84404 JIT CLAIM DEED 
BOOK 1 4 2 4 PAGE2443 
PAUL B. CRAG UN INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p , 
grantor of P l ea san t .County of Weber , State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT CLAIM to 
DENNIS V. SPENCER and LINDA S.SPENCER, husband and w i f e , 
as j o i n t t e n a n t s , 
giantce of P l e a s a n t View, County of Weber, S t a t e of Utah, 
for the sura of ONE DOLLAR AND OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATION ($1,00) 
the following described tract of land in Weber County, State of Utah: 
A non- rexc lus iy .e - r igh t j? f_way for purposes of i n g r e s s , eg re s s and u t i l i t y i n s t a l l a t i o n 
and maintenance over and across* the fo l lowing *descHY^~T,WcV'of Iffffil1,1 lo^wl'tt* 
k p a r t of the Southwest Quar te r of Sect ion 19, Township 7 Nor th , Range 1 West, 
Sa l t Lake Base and Mer id ian , U. S, Survey: BEGINNING a t a p o i n t North 30° 20f E a s t 
179.45 f e e t and 120 f e e t , more or l e s s , North 59° 40 f West from the i n t e r s e c t i o n of 
the Ve^t l i n e of 950 West S t r e e t with the North l i n e of 3650 North S t r e e t , sa id p o i n t 
being a t a corner of the p r o p e r t y conveyed t o Town of P l e a s a n t View for road ; r u n n i n g 
'-litnce North 33°02v East 60 f e e t along said p r o p e r t y , to the North l i n e - o f r i g h t of 
%ay conveyed by deed recorded i n Book 1121 of Records , Page 288; thence North 59° 401 
vest a long sa id r i g h t of way 66 f e e t ; thence South 83° 02 ' West 45.00 f ee t a long sa id 
n g h t of way; thence South 77° 19° 06" West 74.41 f e e t a long sa id r i g h t of way; thence 
South 88° 35* West 50.00 f e e t a long sair* - i g h t of way; thence North 78° 25' West 
.39 f e e t , a long sa id r i g h t of way to the Eas t l i n e of p r o p e r t y conveyed to Orson A. 
^inward and wife , by deed recorded in Book 1263 of Records , Page 849; thence South 
!4° 32* 20" West 60 f e e t , more or l e s s , t o t h e South l i n e of sa id r i g h t of way; thence 
Jouth 78° 251 Eas t along sa id r i g h t of way 175 f e e t , more or l e s s ; thence North 77° 
9° 06" Eas t 85 f e e t , more or l e s s , al*«g-ea4^-yigfe4-«e£-vftyT to West l i n e of p r o p e r t y 
»f John E. Malraberg; thence Nor th 30° 20T Eas t a long said p r o p e r t y to the Northwest 
orner t he reo f ; thence South 59° 40* East 80 f e e t , more or l e s s , to the p lace of 
•eginning. 
'his r i g h t of way s h a l l t e r m i n a t e , for purposes of i n g r e s s and eg re s s , when t h e r e i s 
dedica ted road a b u t t i n g p r o p e r t y of the g r a n t e e along the North l i n e of s"aid r i g h t 
f way. 
/1TNESS. the hand of said grantor , this 10th day of May A. D. 19 83 
Tl A TTT T» rrn A r»TTTk.i T\TTrnorrnT-i\Tm n r * i r k * \ n r 
11 JULY 1983 
Members Present: George Wilkey Visitors 
Paul Butterfield John Parker 
Gladys Evans John Malmberg 
Dennis Spencer 
Elmer Bailey 
ITEMS DISCUSSED: 
1. George Wilkey opened the discussion on the property owned by Dennis 
Spencer and the parcel that John Parker has requested permission to be 
granted a varience to build a home on a private road. George Wilkey 
brought them up to date on the filing of the petition and the reasons it 
has been delayed. 
2. A question was raised as to whether if we grant a varience to Mr. 
Parker are we setting a presidence that may cause some problems by 
having to deny others the same priviledge and still maintain control the 
on undedicated roads. 
3. Paul Butterfield made the motion that they grant Mr. Parker a varience 
with the following stipulations: 
1. That Mr. Parker has a 20,000 ft lot after the right-of-way has 
been granted. 
2. That the building must be set back at least 30 ft from the edge of 
the right-of-way. 
3. That Mr, Parker & Mr. Spencer will provide an Engineers design 
showing cuts for utilities, grades for the road, and the design 
of the right-of-way for future development in the area. 
4. That we secure a Legal Opinion from the City Attorney as to whether 
the City can control any future requests for variences on undedicated 
reads if they grant Mr. Parker a varience at this time. 
5. That should any future development be made that Mr. Parker participate 
in hard surfacing the road, curb & gutter and sidewalks, etc „ 
Gladys Evans 2nd the motion, motion carried. 
4. Paul Butterfield stated that it is our job to help Mr. Parker if 
possible but if any of the above stipulations are not met with an affirmative 
answer then the Board of Adjustments should reassemble and see what the next 
step is before a varience is granted. 
5. Mr. Bailey and Mr. Malmberg both stated they did not want to deny anyone 
the priviledge of building in Pleasant View but that we should see to It that 
it is done correctly and properly according to the Zoning Ordinances so that 
down the road a few years we do not create any problems. 
Adjournment at 7:25 P. M. 
/ oQ 2-
PLEASANT VIEW CITY 
PLANNING COMMISSION 
ATTN: LEROY HARRIS 
PLEASANT VIEW, UTAH 
RE: SPENCER SUBDIVISION QUESTION 
Dear Leroy: 
This will verify that through an oral conversation with 
Michael McCoy, the Attorney for the League of Cities and Towns. 
I was informed that, in his opinion, the sale of property by 
Denny Spencer to John Parker, which we have been discussing, 
would not constitute a subdivision and, therefore, would not 
have to comply with the cities subdivision ordinance. 
The proponents of the subdivision question relied on the 
definition of agricultural land but Mr. McCoy pointed out that 
that definition is attached to the zoning ordinance and not the 
subdivision ordinance. He said that his position has always 
been that if the purchasers of the land do not build and indicate 
that it is not their intention to, that it is an agricultural 
purpose. 
Obviously, it would be preferrable to have this written 
opinion from Mr. McCoy, but since it has taken so long to get 
even an oral one, I'm certain that we can rely upon on this. 
If you have any questions, feel free to give me a call. 
I have informed Mr. Spencer's Attorney, Bob Echard, of the 
decision and he indicates that they will be attempting to get 
this back on the calendar for our next meeting which %I told him 
would be the 21st day of February. 
Yours very truly, 
RICHARD R. MEDSKER 
Attorney at Law 
RRM:ml 
RICHARD R. MEDSKER // /£# 
ATTORNEY AT LAW * t 
2910 Washington BUd . buite 100 ]#,is^~ *^ 
Ogden. Uah 84401 <f / 
Telephone W-0822 
February 6, 1984 
raxnuiaa ur r LLA&AJN l V1CW fLAJNNllNU LUNMli 'IN MEETING 
HELD 20 MAI 1 9 8 4 . MEETING COMMENCED AT 7: P . ML. '/£ 
MEMBERS PRESENT: Leroy H a r r i s , Chairmaa 
Leon Jones 
Kenton Barker 
<P> o i /— Joyce Humphries 
INVOCATION: Kenton Barker 
Pete R u s s e l l 
Paula Graven 
Gene Mortensen 
Hayward Wride (Ci ty Counci l ) 
/ * * ^ 
MINUTES: 
ITEMS DISCUSSED: 
#1 Dennis Spencer 
P r o p e r t y 
#2 Mr . Jones 
3 1 d g . Permit 
#3 Mr. Toone 
B l d g . Permit 
#4 Mayhew 
P . V. Drive 
The minutes were approved with the fo l lowing c o r r e c t i o n 
( i tem #3 be changed from RE-20 to A-l) 
1 , Dennis Spencer Proper ty 
20 Jones 31dg0 P e r m i t 
3 . Toone B ldg . P e r m i t 
4 . Mayhew 31dg0 Pe rmi t 
5 . Rezoning p r o p e r t y from A-5 to A - l . 
6 . White Barn P r e s e n t a t i o n 
7 . Ted B u r r e l l - Gas Pumps. 
Discuss ion was p r e s e n t e d on Actorney McCoy's op in ion and 
the f i n a l d e c i s i o n was tha t the Planning Commission would 
abide by McGoy's d e c i s i o n . His dec i s ion was t h a t i t does 
not c o n s t i t u t e a s u b - d i v i s i o n . Pete R u s s e l l made the 
motion t h a t they l e t him go ahead and s t a r t b u i l d i n g and 
i t i s not n ece s s a ry to go back to the Board of Adjus tments . 
Leon Jones 2nd the mot ion . Voting was unanimous i n t h e 
a f f i r m a t i v e . 
Mr. Jones appeared r eques t i ng permission t o apply fo r a 
Bldg. Permit next door to Orson Winwards p r o p e r t y . I t 
was d i scus sed t h a t t h e r e was some homes i n the a r ea t h a t 
have s idewalks , i t was s t a t ed t ha t Mr. Jones in tended to 
i n s t a l l s i d e w a l k s . I t was a l so d i scussed as to who would 
be r e s p o n s i b l e fo r t h e a spha l t between t h e road as i t now 
e x i s t s and the c u r b . Kenton Barker made the motion t h a t 
Mr. Jones r e q u e s t t o apply for a Bldg. Permi t be g r an t ed , 
Pece R u s s e l l 2nd t h e motion, vot ing was unanimous in the 
a f f i r m a t i v e . 
Mr. Hansen appeared r ep re sen t i ng Mr. Toone r e q u e s t i n g 
permiss ion to o b t a i n a Bldg. Permit for a new home 
d i r e c t l y e a s t of Mr. J o n e s . I t was noted t h a t Mr. Toone 
a l so in tended t o i n s t a l l s idewalks . Leon Jones made t h e 
motion t h a t Mra Toone be given approval to o b t a i n a Bldg . 
Permit , Pe te R u s s e l l 2nd the motion, v o t i n g was unanimous 
in the a f f i r m a t i v e 3 
Mr. Mayhew appeared r eques t ing permiss ion to r a z e the old 
home a t 948 West P l e a s a n t View Dr. and b u i l d a new home. 
I t was d i s cus sed t h a t Mr. Mayhew's l o t was l a c k i n g the 
130 f t . f rontage b u t t h e r e has been a home t h e r e many yea r s 
and e x i s t e d be fo re t he zoning was put i n t o e f f e c t and would 
be an improvement to the ar^-i, ^irh t h i s thought in mind 
Pete R u s s e l l made t h e motion tha t they approve Mr. Mayhew's 
reques t t o ' o b t a i n a Bldg . Permit, Kenton Barker 2nd the 
motion, vo t ing was unanimous in the a f f i r m a t i v e . 
February 8, 1993 
Mrs, Lola Parker 
£819 No. 10£5 E. 
North Ogden, Utah 84414 
Re: property I.D.#' s Q040 and 0043 
Dear Lola: 
This letter is in regards to the attached copy of the Board of 
Adjustments meeting dated July 11, 1983. 
Our city attorney, Richard Medsker, has provided an opinion that 
due to the following reasons: 
(1) The surrounding property has changed. 
(£) 10 years is not a reasonable time. 
(3) None of the stipulations were followed. 
Therefore, the city of Pleasant View will not issue a building 
permit for a dwelling on your property. 
If you have any questions please feel free to call me. 
Sincerely, 
d). :dWr /w^--
D. Brent Hales 
Mayor 
PIFASANT VIFW WhJ COMF? vnn AT TUC ur\r\T r\r. O/-A 
JACK C. HELGESEN 
R. SCOTT WATERFALL 
RICHARD W. JONES 
MICHAEL V.HOUTZ 
KEITH M. BACKMAN 
LUCILE KELLY LOWREY 
LAW OFFICES 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
AMERICA FIRST BUILDING 
4768 HARRISON BOULEVARD 
OGDEN, UTAH 84403-4305 
FAX 
(801) 479-4804 
TELEPHONE 
(801) 479-4777 
May 19, 1995 
Dennis Spencer 
P.O. Box 2220 
Ogden, Utah 84412-2220 
RE: Application for Appeal to Pleasant View City 
Dear Mr. Spencer: 
As you are aware this office represents Pleasant View City. Pleasant View City has 
delivered to me a copy of Your Application for an Appeal to the Pleasant View City 
Board of Adjustment. With that application you also submitted a check for $50.00. 
Enclosed is the check for $50.00 which is being returned to you for the reasons set forth 
below. 
In your application you indicated you were requesting a special exception to the 
ordinance, i.e. a renewal of the variance granted March 31, 1986. The Board of 
Adjustments cannot legally address this issue for the following reasons. Utah Code 
Annotated §10-9-706 grants to a board of adjustment the authority to hear and decide 
special exceptions, but states that it is only authorized to do so if permitted in the local 
zoning ordinance and only according to the standards contained in the local zoning 
ordinance. While the Pleasant View City zoning ordinance does permit special 
exceptions, the City has not adopted any standards upon which a special exception may 
be granted. Therefore the board of adjustment is without authority to grant special 
exceptions. In addition the action taken over eight years ago by the board75T 
adjustment has no bearing on what the current board of adjustment may do or should 
do. 
If you would like to apply for a hearing before the board of adjustment based on some 
other provision of the law which would permit the board of adjustment to hear and 
decide your case, then you should reapply to the board for such a hearing. 
You should also be aware that it is not the role of the board of adjustment to intervene 
and decide a dispute between two private property owners. From what I ndw about this 
situation from our prior discussions'it appears there is a private property owner with 
whom you need to resolve a dispute regarding the scope of your right of way. That 
i c c i i o Hruac nr\+ a m n o o r *r\ h o o mo+for \A/hir^h t h o P i t \ / c h m iIH oHomr \+ +/^  rac*r\\\/a, 
i t 7V ^ 
Dennis Spencer v — ^ f 
May 19, 1995 
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The City hopes that you will find a method wherein you can resolve this issue and 
obtain the results that you desire. 
Very truly yours, 
Richard vY^ones 
RWJ/lgc 
cc: Pleasant View City 
enclosure 
JACK C. HELGESEN 
R. SCOTT WATERFALL 
RICHARD W. JONES 
MICHAEL V. HOUTZ 
KEITH M. BACKMAN 
KELLY LOWREY 
LAW OFFICES 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
AMERICA FIRST BUILDING 
4768 HARRISON BOULEVARD 
OGDEN, UTAH 84403-4305 
FAX 
(801) 479-4804 
TELEPHONE 
(801) 479-4777 
November 5, 1993 
Dennis and Linda Spencer 
993 W. 3800 N. 
Pleasant View City, Utah 84414 
RE: Spencer Subdivision 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Spencer: 
You sent a letter to Pleasant View City dated October 27, 1993. Pleasant View City has 
asked me to respond to that letter. 
It appears the purpose of your letter is to further your efforts to create a subdivision. As 
I indicated to you during our recent telephone conversation, Pleasant View would like to 
see your property developed. In order to develop your property you will need to comply 
with all the City subdivision ordinances and follow the procedure outlined in the City 
ordinances. The City is awaiting your proposals to resolve some of the difficulties that 
have been addressed in the prior meetings. When those proposals are received the City 
will consider them in light of the ordinances and requirements stated in the City 
Ordinances. Until that time the City will take no action. 
One of the apparent impediments to approval of your subdivision is the lack of access. 
While it is clear you have a right-of-way to enter onto your property across Cherrywood 
property, there is nothing in the documents submitted to the City stating you can dedicate 
a public road across Cherrywood's privately owned property. This is a situation you will 
need to resolve with Cherrywood. 
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November 6, 1993 
Mr Richard W Jones 
Attorney for Pleasant View City 
4768 Harrison Blvd 
Ogden, Ut 84403 
Dear Mr Jones: 
Again we find it necessary to respond to your letter, dated November 5, 
19S3, regarding Spencer Subdivision. 
You state, and we quote: There is nothing in the documents submitted 
to the city stating you can dedicate a public road across Cherrywood!s 
privately owned property, unquote. 
You know full well that a public road is impossible, as Pleasant View 
City granted Cherrywood a private road on the right-of-way provided 
and planned for a public road, by the late Paul B Cragun. For this 
reason, we have requested a variance and the same consideration granted 
to Cherrywood and many others, in Pleasant View, which is: to create a 
one lot subdivision accessed via our right-of-way. This would create 
a semi-private road at the extreme northeast corner of Cherrywood!s 
access road. We have no intention of entering Cherrywood's residential 
area. 
Another alternative would be for Pleasant View City to complete 
annexation of 3700 North to the west end of thn corner lot. This 
should have been done when said lot was developed. This road was 
allowed to end half way through the property. This annexation would 
bring the public road to our property. 
If Pleasant View City is truely interested in seeing* our property 
developed, as you claim, a solution will be reached without delay. 
Time is of the essence, please respond immediately. 
Very sincerely, 
Dennis V aim Linda S Spencer 
993 West 3800 North 
Pleasant View, Ut 844 14 
isi. 
cc: Pleasant View City Officials 
(y^^L &k>?7kz/ 
LAW OFFICES 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
AMERICA FIRST BUILDING 
4768 HARRISON BOULEVARD 
OGDEN, UTAH 84403-4305 
R. SCOTT WATERFALL *<ZJ/ O® ^ I ^ (801)479-4804 
RICHARD W. JONES , / 
MICHAEL V. HOUTZ ^ ^ ' ' TELEPHONE 
<E!TH M. BACKMAN
 ( 8 0 1 \ 479-4777 
.UCILE KELLY LOWREY 
JACK C. HELGESEN &, 3 /0 
May 19, 1995 
Dennis Spencer 
P.O. Box 2220 
Ogden, Utah 84412-2220 
RE: Application for Appeal to Pleasant View City 
Dear Mr. Spencer: 
As you are aware this office represents Pleasant View City. Pleasant View City has 
delivered to me a copy of Your Application for an Appeal to the Pleasant View City 
Board of Adjustment. With that application you also submitted a check for $50.00. 
Enclosed is the check for $50.00 which is being returned to you for the reasons set forth 
below. 
In your application you indicated you were requesting a special exception to the 
ordinance, i.e. a renewal of the variance granted March 31, 1986. The Board of 
Adjustments cannot legally address this issue for the following reasons. Utah Code 
Annotated §10-9-706 grants to a board of adjustment the authority to hear and decide 
special exceptions, but states that it is only authorized to do so if permitted in the local 
zoning ordinance and only according to the standards contained in the local zoning 
ordinance. While the^fleasant View City zoning or^ancdNJoes permit special 
exceptions, the City Kas~riot adopted any standards uporTwnjch a special exceptk)njriay 
bejjranted. I herefore the board of adjustment is without au^jorit^jg^grant special] 
§xcegti£ns_. in addition the action taken over eight years ago by the board of 
adjustment has no bearing on what the current board of adjustment may do or should 
^do. 
If you would like to apply for a hearing before the board of adjustment based on some 
other provision of the law which would permit the board of adjustment to hear and 
decide your case, then you should reapply to the board for such a hearing. 
You should also be aware that it is not the role of the board of adjustment to intervene 
and decide a dispute between two private property owners. From what I now about this 
situation from our prior discussions, it appears there is a private property owner with 
whom you need to resolve a dispute regarding the scope of your right of way. That 
Dennis Spencer 
May 19, 1995 
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The City hopes that you will find a method wherein you can resolve this issue and 
obtain the results that you desire. 
Very truly yours 
Richard VQLJbnes 
RWJ/lgc 
cc: Pleasant View City 
enclosure 
RAYMOND B. ROUNDS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2650 WASHINGTON BLVD., SUITE 102 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
(801) 621-4015 
October 8, 1996 
Richard W. Jones 
Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones, P.C. 
America First Building 
4768 Harrison Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403-4305 
Re: Dennis Spencer v. City of Pleasant View 
Dear Richard: 
After our meeting on September 24, 1 996, I received copies of 
the Pleasant View City ordinances dealing with subdivisions, storm 
sewer and zoning applicable to the issues at hand. I have reviewed 
such documents and have again consulted with my client regarding a 
building permit that he would desire on land owned by him* 
The first contention of the City appeared to me to revolve 
around the ability of Dennis Spencer to have adequate access to 
utilities to service a proposed building on his lots, I will break 
down the issues into categories and then address the resolution of 
those questions. 
1. First; I direct your attention to a quitclaim deed duly 
recorded with Weber County at Book 1424, Page 2443, wherein Paul B* 
Cragun Investment Company, a Utah Limited Partnership, as signed by 
Paul B. Cragun, General Partner, deeded to Dennis V. Spencer and 
Linda S. Spencer the right-of-way which is in question. I direct 
your attention to the beginning of the metes and bounds description 
of the right-of-way itself wherein the right-of-way includes "a 
non-exclusive right-of-way for purposes of ingress, egress and 
UTILITY INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE over and across the following 
described tract: of land, to wit:M (emphasis added) According to 
my reading of this right-of-way there would be no need for Dennis 
Spencer to access any private property exclusive of his right-of-
way in order to connect to appropriate utilities. All discussions 
about gaining permission from private land owners on the north or 
south of the right-of-way are therefore pointless. 
a sr 
Richard W. Jones / 
October 8, 1996 
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2- Culinary Waterlines, Apparently as far back as May 16, 
1977, when Lot No. 0025 was developed by James G, Laughter and John 
and Janet Malmberg, the issue of waterlines running along the 
northern edge of that property became a question. According to 
Exhibit B, attached for your perusal there was an agreement between 
affected parties on improvements, which included water. The 
document was duly recorded at Book 1212, Pages 27, 28, 29 and 30 at 
the Weber County Recorder's Office. Particularly, when John and 
Janet Malmberg purchased the property from James G. Laughter, there 
were agreements as to cost of extension of the waterline to the 
western boundary of that property. As you recall from our personal 
investigation of the property, the Malmberg properties' west 
boundary is directly across the street from the Spencer property. 
Apparently the Malrobergs were required to pay one-half (1/21 of the 
cost of extending the waterline to the west end of their property 
and Elmer K. and Melba M, Bailey were required to pay the other 
one-half (1/2) of the cost of extending the waterline to the west 
end of the Malmberg property. This document was duly signed by all 
of the parties involved and recorded. Mr. Spencer, being aware of 
this particular situation, tells me that the clear intention of the 
parties during the negotiation of this process was to extend 
utilities to the west end of the Malmberg property anticipating the 
possibility of development on the north side of the road and right-
of-way. The waterline does extend under the roadway to the west 
end of the Malmberg property and then continues on under the right-
of-way to service Cherrywood Condominiums. This is not an 
exclusively owned waterpipe by Cherrywood Condominiums, the 
Malmbergs, or their predecessors in interests, or the Baileys, but 
simply a waterline to access properties around this area. Mr. 
Spencer therefore has access to culinary water within an acceptable 
distance from the lot in question. 
3. Storm Sewer Ifflprpvement. Mr. Spencer indicates to me that 
storm sewer improvements have been made to the land in order to 
deal with runoff both on property to the north of his and for the 
Cherrywood Condominiums. Mr. Spencer states that the runoff that 
would come through his lots has been improved to deal with movement 
of water through the land, and there is a storm sewer collector on 
the south end of the property which goes under the roadway and 
moves water away from the condominiums. These improvements have 
already been accomplished and I read nothing in the Pleasant View 
ordinances, Chapter 13.08, which would prohibit a building permit 
based on any criteria contained therein. 
4. Sanitary Sewage. A survey of the land indicates that 
there is a sewage line extending under Pleasant View's road and 
under the roadway which ends inside of the property owned by Dennis 
Spencer. Apparently the sewer system was put in place to deal with 
sewage from buildings just north of the Spencer property and his 
ability to access sanitary sewer lines is not questionable. 
( Gy' V 4/o 
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5- Utilities. Electricity and telephone transmission lines 
exist on a pole in the northwest corner of the Malmberg property. 
There would be absolutely no problem accessing these utilities by 
simply having them cross the right-of-way and enter into Spencers' 
property. 
6. Fire. There is a fire hydrant on 950 West Street, just 
east of the Malmberg property, by which the fire department can 
access all areas surrounding the right-of-way. Additionally, as I 
recall, there is a fire hydrant on the west side of the right-of-
way near Cherrywood Condominiums which would have direct access to 
the Spencer property. 
Despite Terry Cragun's assertions that this was never done, 
Mr. Spencer states unequivocally that in 1993, when Pleasant View 
City determined that Mr. Spencer was a one lot subdivider, Mr. 
Spencer consulted engineers and surveyors at a cost of nearly 
$3,000.00 to address the questions which now seem to be arising 
again. Mr. Spencer appeared on the Saturday morning meeting of the 
Planning Commission after having previously provided thirteen (13) 
separate copies of all of the actions that he had done in order to 
demonstrate utility hookups and compliance with the subdivision 
ordinance of the City of Pleasant View. He gave all thirteen (13) 
copies to Terry Cragun for dissemination to the Planning 
Commission. Although the Planning Commission, for what reason 1 
cannot discern, determined that they would not review the matters 
presented by Mr. Spencer, the City of Pleasant View should have 
copies of all of the actions he took regarding this matter, unless 
they were discarded arbitrarily and capriciously. 
It is interesting for me to note that after seven (7) months 
of dealing with this case, I new learn that there is no explicit 
prohibition in obtaining a building permit on a piece of property 
simply because the property is fronted by a right-of-way and not by 
public access. After leaving ycu on September 24, 1996, I obtained 
a copy of Title 17 of the Pleasant View City Ordinances entitled 
Subdivisions. I read much to my surprise, as indicated by you in 
your fax to me dated September 24, 1996, that Provision 17.16,040 
allows a building permit on a piece of land on a private right-of-
way if: ., 
2. The area of the right-of-way shall be an addition to the 
minimum lot area requirements of the zone in which the lot is 
located; 
3. The grade of any portion of the right-of-way shall not 
exceed fifteen percent (15%>; 
U/o 
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4. Lots so created shall be large enough to comply with all 
yard and area requirements of the zone in which the lot is located. 
In the case at hand the Planning Commission has not extended 
the public street to serve the lot. The RE-20 Zone would not be 
violated by the building permit on the property owned by Dennis 
Spencer. The grade at no portion of the right-of-way exceeds 
fifteen percent (15%) and any building can clearly be in compliance 
with all yard and area requirements of the zone. Having taken this 
additional step of review, I see no reason whatsoever for denial of 
a building permit to Dennis Spencer nor do I feel that a special 
exception has to be granted him in order to accomplish this task. 
Mr. Spencer can and has complied with all city ordinances and Utah 
State law which I have reviewed on the matter. 
Please review the materials provided to you and respond within 
ten (10) days so that I can adequately advise my client as to his 
next step. 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter 
please contact me at the above-captioned telephone number or 
address. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
Jfaf"+u£'& <^&{**6 
/ 
Raymond B. Rounds 
Attorney at Law 
RBR/zao 
Enclosures 
Mr. Raymond Rounds 
October 21, 1996 
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can correct my understanding of Utah law, I will recommend to the City that the issues 
surrounding access be resolved between Cherrywood and Mr Spencer prior to 
approval being granted. I am nopefu! Cherrywood will cooperate with Mr. Spencer 
since it seems he has a night to use Cherrywood's property to gain access to his 
property. If Cherrywood is not willing to work with htm, I am not aware of any ordinance 
or power the City has to force them to cooperate with Mr. Spencer to clarify the access 
issue. If I am wrong, please halp me understand why you might fee! differently. 
I assume Mr Spencer will follow the course outlined above unless I hear differently from 
you. 
Very truly yours, 
RichahJW Jpnes 
RWJ/lgc \ ^ ' 
cc: Pleasant View City 
/ o P Z-
PLEASANT VIEW CITY 
PLANNING COMMISSION 
ATTN: LEROY HARRIS 
PLEASANT VIEW, UTAH 
RE: SPENCER SUBDIVISION QUESTION 
Dear Leroy: 
This will verify that through an oral conversation with 
Michael McCoy, the Attorney for the League of Cities and Towns, 
I was informed that, in his opinion, the sale of property by 
Denny Spencer to John Parker, which we have been discussing, 
would not constitute a subdivision^ and, therefore, would not 
have to comply with the cities subdivision ordinance. 
The proponents of the subdivision question relied on the 
definition of agricultural land but Mr. McCoy pointed out that 
that definition is attached to the zoning ordinance and not the 
subdivision ordinance. He said that his position has always 
been that if the purchasers of the land do not build and indicate 
that it is not their intention to, that it is an agricultural 
purpose. 
Obviously, it would be preferrable to have this written 
opinion from Mr. McCoy, but since it has taken so long to get 
even an oral one, I'm certain that we can rely upon on this. 
If you have any questions, feel free to give me a call. 
I have informed Mr. Spencer's Attorney, Bob Echard, of the 
decision and he indicates that they will be attempting to get 
this back on the calendar for our next meeting which I told him 
would be the 21st day of February. 
Yours very truly, 
RICHARD R. MEDSKER 
Attorney at Law 
RRM:rffflJ 
RICHARD R. MEDSKER // /$# 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2910 Washington Blvd , buitc MX) 
Ogden. Utah 84401 
Telephone W-0822 
February 6, 1984 
MINUTES 0' JE PLEASANT VIEW PLANNING COMM 
HELD 20 MAKCH 1984 . MEETING COMMENCED AT 7: 
ION MEETING 
03 P . M. 
& > 
MEMBERS PRESENT: 
INVOCATION: 
MINUTES: 
ITEMS DISCUSSED: 
#1 Dennis Spencer 
Property 
#2 Mr. Jones 
Bldg, Permit 
#3 Mr. Toone 
Bldg. Permit 
#4 Mayhew 
Pa V. Drive 
Leroy Harris, Chairman 
Leon Jones 
Kenton Barker 
Joyce Humphries 
Kenton Barker 
Pete Russell 
Paula Craven 
Gene Mortensen 
Hayward Wride (City Council) 
P^^ 
The minutes were approved with the following correction 
(item #3 be changed from RE-20 to A-l) 
1. Dennis Spencer P r o p e r t y 
2. Jones 31dg0 Permi t 
3 . Toone B ldg . Permi t 
4 . Mayhew 31dg0 Pe rmi t 
5 . Rezoning p r o p e r t y from A-5 to A - l . 
6. White Barn P r e s e n t a t i o n 
7 . Ted B u r r e l l - Gas Pumps, 
Discussion was p r e s e n t e d on Attorney McCoy1 s op in ion and 
the f ina l d e c i s i o n was t h a t the Planning Commission would 
abide by McCoy's d e c i s i o n . His dec is ion was t h a t i t does 
not c o n s t i t u t e a s u b - d i v i s i o n . Pete Russe l l made the 
motion t h a t they l e t him go ahead and s t a r t b u i l d i n g and 
i t is not necessa ry to go back to the Board of Adjustments
 a 
Leon Jones 2nd the m o t i o n . Voting was unanimous i n the 
aff i rmat ive, , 
Mr. wTones appeared r e q u e s t i n g permission to apply for a 
Bldg. Permit next door t o Orson Winwards p r o p e r t y . I t 
was d iscussed t h a t t h e r e was some homes in the a r e a t h a t 
have s idewalks , i t was s t a t e d t ha t Mr. Jones in tended to 
i n s t a l l s i d e w a l k s . I t was a l so discussed as t o who would 
be r e s p o n s i b l e fo r t he a s p h a l t between the road as i t now 
e x i s t s and the c u r b . Kenton Barker made the motion t h a t 
Mr. Jones r e q u e s t to a p p l y for a Bldg. Permit be g ran ted , 
Pete Russcill 2nd the mot ion , vot ing was unanimous in the 
a f f i r m a t i v e . 
Mr. Hansen appeared r e p r e s e n t i n g Mr. Toone r e q u e s t i n g 
permission to o b t a i n a B l d g . Permit for a new home 
d i r e c t l y e a s t of Mr. J o n e s . I t was*noted t h a t Mr. Toone 
a l so intended to i n s t a l l s idewalks , Leon Jones made the 
motion t h a t Mra Toone be g iven approval to o b t a i n a Bldg. 
Permit, Pete R u s s e l l 2nd the motion, vot ing was unanimous 
in the a f f i r m a t i v e 3 
Mr, Mayhew appeared r e q u e s t i n g permission to r a z e the old 
home a t 948 West P l e a s a n t View Dr0 and bu i ld a new home. 
I t was J . i s -ussed t h a t Mr. Mayhew's l o t was l a c k i n g the 
100 f t 0 f rontage but t h e r e has been a home t h e r e many y e a r s 
and ex i s t ed be fo re the zoning was put in to e f f e c t and would 
be an improvement to t h e are-i, ^inh th i s thought i n mind 
Pete Russe l l made the mot ion tha t they approve Mr. Mayhew's 
•request to o b t a i n a B l d g . Permit , Kenton Barker 2nd the 
motion, vo t ing was unanimous in the a f f i r m a t i v e . 
JACK C. HELGESEN 
R. SCOTT WATERFALL 
RICHARD W. JONES 
MICHAEL V.HOUTZ 
KEITH M. BACKMAN 
LUCILE KELLY LOWREY 
LAW OFFICES 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
AMERICA FIRST BUILDING 
4768 HARRISON BOULEVARD 
OGDEN, UTAH 84403-4305 
FAX 
(801) 479-4804 
TELEPHONE 
(801) 479-4777 
May 19, 1995 
Dennis Spencer 
P.O. Box 2220 
Ogden, Utah 84412-2220 
RE: Application for Appeal to Pleasant View City 
Dear Mr. Spencer: 
As you are aware this office represents Pleasant View City. Pleasant View City has 
delivered to me a copy of Your Application for an Appeal to the Pleasant View City 
Board of Adjustment. With that application you also submitted a check for $50.00. 
Enclosed is the check for $50.00 which is being returned to you for the reasons set forth 
below. 
In your application you indicated you were requesting a special exception to the 
ordinance, i.e. a renewal of the variance granted March 31, 1986. The Board of 
Adjustments cannot legally address this issue for the following reasons. Utah Code 
Annotated §10-9-706 grants to a board of adjustment the authority to hear and decide 
special exceptions, but states that it is only authorized to do so if permitted in the local 
zoning ordinance and only according to the standards contained in the local zoning 
ordinance. While the Pleasant View City zoning ordinance does permit special 
exceptions, the City has not adopted any standards upon which ,a special exception may 
be granted. Therefore the board of adjustment is without authority to grant special 
exceptions. In addition the action taken over eight years ago by the boarcToT 
? adjustment has no bearing on what the current board of adjustment may do or should 
l^do. 
If you would like to apply for a hearing before the board of adjustment based on some 
other provision of the law which would permit the board of adjustment to hear and 
decide your case, then you should reapply to the board for such a hearing. 
You should also be aware that it is not the role of the board of adjustment to intervene 
and decide a dispute between two^private property owners. From what I nSw about this 
situation from our prior discussions, it appears there is a private property owner with 
whom vou need to resolve a dispute regarding the scope of your right of way. That 
r n^ 
Dennis Spencer 
May 19, 1995 
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The City hopes that you will find a method wherein you can resolve this issue and 
obtain the results that you desire. 
Very truly yours, 
Richard W^Jbries 
RWJ/lgc 
cc: Pleasant View City 
enclosure 
MINUTES OF THE PLEASANT VIEW CI TV PLh-lNUlN& COMMISSION 
J-'EGULHR MEETING HELD JANUARY 16. : ^ ? 
Chairman .John Shepherd called the meeting to order at &: ©i3 P.M. 
Members Pr esent: 
John Shepherd, Chairman 
Frank Maughan 
Russ Chatelain 
Lynn Smith 
Bill Dodgson 
Kenton Barker, CC Rep. 
John Janson. City Planner 
Debbie Jones, Secretary 
Tern Cragun, Community Development 
Coordinator 
Uisifcrs Present: 
Lincoln S. Nelson 
Shir lee Nelson 
Stephen Bond 
Curt 1s Wo 1th1 us 
Jim Chamber1 in 
Lucille Ch a m b e r1In 
Scott Budge 
David Sheen 
Sam Love 
Jerry Lars en 
James Thorsted 
Edr 3 z Thorsted 
Wayne Kinney 
Barb Kinney 
Brent he 11er 
Denr<3 s Spencer 
Brent Marriott 
Glen Dick, em ore 
Tom Murrav 
THE AGENDA CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING: 
INVOCATION: Kenton Barker 
Motion was made to approve the minutes as amended of the meetings 
held December 5, 1996 and January c!, 1997 by Frank Maughan. 
Motion was seconded by Russ Chatelain. Voting was unanimous m 
favor. 
BUSINESS: 
(1) Election of Planning Commission Chairman and Vice 
Chairman for the year 1997. 
Frank Maughan made to motion to table the agenda item until 
a full quorum was present. Motion was seconded by Bill Dodgson. 
Voting was unanimous in favor. 
<E') Paul Mackley - Request to »c^ « r u u n u 
Conditional Use Permit for a shed in the CP-3 Zone. 
r— . _ _ I. K.4_.. L_ _ _ __l _ J_ l_ _ _ . ! - _ .L. _ _ _ X. — f~ I . . U. 1 -. 
set a Public Hearing for 
Frank Maughan made the motion 
February E'0, 199 
CP-3 Zone. Motion was 
unanimous in favor. 
a -cn to set a Public Hearing for 
7 for a Conditional Use Permit for a shed in the 
, ^  ••— seconded bv Russ Chatelain. iin-*-n«n ^ IOC Voting was 
consider amending the- Master Road (3) Public Hearing to 
Plan in the MP-1 Zone. 
Lynn Smith made a motion to open the Public Hearing. Motion 
was seconded by Frank Maughan. Noting was unanimous in favor. 
Frank Maughan asked the question why the road was;, proposed 
there in the first place? Terri Cragun said that was th.e way the 
city engineer drew the master road plan for the MP-1 Zone. She 
said that a public hearing was held and the commission voted to 
accept the engineer's drawings-
Bert Smith said he was opposed to the road going along the 
east side of the railroad tracks. He felt like there is no 
property to be landlocked in the area and that the property gets 
too narrow at the north end that a road would take up too much 
land. He felt a road is not necessary if the area is planned 
ri ght. 
Jerry Larsen said there is no need for a road on the east 
side of the railroad tracks. He said that the land only goes in 
from the highway 500 feet at the mos.t. He said that the property 
owners could apply to Highway 89 for access if they needed it. 
Scott Budge said he understood that the road would be right 
up the middle of the whole area. He said that there is no need 
for two roads in the area. 
John Shepherd told the audience of Parkland Business Center 
and their plans for improving the west master road through their 
property at the west end of the MP-1 Zone. 
David Skeen. another property owner stated that he felt the 
road was not necessary on the east side of the railroad tracks. 
John Shepherd said that it looked like the majority of the 
audience would like to see the road deleted from the master road 
plan. 
Lynn Smith made a motion to go out of the Public Hearing. 
Frank Maughan seconded the motion. Voting was unanimous in 
favor. 
Frank Maughan made the motion to recommend the City 
Council to amend the Master Road Plan by deleting the road that 
goes along the east side of the railroad tracks. Motion was 
seconded by Russ Chatelain. Voting was unanimous in favor. 
open the Public Hearing. 
Voting was unanimous in 
:one change would 
(4) Public Hearing to consider amending the Master Plan by 
changing the MP-1 Zone to a CP—3 Zone. 
Lynn Smith made the motion to 
Motion was seconded by Frank Maughan 
favor. 
Jerry Larsen asked the commission what the 
do to the tax base and if it would affect property taxes? 
Frank Maughan said that historically the county says the 
change of a zone shouldn't change the tax base until the land use 
is changed. 
Lincoln Nelson said he recently bought property in that area 
with the intent for animals and a shed. He asked if hre could put 
a shed on the property if the zone changed? 
Mr. Nelson was told that he could still have agriculture. 
Bert Smith said that his property is currently in M-i, M-£ 
Zones and he needs the heavy zoning there for his business. He 
also wcinl s to oricourciLjfc a good tax base for i hi- :.tv. He asked 
if tr.e c 11 v changed to CP- 3. ct n d a m a ri u ^ achu-j n t> tas*r,pss can e 
along, could the people ask for a rezone cgam"'. HL< sajc he 
would like to see his property stay MP-1. 
John J an £ on brought up the fact that Pa-"Klano BusintLs 
Center has just received final approval from the c:itv, and it 
would be to their benefit if they h^d the option for more 
commere1al zoning. 
Kenton Barker agreed. He said Parkland would like to tee 
CP-3 zoning because it would give them more options. Plus the 
city would get more sales taK from a commercial zone. 
Paul Mackley said that he manufactures trusses in the CP-3 
Zone, but manufacturing has become n.ore restrictive for him from 
MP-1 to CP—3. He says the developer goes through so much more in 
terms of too many steps and too much time loss. He felt like 
there was no good reason to make zoning more restrictive. He 
said he would have held out to stay MP—1 if he could go back 
three years. 
LeRoy Harris said he feels the city needs to look at the 
long range plan with vision. He said the city needs to set a 
tone as to what we want in the way of long term benefits. 
David Skeen said he would recommend leaving the zone at MP-1 
and not change anything until the city is requested to do so by 
individual property owners. He would rather have the area remain 
MP-1 for his small business. 
Jerry Larsen would like to see everything stay the same zone 
as it is now. 
Frank Maughan made the motion to close the Public Hearing. 
Motion was seconded by Russ Chabelain. Voting was unanimous in 
favor. 
John Jans-on told the commission it was his opinion that tney 
had se*p,al options. They could change the peripheral to CP and 
keep the inner MP. They could also change the MP to allow nore 
CP businesses. 
Lynn Smith said that he felt the CP Zone is appropriate to 
the west side of the tracks. He said that would preserve the 
integrity of the general developer. He said Parkland Business 
Center has in mind commercial uses in their development. 
Frarik Maughan made the motion to recommend to the City 
Council that portion of the MP—1 Zone, west of the railroad 
tracks, excluding Brill Manufacturing, be redesignated from MP-1 
Zone to CP—3 Zone on the Master Plan. Motion was seconded bv 
Lynn Smith. Voting was unanimous in favor. 
(5) Dennis Spencer - Request preliminary approval for 
Spencer Acres Subdivision. 
Mr. Spencer discussed with the commission the status of his 
proposed subdivision. He said he submitted all the materials to 
the city in November and he felt like at that time we (the city 
and Mr. Spencer) had passed the hurdle on letting Mr. Spencer 
build on right of way. 
Russ Chatelam asked Mr. Spencer why he thought that hurdle 
had been passed"1 
Mr. Spc-ncer said that the city attorney haid cigrtrbd that he 
(/y / ZU+^s^ 
can build on a right of way. 
John Shepherd said that the ordinances state, in order to 
have a subdivision, there has to be a public street that is 
dedicated to the city. Mr. Spencer told the c:« ran; i ss i on that 
there never will be a road dedicated to the city. because 
Cherrywood encroached on the right of way. Mr. Spencer said 
there is a road there but it will never be a public road. Mr. 
Spencer said that all this was covered in the November meeting 
and that there never will be a public, dedicated street in front 
of his property. 
John Shepherd asked Terri Cragun what else Mr. Spencer 
needed before he could get preliminary approval. 
Terri said that last night (January 15, 1997) the city 
received a drawing for Mr. Spencer's storm water and that needs 
to go the city engineer for approval. Terri also read a letter 
from the city attorney. Rich Jones, addressed to Mr. Spencer's 
attorney, Raymond Rounds, with stated that Mr. Spencer needs to 
work out an agreement with the owners of Cherrywood and do what 
the city ordinances require of him. 
Mr. Spencer said that he doesn't plan 
Cherrywood in any way. He said he will set 
perimeters the city tells h i rn to. He wants tc 
on 
1. 
t o e n c r o a c h on 
t h e home a t a n y 
a c c e s s b o t h l o t s 
h i s p r o p o s e d s u b d i v i s i o n by d r i v i n g a c r o s s t h e p r o p e r t y on l o t 
i f s h e w o u1d g i v e M r 
t o do so he c a n g e t 
S p e n c e r a 
pre 1i m inary 
John Shepherd asked Terri 
list of exactly what he needs 
approval. c r > 
Terri said iy-f* Mr, ij?~«enceir .has all thr? information ho neecjs 
*Vftlt tVllW'lflft* m ' ^ ,r'0^^jfe^Av4.'--- Sl p s*->Tlfr f\arj <yU staff 
depart: nle'ftt*. * •rc:-i>pC'^  i s f *- ^  ml ftriv di ty attorney to )~i£ _ citu-,,fij'" 
rtLjdre %z i r.^  what he needs to do.' She said she doesn't feel right 
a'tioiii" itemizing a list for Mr. Spencer, because it may not be all 
inclusive, that the city engineer may come up with something 
else, or the city attorney. Terri felt like Mr. Spencer has all 
the information he needs and he should take some responsibility 
to see that he does what the city is requiring of him to do based 
on the information he has. 
Mr. Spencer said that Terri should be removed from being 
involved in the approval of his subdivision. He said she has 
fought him for five years. He claimed she is against his 
subdivision because she has a personal interest in Cherrywood. and 
owns pr ope rt y there. He said the city has allowed Terri Cragun, 
her family, and Cherrywood Condominiums to encroach upon the 
right of way of Mr. Spencer. He also said that there will never 
be a dedicated road in his subdivision because Pleasant View City 
allowed Cherrywood to encroach on his right of way. ,^ 
John Janson said that it is up to the individual to say if 
they have a conflict of interest and apparently Terri feels like 
she has no conflict of interest. He also stated that there has 
not been a subdivision application given to the city so if there 
is not an application, then basically there is no subdivision to 
be considered for approval. 
Frank Maughan made the motion to table the discussion until 
* G . < LilcA W * Uk\oM-dcwbf3)cbUei fofaM 
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i & i n M r - S p e n c e r' s h a n d i & take n c a r e of. 
Motion died for lack of a second. 
Lynn Smith made the motion to deny preliminary approval for 
Spencer Peres Subdivision based c^n the city subdivision 
ordinances, Rich Jones' letter dated 18/£l/96, Northview Fire 
Department's letter dated 1/10/97, staff report dated 1/7/97, and 
Neil Smiths memorandum dated 1/6/97. Rust Chatelain seconded the 
motion. Voting was unanimous in favor. 
Russ Chatelain told Mr. Spencer that because he is askino 
for approval for a subdivision, then Mr. Spencer needs to FoTTow 
the city subdivision ordinances. He said the city is not asking 
for him to do anything more than they require of all subdividers. 
Frank Maughan told Mr. Spencer that he is offended at his 
attack on a staff member and that Mr. Spencer was totally out of 
jrrgpr^— He would move that the commission take a stand and 
censure Mr. Spencer. He said that "this body does not need to 
d i scu s s any member of this body or staff with personal attacks. 
If you. Mr. Spencer, need to make an-accusation, there is a court 
of law. This body will not allow personal attacks. You have 
offended the body, the city and the staff." 
John Shepherd told Mr. Spencer that the commission would 
appreciate respect, for^ the commission, for Mr. Spencer and for 
the staff. 
(6) To n? Murray — Request pre 1i m i nary appr oval for R i dg e v iew 
Subdivision, Phase I. Request preliminary approval for Ridgeview 
Subdivision, Phase II. 
Mr. Murray told the commission that he felt he had 
submitted everything. The commission reviewed the memorandum, 
from the city engineer, Neil Smith, dated January 15, 1997. 
Di scussion fol1 owed. 
Lynn Smith made the motion for preliminary approval for 
Phase I of Ridgeview Subdivision with the understanding that the 
retention basin is in compliance with the 100 year storm for 
runoff and runoff easement is received if engineer states it is 
necessary (see Reeves letter dated iS/19/96, item #5). Motion 
was seconded by Frank Maughan. Voting was unanimous in favor. 
Mr. Murray asked about getting preliminary approval for 
Phase II of his subdivision. Mr. Murray has no secondary water 
for the second phase of his subdivision. Mr. Wolthius, Mr. 
Murray's attorney, suggested that Mr. Murray be able to sign an 
agreement with the city that was written by Rich Jones, the city 
attorney, to allow the start of preliminary even though there is 
no secondary water. 
Terri Cragun said that the City Council has not seen the 
agreement written by our city attorney. She felt that the 
council should review the agreement and get their approval before 
anyone signs anything. 
(7) Floyd Uloodfield - Request preliminary approval for 
Grand Legacy Subdivision, Phase II. 
Brent Marriott was representing Mr. Uloodfield for his 
subdivision. Mr. Marriott stated that they will need to sign an 
agreement with the city because they also do not have secondary 
wat e r a v a i 1 ab 1 e t o t h e ni f o r t h e i r s ubd -:. v i L> i on. Mr . Marr i u 11 sa i 
that Mr. Woodfield paid S5S, Q'30 for his share of secondary wat e 
to be brought into his-, subdivision. 
Discussion followed. 
F r• a n k M a u g h a n made t o m otic n t o g r a n t p r e 1 i IT; i n a r y a p p r o v a 
to Grand Legacy, Phase II, subject to concerns noted by the cit 
engineer in memorandum dated wTanusiry 6. 1997 and provided tha 
secondary water delivery is guaranteed by Weber / Box Elde 
Conservation District and the agreement that Rich Jones propose 
is approved by the City Council and signed by Mr. Woodfield 
Motion was seconded by Bill Dodgson. Voting was unanimous i 
favor. 
The memorandum from Neil Smith notes that Mr. Woodfiel 
needs to have secondary water addressed and show how the syste 
will be installed and also requests a temporary cul-de-sac at th 
east end of 4(350 North Street. 
(6) Jim Chctmberlin - Request preliminary approval f o 
Pheasant Hill Subdivision. 
Mr. Chamberlin also needs secondary water for approval fo 
his subdivision. He said he would be willing to sign th 
agreement after the council approves it. 
Mr. Chamberlin said that Mr. Woodfield said he would gran 
M r. C ["i a m b e r 1 i n a n e a s e m e n t f o r h i m t o r u n t h t- s t o r rn r u noff w a t e i 
off of Pheasant Hill, as soon as Mr. Woodfield receive' 
preliminary approval for Phase II of Grand Legacy. 
Kenton Barker suggested that the city reoeive that agreemc-n 
before preliminary approval is given. 
Terri Cragun explained to the Chamber 1ins that the qity doe 
need a written easement (reviewed by the city attorney) thai 
states Mr. Woodfield is willing to let Pheasant Hill run it'' 
storm water runoff onto Mr. Woodfield' s property. 
Frank Maughan made the motion to table preliminary approval 
for Pheasant Hill Subdivision to February £Ci, 1997, Motion wa« 
seconded by Russ Chatelain. Voting was unanimous in favor. 
(9) Discussion and/or action to clarify the definition of i 
service station. 
John Shepherd told the Planning Commission about Cit} 
Council meeting that was held January 14, 1997.* 
Kenton Barker said that he doesn't want the service statioT 
there. He feels like there are more appropriate place in the 
city for that type of a.business. He said that he talked to the 
city attorney and asked him to define 'auto repair' and 'service 
station' according to our city ordinances. 
John Shepherd made a motion to hold a Public Hearing or 
February E'0, 1997 to discuss amending the ordinance to include 
automobile repair as a Conditional Use in CP-1. Motion was 
seconded by Bill Dodgson. Voting was unanimous in favor. 
(10) Discussion and/or action to consider apartments in the 
city. 
Terra Cragun told the commission that as far as she can tell 
there are approximately eight (3) apartments that have been in 
7<Ht 
the city twenty five years or more- She said that there are more 
recent ones that have been built in the past few years that may 
be affected by the ordinances. 
John Jan son led a discussion with the commission on why 
consider allowing accessory apartments in the city, what types of 
apartments would they feel would be acceptable, and what the 
issues would and could be. 
Discussion followed. 
Frank Maughan made the motion that the Planning Commission 
come prepared to the February £0, 1997 meeting, to discuss the 
subject of ancillary living space in single family dwellings and 
be prepared to reach consensus on that subject and to schedule a 
combined work session with the City Council. Motion was seconded 
by Bill Dodgson. Voting was unanimous in favor. 
MINUTES CP THE BCARD OF ADJUSTMENT? MEETING HELD 
31 March 1986 
MEMBERS PRESENT: VISITORS 
Gladys Evans (Chairperson) Dennis Spence: 
Glen Anderson Ron Horton 
Vaughan Larsen John Malmberg 
Pete Russell Gordon Cragun 
John Parker 
ITEMS DISCUSSED: 
1. Dennis Spencer appeared requesting a varience to build a home on 
a private R-O-W. The Board of Adjustments discussed the need to plan for 
future development for property owners beyond Mr. SpenceCs. 
The need for a temporary cul-de-sac for a turn around for Emergency 
Vehicles was discussed• Mr, Spencer stated that they would like to keep 
it as private as possible and he could net see the need for a pul-de-sac. 
After reading the stipulations given to Mr. Jcnn Parker at I the 11 July 
1983 Beard of Adjustments Meecing/ Gladys Evans made a motion that Mr. 
Scencer be granted a varience if: MrT Spencer agreed to following 
stipulations: 
a- A 20,000 ft let still exists after the R-O-W has been granted, 
b. That the building must be set back at least 30 ft from the 
front let line, 
c. That an Engineers design shewing cuts for utilities!* grades for 
tne roads, and the design of the R-O-W for future development in 
the area be furnished the City. 
d. That should any future development oe made/ that the property 
owners participate in hard surfacing the road/ curb and gutter and 
sidewalks and tne Mr. Spencer provide an Escrow iri the atoount 
determined by City Engineer Neil Smith for the improvements 
boarding his property. Pete Russell 2nd the motion. Motion 
carried. 
ADJOURNMENT: 5:55 P.M. 
Submitted by, 
Gloria H. Jenkinsf Recorder 
November 5, 1993 
Mr Kenton P Barker 
Pleasant View Board of Adjusments 
Dear Kenton 
Again we find, upon research of Pleasant View City public records, letters 
that have been filed, that require a response from us, as they affect 
the development of our property that boarders Cherrywood Manor. 
We refer now to your letter dated February 18 1993, and addressed To 
Whom It May Concern. 
Points that need clarification are: 
#1 - In paragraph #2, you state, "See copy of the final plat declara 
tion of covenants, conditions and restrictions letter which is attach-
ment #1," We were unable to obtain this at the city offices, please 
supply us with same. 
#2 - You also state "see attachment #2" please supply us with same. 
#3 - Your postscript says, "see attachment #3", please supply 
us with copy of same. 
#4 - Your last paragraph states, "This is the way I remember the 
conditions at the time." Please clarify when you reportedly had these 
conversations with Mr Spencer & Mr Parker and the time elapsed between 
then and Feb 18, 1993. 
Also I would like to "jog" your memory further, as you stated Mr Spencer 
and Mr Parker apparently made the exact response. I would like to 
remind you that my response was as follows: We had already attempted 
to negotiate with Mr Johnson, for the sale of our property. We agreed 
to trade our 2/3 acre lot for equity in a Cherrywood Manor condo for 
fair market value of both. Mr Johnson did not accept this offer and to 
complicate matters, stated we would not receive compensation for our 
lot until Cherrywood Manor was completed and all liens satisfied. I 
think you would agree this would have been folly, as Cherrywood Manor 
problems still exist to this date. 
It appears that Pleasant View City is attempting to saddle us and our 
neighbors with Cherrywood's problems. We find this totally unacceptable 
and request a speedy response to this letter as time is of the essence. 
Sincerely,// ,_ lA!^^ 
Dennis V and Linda S Spencer^ 
cc: To all Pleasant View Officials 
Q 
September 19, 1994 
Mayor D. Brent Hales 
Pleasant View City 
885 West Pleasant View Dr. 
Pleasant View, Ut 84414 
Dear Mayor Hales : 
Again, we find it necessary to write to you concerning our building 
lot, located in Pleasant View City. We and our adjoining neighbors 
continue to receive harassment and lack of cooperation, from Cherrywood 
Manor, which borders our property. 
As you are aware, we and our neighbors are in possession of a 60' 
right of way, at the northern border of said Cherrywood Manor. 
When said Cherrywood Manor was first developed, Pleasant View City 
ignored our right of way and to this time has been uncooperative in 
the development, of our property, for residential use. Again, we 
appeal to you to renew our building permits, accessed by the existing 
private road. This appears to be the only logical solution, as Cherry-
wood has refused to participate in a public road. 
Hopefully your response will be swift and comprehensive, as we have 
reached a point where drastic measures must be taken. 
Dennis V Spencer 
1450 North 400 East #125 
Ogden, Ut 84404 
cc:' Mel Rogers, Pres Cherrywood Manor 
John & Lola Parker 
Vernon Perkins 
Leon & Juanita Fowers 
Clair Knight 
Lillie Amidan 
RAYMOND B. ROUNDS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2650 WASHINGTON BLVD., SUITE 102 
OGDEN, UTAH 8440! 
(801) 621-4015 
October 8, 1996 
Richard W. Jones 
Heigesen, Waterfall & Jones, P.C, 
America First Building 
4768 Harrison Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403-4 305 
Re: Dennis Spencer v. City of Pleasant View 
Dear Richard: 
After our meeting on September 24, 2 996, I received copies of 
the Pleasant View City ordinances dealing with subdivisions, storm 
sewer and zoning applicable to the issues at hand* I have reviewed 
such documents and have again consulted with my client regarding a 
building permit that he would desire on land owned by him. 
The first contention of the City appeared to me to revolve 
around the ability of Dennis Spencer to have adequate access to 
utilities to service a proposed building on his lots, I will, break 
down the issues into categories and then address the resolution of 
those questions. 
1. First, I direct your attention to a quitclaim deed duly-
recorded with Weber County at Book 1424, Page 2443, wherein Paul B" 
Cragun Investment Company, a Utah Limited Partnership, as signed by 
Paul B. Cragun, General Partner, deeded to Dennis V. Spencer and 
Linda S. Spencer the right-of-way which ..s in question. I direct 
your attention to the beginning of the metes and bounds description 
of the right-of-way itself wherein the right-of-way includes "a 
non-exclusive right-of-way for purposes of ingress, egress and 
UTILITY INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE over and across the following 
described tract of land, to wit:" (emphasis added) According to 
my reading of this right-of-way there would be no need for Dennis 
Spencer to access any private property exclusive of his right-of-
way in order to connect to appropriate utilities. All discussions 
about gaining permission from private land owners on the nortih or 
south of the right-of-way are therefore pointless. 
Richard W. Jones 
October 8, 1996 
Page 2 
2, gi;linary Waterlines. Apparently as far back as May 16, 
1977, when Lot No. 0025 was developed by James G. Laughter and John 
and Janet Malmberg, the issue of waterlines running along the 
northern edge of that property became a question. According to 
Exhibit B, attached for your perusal there was an agreement between 
affected parties on improvements, which included water. The 
document was duly recorded at Book 1213
 r Pages 27, 28, 29 and 30 at 
the Weber County Recorder's Office. Particularly, when John and 
Janet Malmberg purchased the property from James G. Laughter, there 
were agreements as to cost of extension of the wateriine to the 
western boundary of that property- As you recall from our personal 
investigation of the property, the Malmberg properties' west 
boundary is directly across the street from the Spencer property. 
Apparently the Malmbergs were required to pay one-half (1/2 i of the 
cost of extending the wateriine to the west end of their property 
and Elmer K- and Melba M, Bailey were required to pay the other 
one-half (1/2) of the cost of extending the wateriine to the west 
end of the Malmberg property. This document was duly signed by all 
of the parties involved and recorded. Mr. Spencer, being aware of 
this particular situation, tells me that the clear intention of the 
parties during the negotiation of this process was to extend 
utilities to the wast end of the Malmberg property anticipating the 
possibility of development on the north side of the road and right-
of-way. The wateriine does extend under the roadway to the west 
end of the Malmberg property and then continues on under the right-
of-way to service Cherrywood Condominiums. This is not an 
exclusively owned waterpipe by Cherrywood Condominiums, the 
Malmbergs, or their predecessors in interests, or the Baileys, but 
simply a wateriine to access properties around this area. Mr* 
Spencer therefore has access to culinary water within an acceptable 
distance from the lot in question. 
3. Storm Sewer Improvement. Mr- Spencer indicates to me that 
storm sewer improvements have been made to the land in order to 
deal with runoff both on property to the north of his and for the 
Cherrywood Condominiums. Mr. Spencer states that the runoff that 
would come through his lots has been improved to deal with movement 
of water through the land, and there is a storm sewer collector on 
the south end of the property which goes under the roadway and 
moves water away from the condominiums- These improvements have 
already been accomplished and I read nothing in the Pleasant View 
ordinances, Chapter 13.08, which would prohibit a building permit 
based on any criteria contained therein. 
4
- Sanitary Seyag.g. A survey of the land indicates that 
there is a sewage line extending under Pleasant View's road and 
under the roadway which ends inside of the property owned by Dennis 
Spencer. Apparently the sewer system was put in place to deal with 
sewage from buildings just north of the Spencer property and his 
ability to access sanitary^sewer lines is not questionable. 
Richard W, Jones 
October 8, 1996 
Page 3 
5- Utilities. Electricity and telephone transmission lines 
exist on a pole in the northwest corner of the Malmberg property. 
There would be absolutely no problem accessing these utilities by 
simply having them cross the right-of-way and enter into Spencers-' 
property. 
6. JLL££* There is a fire hydrant on 950 West Street, just 
east of the Malmberg property, by which the fire department can 
access all areas surrounding the right-of-way. Additionally, as I 
recall, there is a fire hydrant on the west side of the right-of-
way near Cherrywood Condominiums which would have direct access to 
the Spencer property. 
Despite Terry Cragun's assertions that this was never done, 
Mr- Spencer states unequivocally that in 1993f when Pleasant View 
City determined that Mr. Spencer was a one lot subdivider, Mr. 
Spencer consulted engineers and surveyors at a cost of nearly 
S3,000.00 to address the questions which now seem to be arising 
again. Mr. Spencer appeared on the Saturday morning meeting of the 
Planning Commission after having previously provided thirteen (13) 
separate copies of all of the actions that he had done in order to 
demonstrate utility hookups and compliance with the subdivision 
ordinance of the City of Pleasant View. He gave all thirteen (13) 
copies to Terry Cragun for dissemination to the Planning 
Commission. Although the Planning Commission, for what reason 1 
cannot discern, determined that they would not review the matters 
presented by Mr. Spencer, the City of Pleasant view should have 
copies of all of the actions he took regarding this matter, unless 
they were discarded arbitrarily and capriciously. 
It is interesting for me to note that after seven (7) months 
of dealing with this case, I new learn that there is no explicit 
prohibition in obtaining a building permit on a piece of property 
simply because the property is fronted by a right-of-way and not by-
public access. After leaving ycu on September 24, 1996, I obtained 
a copy of Title 17 of the Pleasant view city Ordinances entitled 
Subdivisions. I read much to my surprise, as indicated by ycu in 
ycur fax to me dated September 24, 1996, that Provision 17.16.040 
allows a building permit on a piece of land on a private right-of-
way i f: 
1, The Planning Commission determines that it is impractical 
to extend streets to ser^e .snen. lots; 
2, The area of the right-of-way shall be an addition to the 
minimum lot area requirements of the zone in which the lot is 
located; 
3, The grade of any portion of the right-of-way shall not 
exceed fifteen percent (15%); 
Richard W. Jones 
October 8, 1996 
Page 4 
4. Lots so created shall be large enough to comply with all 
yard and area requirements of the zone in which the lot is located. 
In the case at hand the Planning Commission has not extended 
the public street to serve the lot. The RE-20 Zone would not be 
violated by the building permit on the property owned by Dennis 
Spencer. The grade at no portion of the right-of-way exceeds 
fifteen percent (15%) and any building can clearly be in compliance 
with all yard and area requirements of the 2one. Having taken this 
additional step of review, I see no reason whatsoever for denial of 
a building permit to Dennis Spencer nor do I feel that a special 
exception has to be granted him in order to accomplish this task* 
Mr. Spencer can and has complied with all city ordinances and Utah 
State law which I have reviewed on the matter. 
Please review the materials provided to you and respond within 
ten (10) days so that I can adequately advise my client as to his 
next step. 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this matter 
please contact me at the above-captioned telephone number or 
address. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
/ 
Raymond B. Rounds 
Attorney at Law 
RBR/zao 
Enclosures 
LAW M*?1<1 
HZLGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
KMWWOW lOUlIVARO 
*f n*u. MAG**** Mi)t7*-4rn 
(101) «7 
October 21. 1996 
Mr Raymond Rounds # / J / ^ A / 
2650 Washington B'vd #102 ^ W • , A^ '' 
Ogd«a Utah 84401 ^\ K^ <a/>A<f 
RE Spencer v Pleasant View C'ty £* / / , / ' -A/^'*' 
Dear Raymond / / i / ^ ^ 
/ appreciated receiving '/cur letter of October 8, 1996, I wiiJ not attempt to comment on 
\n* v^  nous contenders and points you made m your letter but will allow those matter* 
to be reviewed by the proper C<ty persor.net. inctudinQ the planning commission, board 
of adjustment, city council and city engineer. 
Without knowjngjhe entire history of this matter, it *s my understanding Mr Spencer has 
)/u<*4 — never reqjjesjgdaSaildinq permit crfth'SpVoperty n Pleasant View City I believe ha 
^ has in the oass unsuccessfully scugnt subdivision approval aid still nseds to obtain 
subdivision approval s^ nce ne has divided the property a number of times during the 
jirfj.n/a— oastjew years Assurn/ng he meets the criteria contained in the City subdivision 
i ordinance, zoning ordinance and other relevant ordinances ft appears for Mr Spencer^ 
j&$oi\fa fits access problem t*e planning commission womd first have to determine thaP" 
(Trsjnot prectlcjino^ifend the rraei that serves"hl^propertyj then he~would neea to 
seek a variance from the Poard of aajustment pursuani toTFie provisions of Pleasant 
View Code §17.16.04C and ary other relevant law c'eal>ng with variances I suggest 
mat Mr Spencer submit the necessary documents to fne apprcpngte Ctfy departments 
and personnel They will then jndergo the appropr-ate review, approval and input 
process 
It seems to me tnat even though W S^ancsr r,cs a'n ^ a&* ment to access hts property, 
under Utah law he cannot enlarge that access td! *Wrva property other than the property 
to which the easement original ran nor can he enfege ttv use of the easement It cJ/La^ a ^x 
may be wise to commun cate and work out apy neo*Sf SjfVi* greements with Cherrywood ^J 
Condominiums since Mr Spencers subdiv»cmg!anlr instruction may require him to 
ms'a'l Improvements across Che-rywood's pnvdie>y owned property Even though ^e 
apparently *as an easement over Chemywood's property, I do not believe Utah law 
permrts him to improve or change Cherrywood's property without Cherrywood's 
consent. Unless you understand the scope of Mr. Spencer's easement to Pe different or 
C^irK fy'3^ Sc* oC 'a m r'l 
-AiV upfU F 
2o:-
Mr. Raymond Rounds 
October 21 1996 
Page 2 
£ " o ^ - c o m ™ , to the City that the ,«ues 
approval being granted VZ hZ^rl C h e r r > ™ * * * * Mr Spencer prior to 
since ,t seeris f i ^ ' n j T t r ^ ^ 9 r n r t ^ ^ « * * > » * • "^ Mr. Spencer 
Property, tf C t m ^ ^ 0 ^ 1 ^ ? 0 ^ Er0P*nV t 0 9 3 , n a c c e s s t 0 » * 
or power the C . t y ^ o
 0fce rhem *n 1 * ° * T ' h ^ *' a m n o t ***" <* « V Mm*** 
•ssue ft I am w r o £ D i e e s ^ ? f ~ i c o ° ^ e r a t 9 *»<h Mr Spencer to clanfy the eccss, 
wro, .g pieaso hofp ne understand why you mSht fee! differently 
assume Mr Spencer „, , foiicw the course coffin* aoove unless | hear diffe ,ently from you. 
Very truly yours, 
RWJ/IQC *'ChajTw J&n« 
cc. Pleasant V*ew Oty s ^ ; 
MINUTES OF THE PLEASANT VIEW CITY PLANNING COMMISSION 
REGULAR MEETING HELD NOVEMBER El, 199b AT 5:35 P.M. 
Vice Chair in an Lynn Smith called the meeting to order at 5:35 P.M. 
with the following present 
MEMBERS PRESENT: 
Lynn Smith, Vice Chairman 
Mike Humphreys 
Bill Dodgson 
John Shepherd 
Frank Maughan 
R u s s Ch a t e 1 a i n 
THE AGENDA CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING: 
INVOCATION: Russ Chatelain 
Minutes of the meetings field October- 17. 1996 were 
amended on a notion made by Lynn Swith- Motion was 
Frar.U Maughan. Voting was unanimous in favor. 
BUSINESS: 
(I; PcAil Mack ley - Request bo set Public Hearing to 
co.-zider amending the Master Ro^d Plan in the MP-1 Zone. Paul 
Mack ley told the Planning Commission that he had been approached 
\DV Mike Vandenberg bo u*:.y art easement for WorldCom to put in a 
r e g sr. e r a ':• i o n s t at i o n. Mr . M a c k 1 e y told t hi e c o m n\ i s s i o n t h a t h e 
o w n s a b o A t f o u r a c r e s a n d c u r r s n 11 y h a s 5 £i s t o r- age u n i t s a n d 
T/•• s.i s s we 11 Manuf act ur i ng. He said that at t h e t ir:e Tr u s s well was 
built the city engineer told hi^ not to do the detention pond for 
bhi ay-ea until the county decided if they were going to build on 
o r " c t, Mr. M ack 1 e y s a i d h e n e v er h e ard f'r o z\ t h e c i t y an d wh e n 
Worldcom approached hin, he sold then: an easement on the 
s o •-'. t h w est c o r n e r :• -•- r i s p r ope r ty. After the sale of the 
easement, Mr. Mack ley said the city notified him that the city's 
naster road plan went along the west side of his property. He 
said he is working things out with WeridCen, but would like to 
VISITORS PRESENT: 
Robert Hyde 
Mi ke Variden berg 
•James Poulsen 
Dennis S p e n c e r 
Paul Mack 1e y 
Jim Fisher 
approved as 
s e conded b v 
the Planning Co mm i s s i on their concerns about being delayed any 
l o n g e r for ths "regeneration . station. The Planning Commission 
told their: that they had recommended to the City Council approval 
of t h e regeneration station, and it was the City Council that had 
d e n i e d the request, so they need to go back to the City Council 
•with revisions or whatever the council required them to do-
Paul Mackley also told the Planning Commission that he was 
going to do a building expansion on the property to the north of 
his storage unit and asked what steps needed to be taken? He was 
told he needed to bring plans and a plat plan into the city and 
r e q u e s t a Conditional Use Permit for an expansion and go through 
the p r o p e r steps, i.e., Public Hearing, etc. 
(£') Discussion ar\d/or action to set a Public Hearing to 
c o n s i d e r changing the MP-1 Zone to a CP Zone. 
Lynn Smith said that he felt rezoning the MP-1 Zone to a CP 
Zone 'would be an asset to the city. He said Brill might object 
to h a v i n g to interface with the CP Zone. 
D i s c 1.1 ssion followed. 
Mike Humphreys made a motion to set a Public Hearing for 
- dQ~7 r97< to rov:ider r e z o, inc the M P — 1 Z one t c •January .-. 
Zone. Motion was seconded by Frank M a u g h a 
u nan i m o u s in favor. 
w a s 
2THER BUSINESS: Dennis Spencer appealed :• n e «.- ,- .C ... .... 
(- -,7 J. |_. #_. j_; ^ <= -l_ ... .-<w, , 
W o r t h and ISStf 
'.*;.?st« H e told the c o m m i s s i o n that f o - th r e e years he !~as b e e n 
t-yi:\g tu d e v e l o p his property and h a s a l w a y s come to a d:,*c end. 
r "-
1 r-. , 
.toe at appro* 1 mat 1 
* i H s a 1 f i l e d a c l a i m a c a i n s t t h e c i t y . H e s a i d t h e c \ t v 
:-: 'CCr-n e y 'i a s g 1 v • 
g o i n g on h i 
h i m a v e n u e s o p r o c e e d w i t i 
g o b e f : t h e P1 a n n i n q C 0 m m i 
i s c he 
; e l d by 
and see 
g e t 
c i t y 
t h e y 
*= i 11 •- -• K l e t o p u t a p \ ib :-. , , K 1 -. .-. t - o e t t h r o u g h h i s p r o p e r t v . 
S p e n c e r c l a i m e d h a s h a d b u i l d i n g p e r m i t s g r a n t e d f o r t w o 
t h e l o t s , o n e g r a n t e d bv t h e P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n a n d o n : 
^•r&~ ; h e B o a r d '.: f a d j u s t m e n t s . 
M — said cnat in was* approached - by 
• wo od condom i n i um s t hat th ey wo u Id like t o use Mr. 
prope-ty a. 1 d c as <- 1 m "» 3. I- -. •-I; s* - t n •? 71 •5- h * v wen t bankrupt 
; e n c e r 1 s 
He said 
!;h?y (Cherry-wood) put in a private road and they encroached on 
Mr. '= pence-' s property by about ^ i v e or six feet, Mr. S p e n c e r 
•:,-.id that Ray /ohnson told him if he didn't wor-< with Cher-.-/wood, 
the- they would 1 a -•::! \ oc!-: hi"i, M--.. ?|:ercsr said that Cherrywood 
wanted him to deed over his property to them ar\d be with 
C h e r - y w c o d . Mr. Spencer told the Planning Commission that they 
ha-s to decide now if a public road should go through his 
:-{ •:: I .< ~ H 
- . - 4 . .. 
. ; r •. 
r, z-penc er r: ow n o v;r 
• -t y :s t h e r e i- no p u b l i c s t r e e t 0 
H a l e s t o l d the ' P l a n n i n g C o m m i :.:• s 1 :",_ 
::•;•!; iTor I n g r e s : , e g r e s s a n d ut i 1 i t i 
o u: 
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Mr. S h e p h e r d t o l d Mr. S p e n c e r t h a t any new s u b d i v i s i o n h a s 
t o confov-rs t o t h e s t a n d a r d s and o r d i n a n c e s of t h e c i t y , and h e 
f e e l s t h a t Plr. S p e n c e r i s s a y i n g h e w a n t s t o u s e a ' road t h a t i s 
p r i v a t e f o r h i s t h r e e l o t s , and t h a t w o u l d n o t conform t o c i t y 
o r d i n a n c e s . 
Mr-. S p e n c e r s a i d t h a t h e i s m e r g i n g t h e t h r e e l o t s i n t o t w o 
a n d i s r e q u e s t i n g t h e b u i l d i n g p e r m i t s t h a t w e r e i s s u e d 
previ c u s 1 y . 
Mr. S h e p h e r d r e a d t o t h e P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n __ t h e l a s t 
p a r a g r £ £ h _ o j L J ^ ^ ^ l e t t e r , ( s e e f e t t e r d a t e d 1 ©7 £ 1 / 9 6 0 . He' 
thcfTf a s k e d Mr- S p e n c e r why he h a d ecTrne b e f o r e tTTe P T a n n i n g " '/tfy^h 
C o m m i s s i o n ? 1 
Mr. S p e n c e r s a i d t h a t h e i s c o m i n g h e r e f i r s t t o s e e i f a Sy/t-
p u b l i c r o a d i s f e a s i b l e for h i s p r o p e r t y and i f t h e P l a n n i n g y 
C o m m i s s i o n s a y s ' n o 1 t h e n he w i l l go t o t h e Board of A d j u s t m e n t s , ^ e ^ / ^ 
D i s c u s s i o n f o l l o w e d a b o u t C h e r r y w o o d ' s a t t i t u d e a b o u t 4-r?* 
S p e n c e r ' s p r o p e r t y . yf >H-
D e n n i s S p e n c e r t o l d t h e P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n t h a t wha t w i l l **/p 
h a p c e n i s t h e c i t y w i l l end up i n c o u r t b e c a u s e t h e v a l l o w e d ,si//Cc 
Che — r y w o o d ' s m i s t a k e s . 
F r a n k Ma ugh an s a i d t h a t t h e o n l y i s s u e t h a t t h e 'lann ina 
Cc :Drr. i s s i on can de; 
feasible 1 
w i t h i s t o d e cide whet h e r o r not it is 
extend a public road through Mr. Spencer's property. 
He said if the Planning Commission says it is not feasible, then 
Mr, Spencer can go to the Beard of Adjustment, 
Disc u i £• ion followed. 
F .-"• a n k M a u g h a n said t h a t M r. S p e n c e r a n d C h e r •,-• y w o o d n e e d t o 
sit down and work together and co^e up "ith a solution. 
Mayc-"- Hales said that Mr. Spencer*- needs an engineered 
v encineer. ••• a w i; end tc the ci 
that the 
f cit v e n cine e r. 
Dennis Spencer clairned 
o m g h t were sufficient for th 
Frank Maughan made the motion to adjourn, 
ecorded by Bill Dodgson, Voting was unanimous ir. 
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52C West Eiberta Drive, Pleasant View, Utah B4414 
31 March .1998 
Dennis Spencer 
5993 N. 2250 East 
Eden, UT 84310 
Dear Mr. Spencer: 
"ft 
We appreciate rece 
proposed subdivision pro 
and Reeve Engineering on 
requirements found in 
Requirements) as well as 
number of items that are 
included in the drawing 
City s ordinances that 
engineer's use. 
}£- ° f V° u* mo*t recent drawing of your 
il f j e ^ v e r a d t0 t h e City office by Reeve 
March 17, i298. it has been reviewed for 
City Ordinance 17.12 ( Final Plat 
other applicable ordinances. There arp a 
required by ordinance that have not been 
. Attached you will find a'copy ot the 
apply to subdivisions for you and your 
Additionally, ordinance 17.16.010 (A) states "
 9 n •. •, • • 
required by this ordinance shall be extend tctte prope^tv linf 
The street arranqement mr*r h* <si^ u ** * > property line. 
^ . "
e
-
a p p r e ? i a t e y o u r efforts and hope the copies wil' be helnfni to you in moving your project along. helpful 
Sincerely 
TERRI CRAGUN Q 
Community Deve lopment /Treasure r 
< 
% V 
cct Craicr Pall ^^Jl £'2>&'~72 /Z? 
885 West Pteasanr View Drive, Pleasant Viev*. uian 84414 
February 17, 1997 
Dennis Spencer 
5993 N. 225C E««t 
Eden, UT 84310 
Mr. Spencer: 
RE: Spencer Acres 
included in Spencer Acres. plans there ie no dedicated road 
Sincerelv, 
TERRI CRAGUKP 
Community Development 
e n d : City Ordinanc e # 1 7 . I S 
PLEASANT VILW HUCOMCS YOU AT THf FOOT OF BIN LOMOND 
520 West Eiberta Drive, Pleasant View, Utah 84414 
31 March 1998 
Dennis Spencer 
5993 N. 2250 East 
Eden, UT 84310 
Dear Mr. Spencer: 
We appreciate receipt of your most recent drawing of your 
proposed subdivision project delivered to the City office by Reeve 
and Reeve Engineering on March 17, 12 98 It has been reviewed for 
requirements found in City Ordinance 17,12 ( Final Plat 
Requirements) as well as other applicable ordinances. There are a 
number of items that are required by ordinance that have not been 
included m the drawing. Attached you will find a 'copy ot the 
City s ordinances that apply to subdivisions for you and your 
engineer's use, 
Additionally, Ordinance 17.16 010 iA) states *.,.all utilities 
required by this ordinance shall be extended to the property line. 
The street arrangement must be such as to cause no unnecessary 
hardship no owners of adjoining property when ,thev plat- tneii* owr, 
IsndLaod ae&V to provide for c8ftv-fexiYeetfacce.se 
We'appreccat* vtou'~ cifcitaf ana hope the cop:es will be helptul 
to you in moving yo.: project along. 
Sincerely* 
TERRI CHAGUN Q 
CoTimumty Deve lopr ren t /Treasa re r 
PAGE 01 
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665 West Recent View Duvo Peasant View. Utah 84414 
v?.BM O K. A N D..U.M 
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/ 
A ^ V 
TO: 
FROM: 
(y^ RE: 
V 
< 
J fr 
1FRRT CRACUN 
O NEIL SMITH P , B . - CITY ENGINKKR 
5^FNCFR ACRF<? DETENTION PONDS 
1HK SI UMITTFTJ CRAVING S'fOWS 80M? INDTVruUAT, LOT DETENTION 
B A S I N S , ''HF DTSCHARGK FROM TMFKB BASTNS MOST MKRLY WILL BE IN A 
COMBINED STRFAM THAT DTSCHARGJ-S ONTO CHRRRYWOOD PROPBBTY AT THH 
H I S T O R I C R A 1 F S . HOWPVKK, THR HISTORIC RUNOFF WHICH HAS TO BE 
AM.OWKO HAS SHKKTFn ONTO THK CHKKRYWOOD PROPBKTY AND CONCENTRATING 
THK RUNOFF INTO A STNOl.K STRFAM COULD CRHATR KROSION DAMAGE WHICH 
CANNOT HV CONSIDFRKO A RTGHT WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT AND S I G N E D 
KASTMFNT P> CHbHKYWOOn. 
^ 
UP. 
O. NFTI. JsMlTH, P . E . 
CITY FNCINKl-K 
O N S : j j 
- z ? . 
Reeve & Associates. lac, 
Cn / tstgintcrtng *,}/»iic'uraJ Engineering 
Survepixz • LandPlanmnz 
July 18,1997 
Mr, Dennis Spencer 
5993 North 2250 East 
Liberty, Utah 84310 
fie- Spender Acres Detention Ponds 
Dear Mr. Spencer, 
Per your request, I have reviewed th* response letter from Mi 0 Neil Smith, P.E regarding the 
detention basms for the above referenced project In general I do not agree with Mi. Smith's 
comments, and I believe uii this proiecL his geneial summarization is in error 
A local minor detention facility is denned as a facility '"wvmg hydrologic basins smaller than 
or equal to 20 acres, and we designed to mitigate the impact of increased runoff due to 
development The outlet capacity is b.^cd on pt t -developn.em hydrology and downstream 
conveyance system capacir,r The d^ign of your astern complies with this criteria 
Secondly, the comment was made that the flows being concentrated mto a single stream could 
create erosion damage . T in: statement ^ ir. ero" Another advantage of a detention basin is that 
it captures the storm nm-off over the aviation ot the entire btorm, and ;eleases it at a constant and 
steady flow The run-ofHr *m a storni that is net detained ' ^ne^ m intensity. The discharge of 
the btorm at it's peak time ot concent, alien will ! e :ai m e> ;CNS of the constant metered flow dial 
the detention basin will release. The detention ba:> n actuall> improves the erosion potential 
downstream These factor* are major -^ason* that detention basins are designed and constructed. 
In addition, Pleasant View City has required rhat ihe detention basins be designed for a storm 
that would ha\e an intensity and the odds, of occ amng onlv once every 100 years Even with 
ihi5 design, the iraount of .vatcr bei*u released i'om the tw o detention basins is 0 19 c.f.s. and 
0 31 c f s, whicn in engineering terms are extremely small. Ba^cd on mv understanding of 
drainage law and standard practices ::>r engineering, it is m> opinion that the addition of the 
detention basins will not „td\ersety \\\ * the existing drainage features of the existing ditch 
within the Cherrywood Development 
3670 Quincy Ave, Suite No I, Ogden, Utah 84403 fe! No (801) 621-3100, Fax. (801) o21-2666 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
Office ot Private Property Ombudsman 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 3710 
PO Box 145610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5610 
801-537-3455 
801-538-7315 (Fax) 
December 2, 1997 
D. Brent Hales, Mayor 
City of Pleasant View 
885 W Pleasant View Drive 
Ogden, UT 84414 
Dear Mayor: 
RE: Dennis Spencer - Building Permit 
Over the past few months I have been working with Dennis Spencer to resolve issues he has in 
developing a one and one-half acre lot adjacent to the Cherrywood Manor project in Pleasant 
View. I assume you are familiar with the property. 
As an attorney for the State of Utah, acting as the Private Property Ombudsman, my job has been 
to explain to citizens who call me what their rights are under state and federal constitutional 
protections. When someone like Dennis calls me, I often do some checking around to see if there 
are ways to resolve the issues in dispute. In this case I took the time to visit your city office, meet 
with Terri Cragun, read the ordinances and parts of the file related to the Spencer property, call 
Mr. Neil Smith, (who did some engineering for the city on Dennis's previous applications), and 
call and visit with Michael Houtz, your city attorney. I sent him two letters to help clarify and 
offer solutions to what appears to have been a previous empass. I have received no reply from, 
Neil or from Mike 
I have told Dennis that he need not pursue legal action. Although the subdivision standards for 
Pleasant View are problematic when applied to his lot, if the city would allow him a building 
permit for a home that could be accessed from the eastern side of his lot (which adjoins an 
improved private street through which he has a deeded right-of-way), he could sell the property 
and be finished with his involvement with the city. In my discussions with Mike, this approach 
appeared to have some merit, but he is unable or unwilling at this point to respond to my calls or 
my letter of November 4 (enclosed) outlining this proposal. 
I understand that your ordinances allow such access to a homesite, with the approval of the Board 
of Adjustment to use the private right-of-way for access. It appears that the Spencer lot has 
sewer and water at the property line, and that the existing private lane is sufficiently wide to 
c? 
Michael 0. Leavitt 
Governor 
Ted Stewart 
Executive Director 
Craig M. Call 
State Ombudsman 
accomodate emergency vehicles. It also appears that his right-of-way is in writing and recorded 
and that this part of the right-of-way is undisputed. The pavement even appears to extend 
beyond the right-of-way and onto his property. 
While I had hoped to help resolve this issue, 1 can not do so alone. If the city has an interest in 
my mediating the issues and helping with a resolution as a neutral third party, I would be happy to 
do so. My conclusion at this point, absent any response from you, is that there is no such interest. 
I certainly dislike telling a property owner who calls me that his only recourse is in the courtroom, 
but there are situations, perhaps including this one, where that may be the case. 
Please call me, or have Mike or Terri call me, if the city has any interest in attempting to work 
things out. 
Yoprs truly 
Craig I\l Call 
Private Property Ombudsman 
cc* Mike Houtz 
Dennis Spencer 
October 7, 1997 
Michael Houtz, Attorney at Law 
4768 South Harrison 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Dear Mike. 
RE Dennis Spencer Property - Pleasant View 
Enclosed is a plat map of Dennis Spencer's 1 5 acres (give or take) in Pleasant View I have 
indicated there the already completed access road that serves the adjoining PUD - Cherrywood 
My job as a state official is to advise private property owners on issues that relate to government 
regulation of, use of and impact on private property rights As I have visited with Dennis, he has 
asked me to inquire about the options available to him for sale and/or development of his 
property I advised him of the ordinance providing that access to a building lot can be had across 
a private right-of-way if that is approved by the Board of Adjustment I have advised him that he 
may very well be able to obtain that permission to use his entire property for one residential lot 
This would not involve the use of any property for access that is not now already developed as a 
roadway Since his land fronts onto the curb built as part of that roadway, and he would not 
develop the property as more than one residence, he would not be creating a subdivision or using 
antiquated subdivision lots, so would not need to go through the procedures associated with 
subdivision approval 
He has told me that he has a legal, recorded right-of-way over the parcel of property where the 
curbing exists over which his access would be located He would therefore have the required 
permission of his neighbors to use the roadway to access his lands 
Do you see any legal issue that would cloud the approval of access to this land with the existing 
road for a single family residence? Would there be any legal obstacles to obtaining a building 
permit for a single family residence on this lot once that access were approved by the Board? 
I would appreciate your consideration of this matter and advice on how I might respond to 
Dennis's request to advise him on how he can best use his property. 
Thanks for your assistance. 
Yours truly, 
Craig M. Call 
Private Property Ombudsman 
.cc: Dennis Spencer 
c? 
Michae\ O. Leavitt 
Governor 
Ted Stewart 
Executive Director 
Craig M. Call 
State Ombudsman 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
Office of Private Property Ombudsman . / 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 3710 /J/J£?t/ SJ tf 
PC Box 145610 / ' ^J 
Salt Lake City" Utah 84114-5610 
801-537-3455 
801-538-7315 (Fax) 
^t 7'l^y^b November 4, 1997 ft 
Michael Houtz, Esq. 
4768 S. Harrison 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Dear Mike: 
RE: Pleasant View - Dennis Spencer property 
With this note is a copy of a survey that Dennis Spencer had completed for his property and 
surrounding lots. It was done some time ago — please do not prejudice the document because it 
says "subdivision" on it. I don't know why it does — it only shows the existing East lot the way it 
is already drawn at the courthouse, as I understand it. 
At any rate, the drawing does show four things* 
1. The right of way adjoins Spencer's lot. 
2. The road curbing, as built, encroaches on the lot. 
3. The sewer line comes from the East and terminates at the lot, with no connection 
to Chenywood Manor. 
4. The water line, which does continue to Chenywood Manor, goes past the Spencer 
lot. 
The lot located to the South of the right of way and to the East of the Northeast corner of 
Chenywood Manor is shown on other records as belonging to, or once belonging to John 
Malmberg. The Agreement on Improvements enclosed shows that the Malmbergs paid the cost 
of half the water line to the West side of their property, a point farther West than the East side of 
the Spencer lot. This would tend to indicate that the water line was not a private improvement 
devoted solely to Chenywood Manor. Absent another showing, it would appear appropriate for 
the city to assume that Spencer can connect to the water. 
M e m o r a n d u m 
* 3 A T C H CIVIL 
To: 
From: 
Date: 
Subject: 
Tern Cragun - Pleasant View City 
Development Service^ Coordinator 
Mark T. Miller P.E. 
Consulting City Engineer 
May 14, 1998 Owu Sf[S\°[% ( £ y 
Spencer Estates Subdivision 
^ . &^i 
We have reviewed the re-submittals of the Spencc Estates 3'jbdivls;on It appears that two 
options have been proposed Option No 1 indicess a one Ic\ subdivision which, in o^r opinion, 
can not occur. If land is bene divided, w 3re than one lot wi I result, thus the smallest 
subdivision possible is two lots We can only assume then U *; Option No 2 is what Mr 
Spencer intended to submit Reference is made to our men .Q ii March 11,1998 Page 2 of 
that memo details in a seven step procedure w!-et our reconrvndatiors are for obtaining 
subdivision approval No rew tnformat jn has cone to light s.rce that '-me that woJd alter the 
recommendations made in that memc. If item no. 1 has no! been completed, we do not see the 
need to proceed with item no. 2 cv* c*ta> ^ ^ £ ~ V I \ i |3 q ? O ^ ^ ^ V A ^ ^ C ^ 
The problems with subdividing the proposed property as they relate to the Subdivfs.on 
Ordinance are as follows* 
1. Each lot does not front on a public street, (Section 1 7 16.040). 
2. It does rot appear that water service can be provided to each lot without obtaining an 
easement from the neighboring property Owner, (Section 17 20.010 (A)). 
Sewer service to the proposed lot 2 may not be poss.b'e. Lateral sewer lines need a 
minimum slope of 2%, Running the lateral from the exiting clean-out to a future home 
on lot 2 would require more than a 4 foot rise in elevation, It is also rhy understanding 
that the Uniform Plumbing Code requires sach dwelling un*t to have its own sewer 
sen/ice lateral. The proposed sewer for lot 2 connects to the lateral stubbed to lot 1. 
The subdivision sewer system must be approved by the City Council and City Engineer, 
(Section 17.20 010(B)), 
4. Irrigation lines must be provided to each lot, (Section 17 20.010 (D)). 
5 Fire hydrants shall be installed, (Section A7 20 010 (L)) 
6. Subdivides shall reimburse the city for any and all attorney fees and engineering fees 
and other professional fees and costs incurred by the City in relation to the subdivided 
TerrI Craguh - Pleasant View City 2 / j j j q o 
Spencer Subdivision r^\ <* 
page 2 
(6. Cont.) subdivision Said reimbursement shall be made within thirty days of receipt of 
notice from the City of such fees. Failure by the subdivlder to reimburse the City, 
shall be grounds for denial, (Section 17.20 021). 
We recommend rejecting the proposed subdivision because \i does not comply with the above 
mentioned Subdivision Ordinance requirements. 
If you have any questions, please call 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 3710 
Box 145610 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-5610 
801-538-7200 
801-538-7315 (Fax) 
801-538-7458 (TDD) 
May 19, 1998 
Mayor Jim Fisher 
City of Pleasant View 
885 West Pleasant View Dr. 
Ogden, UT 84414 
VIA FACSIMILE: (801) 782-0539 
Dear Mayor Fisher: 
RE: Spencer Subdivision 
Dennis Spencer shared with me a memo given him by Terri Cragun related to the permit approval 
process that has been the subject of some previous conversations between us. It is dated May 14, 
1998 and shown as being from Mark T. Miller of Wasatch Civil. I have compared it to a memo 
from Mr. Miller dated March 11, 1998. 
There has been a suggestion in the past that the City has not been forthcoming with consistent 
answers to Mr. Spencer's requests for review. Prior to receiving this memo, I have always been 
reticent to believe that the City might be constructing barriers to this approval, and have worked 
in good faith to encourage him to deliver to the City the information that it reasonably needs to 
grant him permission to build. While I understand that there must be some conversation about 
what the shortcomings of any given project may be, my impression is that these memos go beyond 
that. 
Our previous discussions have included the concept of his using his land for one building lot, and I 
have told him that the city would have difficulty denying his using his land for one building lot. 
The memo now indicates that, at least in the opinion of your engineer, that it is impossible to use 
the land. You are advised to not approve building on one lot because it isn't a subdivision nor a 
subdivision because of other problems. The engineer notes that it is impossible to approve a 
subdivision that is not a lot split, but communities around us do that regularly, including your own 
if I remember our conversation with Ms. Cragun. 
He also says that access cannot be obtained across a private lane These conclusions appear to be 
counter to your own ordinances, and his own memo of March 11, which references the Board of 
Adjustments process for approving access across private lanes. 
® 
Michael O Leavttt 
Governor 
Ted Stewart 
Executive Director 
Mayor Jim Fisher 
May 19, 1998 
Page 2. 
As a matter of law, the City cannot deny Mr. Spencer all economic use of his property unless the 
city is willing to purchase the property for its fair market value. Having been somewhat familiar 
with the matter, I have not yet seen the valid public purpose in denying him any chance to build. 
The memo of the engineer has that effect, and if it reflects the City's policies in this matter, it may 
be an unconstitutional restriction on his private property rights. 
As you would expect, it is discouraging to have to cover the same ground several times in order 
to make progress in this matter. For example, the engineer says that the Spencers need an 
easement for utilities, but the City has seen several times, I believe, the right of way he has that 
allows for access and utilities. He also lists such things as fire hydrants and irrigation lines that 
can appropriately be conditions of approval rather than reasons for denial. 
I have told Mr. Spencer that I cannot arrange for arbitration in this matter without his first 
obtaining a final denial by the City. I cannot be that arbitrator, because I have been too intimately 
involved in this case. The statute that I derive my authority from provides, however, that I have 
a duty to "identify state or local government actions that have potential takings implications and, 
if appropriate, advise those state or local government entities about those implications." 
If the planning commission denies a single-lot application based on the lack of access to a public 
street or the lack of a utility easement, without findings that substantiate the public purposes and 
legitimate government interests in doing so, I believe that such an action would have the 
implication of a taking without just compensation under the Utah and US Constitutions and could 
be a violation of due process of law. I can state that if a denial were based on the list of reasons 
that are shown in this memo, the City would have difficulty proving that your reviews are fair and 
impartial. 
As an independent third party, I do not understand why Mr. Spencer's right of way does not meet 
the requirements of a private access that the Board of Adjustment can approve. Further, I do not 
know on what basis they would reasonably deny it. I do not understand why all the discussions 
we have held about the subdivision approval process for one lot would have proceeded only to 
have the staff say that a one-lot subdivision approval is inappropriate. 
As I said above, I have not previously been inclined to believe that the City would go out of its 
way to frustrate the resolution of the problems in this matter, but if I needed evidence to persuade 
me that this may be the case, the memo is enough to accomplish that. I have no personal interest 
in this case. As an independent state official, and as it is my duty to do under statute, my letter is 
meant to notify you that the City actions in this matter, if they continue on the present course, 
may be inappropriate and have the implication of a taking of Mr. Spencer's property without just 
compensation. 
Mayor Jim Fisher 
May 19, 1998 
Page 3 
If I can be of help in resolving this matter I remain eager to do so 
Y^urs^truly, 
Craig m. Call 
Private Property Ombudsman 
cc: Dennis Spencer 
P L i ^ S / ^ I VOEW (SOW 
520 West Eiberta Drive, Pleasant View, Utah 84414 
PLEASANT VIEW CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
"AMENDMENT" NOTICE OF DECISION 
NAME: Dennis Spencer DATE: July 28, 1998 
5993 N. 2250 East 
Eden, Utah 84310 
CASE #: 98-1 
You are hereby notified that your appeal to request a variance for 
a lot or lots, not having frontage on a street, as required by the 
zoning title for the zone in which the subdivision is located, but 
upon a right-of-way, was heard by the Pleasant View City Board of 
Adjustment in a Public Hearing held on July 16, 19 98, after due 
notice to the general public and specifically to adjacent property 
owners. 
The Board of Adjustment has given consideration to your appeal 
relative to the merit, circumstances, and conditions affecting said 
property and hereby renders the following decision: 
Your appeal to the Board of Adjustment is: 
GRANTED 
X DENIED 
GRANTED SUBJECT TO: 
REASON FOR DECISION: 
1. Pleasant View City Subdivision Ordinance 17.04.010, section B, 
states, "Any proposed subdivision and its ultimate use shall 
be in the best interests of the public welfare and the 
neighborhood development of the area concerned and the 
subdivider shall present evidence to this effect when 
requested to do so by the Planning Commission." The Board of 
Adjustments felt Mr. Spencer did not support that by not 
sustaining that evidence. 
2. Pleasant View City Subdivision Ordinance 17.16.010, section B, 
states, "New subdivision streets including all utilities 
required by this ordinance shall be extended to the property 
line. The street arrangement must be such as to cause no 
unnecessary hardship to owners of adjoining property when they 
plat their own land and seek to provide for convenient access 
to it. Half streets along the boundary of land proposed for 
subdivision will not be permitted." The Board 
of Adjustment decided there were no physical restrictions on 
why a dedicated public street could not be built on Mr. 
Spencer's land and not cause unnecessary hardship on other 
property. 
If you wish to appeal the decision of the Board of Adjustment, you 
must petition the District Court within 3 0 days after the Board of 
Adjustment's decision is final. 
Sincerely,
 y —p->. 
Debbie Jones 
Board of Adjustment Secretary 
Ct: Wi ri^n^ 
MINUTES OF A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE 
PLEASANT VIEW CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
HELD JULY 16,1998 AT 6:00 PM 
Meeting commenced at 6:05 PM with the following present: 
MEMBERS PRESENT: VISITORS PRESENT: 
Timothy Blackburn, Chairman Dennis Spencer 
Wynn Phillips Kirby Rice 
Carl Bruce Clair Knight 
Gary Rhees Owen Eastes 
Norma Rae Liston Frank Maughan 
Debbie Jones, Secretary Juanita Fowers 
Cordell Hatch 
Bob Gehrig 
Chairman Timothy Blackburn called the meeting to order and welcomed those present. 
Chairman Blackburn also welcomed new Board of Adjustment members, Carl Bruce and Norma 
Rae Liston and welcomed Wynn Phillips, who has served the Board as an alternate, as a 
permanent member. 
MINUTES: The minutes of the previous meeting were not available at this time to approve. 
BUSINESS: 
Dennis Spencer appeared before the Board of Adjustment to ask for: 
Approval for a lot or lots, not having frontage on a street as 
required by the zoning title for the zone in which the subdivision 
is located, but upon a right-of-way. 
The property is located at approximately 3650 North 1000 West in Pleasant View. 
Tim Blackburn turned the time over to Mr. Spencer to make his presentation. Mr. 
Spencer showed the Board of Adjustments Option 1 and Option 2 of his proposed subdivision. 
He showed a 60 foot right of way on his drawings, that he said Paul Cragun deeded to him in the 
early 1970's. Mr. Spencer said that when Cherrywood Condominiums was built,, then it was 
impossible for a public road to go in in front of his property. Mr. Spencer said he is proposing 
using a portion of the right of way for access to his two lots. He said it was in his best interest to 
have two lots there instead of just one large lot. Mr. Spencer said that all the utilities are 
available. He also stated that he didn't understand why his proposal was called a subdivision, 
because the property hadn't been divided in years. He said he wanted the property approved for 
building lots. 
Norma Rae Liston asked Mr. Spencer where the road would go to access hi? nroperty? 
Mr. Spencer said he would not encroach on Cherrywood's property. He showed the right 
of way going halfway into the second lot on the plat on option 2. He said the right of way has 
been established and used for years. 
Tim Blackburn asked Mr. Spencer if Paul Cragun intended the right of way for everyone 
or for just the property owners to have access to the property. 
Mr. Spencer said that he has the right to let whoever he wants use the right of way. 
Carl Bruce referred to the Quit Claim Deed issued to Dennis Spencer from Paul Cragun 
in May of 1983. Mr. Bruce quoted the last paragraph in the deed, "This right of way shall 
terminate, for purposes of ingress and egress, when there is a dedicated road abutting property of 
the grantee along the North line of said right of way." Mr. Bruce said he interpreted that 
sentence to show that Mr. Cragun assumed there would be a road there at a future date. 
Mr. Spencer said that he, himself, had that sentence added. He said that Cherrywood 
built in violation of the Pleasant View City code. 
Tim Blackburn asked Mr. Spencer why he couldn't use more of his property and put in a 
60 foot dedicated public road? 
Mr. Spencer said he chooses not to do that. 
Carl Bruce asked Mr. Spencer if he plans to use the Cherrywood private road to access 
his property? 
Mi. Spencer said, "absolutely5'. 
Mr. Bruce asked if Mr. Spencer had paid Cherrywood anything to be able to do that? 
Mr. Spencer said, "no". 
Tim Blackburn asked Mr. Spencer to explain to him why there is an unreasonable 
hardship to his property? 
Mr. Spencer said that Pleasant View City has allowed encroachment onto his property. 
He said there was no advantage to him to put a thoroughfare to that property. 
Carl Bruce asked Mr. Spencer if he had sold some of that property to other people? Carl 
Bruce told Mr. Spencer that he needs to provide access to other's property. 
Dennis Spencer said yes he had sold property. He said that in 1983 he was given a 
building permit for that lot. He said the League of Cities and Towns told the city to get off 
Dennis Spencer's back. 
Wynn Phillips asked Mr. Spencer how the property owners to the west (Mr. Tafoya and 
Mr. Hales) will be able to get frontage on a public dedicated street? 
Mr. Spencer said he did not understand the question. 
Wynn Phillips asked what are the best interests, in this case, for the public welfare? 
Mr. Spencer said that the city has 1 2/3 acres of property receiving taxes of $300.00 a 
year on that property. He said if he put homes there it would be of monetary value for the city 
rather than a weed patch. He also said no public road will go through there. 
Wynn Phillips asked Mr. Spencer what benefits are there to the neighborhood 
development? 
Mr. Spencer said the neighbors would be glad to see the weeds go away. 
Norma Rae Liston said that she has talked to a few neighbors and they said as long as it 
doesn't affect them, they don't care what happens. 
Tim Blackburn turned the time over to the audience for questions or comments. 
Bob Gehrig 3584 N. 1000 West, said he is the President of Cherrywood Homeowners 
Association. He said he acknowledges that Mr. Spencer has a non-exclusive right of way at the 
north of property, which Mr. Spencer can let anybody use who he wants. Mr. Gerhig says the 
intent was for Mr. Spencer to use the land as pasture, not to subdivide. He says the wording 
shows that in the Quit Claim Deed. Mr. Gehrig said that Dennis Spencer wants to use 
Chenywood's private road to access his proposed lots. Mr. Gehrig said the homeowners for 
years have maintained and paid for their private road. He said Chenywood , at one time, offered 
some land to help Mr. Spencer put a road in and they weren't able to do that because they didn't 
have enough property. - S*+ £*-#**- £**-« cjc b&a<?o <*** /y 
Carl Bruce said that Mr. Spencer does have a right of way, but it doesn't say he has to 
maintain the right of way. Mr. Bruce asked Mr. Gehrig if Chenywood's road encroaches on Mr. 
Spencer's property. Mr. Gehrig said according to Mr. Spencer's engineer it does, but only a little 
piece. He said if that bothers Mr. Spencer, then Chenywood hire a surveyor and cut out that 
little piece. 
Clair Knight, 3556 N. 1000 West said the city ordinance states you have to have 100 foot 
frontage on a public dedicated street to build. Mr. Knight said that Mr. Spencer wants a private 
road there to use. Mr. Knight said Mr. Spencer has abused the right of way. He said the lawn 
has ruts in it. He said he is against the proposal. 
Juanita Fowers said the question has been asked 'what hardship has been placed on Mr. 
Spencer?' She said this property has been exploited more than any property in the city. She said 
the property in it's original form in 1976 was planned to have a road there. 
Cordell Hatch said he purchased a home in the area less than a year ago. He said the 
realtor told him the property behind him was landlocked and couldn't be built on. He said he 
tried to purchase the property from Dennis and Dennis told him it was tied up in court. Mr. 
Hatch said he would like to see the properly stay as is. 
Mr. Gehrig asked Mr. Spencer how he would access his second lot? 
Mr. Spencer said they would use part of Chenywood's grassy area that is on 
Chenywood's property. Mr. Spencer said he had the opportunity to sell his property to the 
Cragun family on their terms for the Chenywood development. He said those terms were not 
satisfactory to him. 
Owen Eastes, 3654 N. 1000 West, said that if the proposed roadway will take some of 
Chenywood's property, then Chenywood would not be in conformance. 
Tim Blackburn said that the Board of Adjustments does not have the power to let Dennis 
Spencer take property. 
Kirby Rice, 3634 N. 1000 West, said the right of way is at the top end of Chenywood. 
He said if Dennis Spencer wants a road up there with Chenywood to take care of, then there's no 
way that will happen. He said Mr. Spencer has enough property to put a road in and conform to 
the ordinances. 
Mr. Gehrig said the ordinances are there for a purpose. He said the Fower's (property 
owners to the west of Chenywood) were required by ordinance to build a dedicated road for their 
subdivision, and now he is asking is the city going to let Mr. Spencer build homes without 
having to put in any street? He said he is against that. He said that Mr. Spencer has enough 
property to put a road in. 
Dennis Spencer said that if he wanted to make a p^of t then he wouki havf *done that 
years ,^Qn He said i&Cherrywoad would m v< half for a road, tnen ne would vqf ULti. He said 
that hefrvftcj tfji? soused a prbbleSTJUtftt fcikft. 
U'atH &tii£b sa!id tna: Unerrywood is noncbriiorming already and the city cannot make 
Cherrywood more nonconforming. 
Tim Blackburn told Mr. Spencer that there were two things that bothered him about Mr. 
Spencer's request and he would like Mr. Spencer to clarify them for him. 
1) Tim said he doesn't understand why Mr. Spencer cannot put a 60 foot road on his 
property and dedicate it to the city? Tim told Mr. Spencer that would solve his problem. 
Mr. Spencer said that he chooses not to install a road built to city standards in his 
subdivision and he feels so strongly about it he'll settle in court if he has to. 
2) Tim told Mr. Spencer that in order for the Board of Adjustment to grant a 
variance, they have to determine that there is an unreasonable hardship on his property. Tim said 
Mr. Cragun's right of way shows that the intent was to eventually have a road go through Mr. 
Spencer's property, which was landlocked at the time Mr. Spencer bought it. 
Mr. Spencer said that Paul Cragun asked him to write the right of way verbage so that 
when the road goes through, then the right of way would terminate. 
JuanitaJEowgl^-^aidjhat Paul Cragun did say that the right of way will be a road someday. 
Carl Bruce asked Frank Maughan, as a member of the Planning Commission, in his 
opinion, would it be impractical to put a road on Mr. Spencer's property? 
Mr. Maughan said that from a Planning Commission standpoint, he didn't think he 
should say. (He had not been asked to come as a representative from the Planning Commission). 
Mr. Maughan said that from the City Subdivision Ordinances, it's a requirement for development 
to put a road in. He said that economically speaking anybody who buys raw ground and develops 
it, then building a road is going to be a cost to the developer. Mr. Maughan said that Cherrywood 
pays for their road continually, with repairs and snow removal. He said the owners have 
assumed a problem of a road not built to standard and would not qualify for a public road. 
Carl Bruce said that in the Pleasant View City Ordinances, Section 17.16.040, that the 
Planning Commission must determine it is impractical to extend streets to serve lots. Mr. Bruce 
asked Mr. Maughan if the Planning Commission deemed it impractical for Mr. Spencer to put a 
road on his property? 
Mr. Maughan said that depends on the definition of impractical. He said if a huge 
boulder was in the middle of the street and it was physically impractical to put the road in, then 
yes, that would be impractical. He said he felt the code was not written for economic impractical 
but for physically impractical. 
Wynn Phillips moved to deny Mr. Spencer's request for a variance for options 1 and 2 for 
approval for a lot or lots not to have frontage on a street, but upon a right of way. as shown on 
his subdivision plat. The motion was seconded by Carl Bruce. 
Tim asked Mr. Phillips to state the reasons for the denial. 
Mr. Phillips stated: 
1) Pleasant View City Subdivision Ordinance 17.04.010, section B, states "Any 
proposed subdivision and its ultimate use shall be in the best interests of the public welfare and 
the neighborhood development of the area concerned and the subdivider shall present evidence to 
this effect when requested to do so by the planning commission." Mr. Phillips said he felt Mr. 
Spencer did not support that by not sustaining that evidence. 
2) Pleasant View City Subdivision Ordinance 17.16.010, section B, states "New 
subdivision streets including all utilities required by this ordinance shall be extended to the 
property line. The street arrangement must be such as to cause no unnecessary hardship to 
owners of adjoining property when they plat their own land and seek to provide for convenient 
access to it. Half streets along the boundary of land proposed for subdivision will not be 
permitted." Mr. Phillips said there were no physical restrictions on why a dedicated public street 
couldnot be built on Mr. Spencer's land and not cause unnecessary hardship on other property. 
Voting was unanimous in favor. 
Meeting adjourned at 7:15 PM. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS V SPENCER AND LINDA S. 
SPENCER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, a Utah 
municipality, CHERRYWOOD MANOR, 
INC., a Utah corporation, CHERRYWOOD 
MANOR HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-XX, individual defendants in their 
private capacities, 
Defendants. 
DEC ? ' 1999 
NOTICE, TENDER OF 
PERFORMANCE AND 
SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS 
Civil No. 980905386PR 
Judge W Brent West 
Defendant Pleasant View City hereby notifies the Court and other parties, including 
the Spencers, that it has agreed, as a good faith gesture in order to resolve the pending 
litigation, to issue two building permits to the Spencers which will allow them to proceed 
with the construction of one residence on each of the two parcels as depicted on and 
consistent with the parcel sizes and technical specifications in the Reeve Engineering 
Proposal of April 8 and 13, 1998, subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The private driveways for the two parcels shall utilize the existing 
paved portion of the non-exclusive right-of-way over the Cherrywood property to 
access these two parcels, but otherwise the private driveway will be located on the 
two parcels as depicted on the April 13, 1998, Reeve Proposal; 
(2) Buildings shall be set back a minimum of 40 feet from the front 
parcel line; and 
(3) Compliance with other applicable requirements of Pleasant View City 
for building permits, including normal and customary fees.1 
The tender of said building permits renders moot the appeal from the decision of 
the Board of Adjustment, which lies at the heart of this action. All of Plaintiffs3 
remaining claims are subject to a motion for summary judgment. 
DISCUSSION 
This is a land use action, the essence of which is a statutory appeal from the 
July 16, 1998, Board of Adjustment denial of an application to permit construction of 
two residences on a private right-of-way. Because this matter is an appeal of that decision 
under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708 and not a de novo review of Spencers3 application to 
the Board of Adjustment, the appropriate remedy if Spencers were to prevail is to remand 
the matter to the Board of Adjustment. The City recognizes that under its ordinances, a 
properly framed application to the City may possibly result in permission to build on the 
two Parcels facing a private right-of-way. The City has concluded that, for reasons of 
economy and fairness, there is no purpose to be served by either a reconsideration on 
remand or evaluation of a new, properly framed request. It has, therefore, decided to 
]There is no express requirement under the Rules of Civil Procedure to notify the 
trial court of a change of circumstances affecting the litigation. However, because this 
action is effectively an appeal of a Board of Adjustment decision, Rule 37, Utah RApp.P. 
appears to apply: Therefore, in compliance with that rule, the City is notifying the Court 
of its action "which render[s] moot one or more of the issues raised." 
grant Spencers permission to build on the two Parcels and to obtain the necessary7 
building permits upon submission of appropriate and sufficient applications. 
The City acknowledges that this unilateral determination does not resolve the 
remainder of Spencers3 claims in this matter. To that end, it expressly reserves any and all 
defenses and denies any implication that the grant of permission to build on the two lots 
arises from any legal duty to Spencers under the facts surrounding the allegations in the 
Complaint. Spencers, likewise, have made no offer of consideration for the City's action 
and have not waived any of the issues in their litigation. 
The City also recognizes that, though it is not legally obligated to approve 
Spencers5 application as presented to the Board of Adjustment or under any of the facts 
presented in this litigation, granting permission to build on the two Parcels moots this 
Court's review of the Board of Adjustment decision of July 16, 1998, by giving Spencers 
the remedy they seek regardless of whether that remedy is appropriate as a matter of law. 
In other words, the appropriate remedy—remand to the Board of Adjustment—would be 
unnecessary as a result of the City's grant of the building permits. Because the review 
under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708 is moot, it is appropriate for the Court to dismiss the 
challenge to the Board of Adjustment decision. 
DATED this of December, 1999. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By_ ^%A^t~ 
Jody/K Biyfnett 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Pfeasant View City 
76200.1 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Beverly Riemann, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law offices of 
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendant Pleasant View City herein; that she served the 
attached NOTICE, TENDER OF PERFORMANCE AND SUGGESTION OF 
MOOTNESS in Case No. 980905386PR before the Second Judicial District Court, 
Weber County, State of Utah, upon the panies listed below by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
Matthew Hilton 
1220 North Main Street, #5A 
P. O. Box 781 
Springville, UT 84663 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the 17th day of 
December, 1999. 
W^ 
Beverly Biematm 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO befor^me this 17th day of December, 1999. 
Notary Public 
>kn«yPubll? Wm " 1 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS V. SPENCER and 
LINDA S. SPENCER,, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, 
a Utah Municipality, CHERRYWOOD 
MANOR, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
CHERRYWOOD MANOR HOME 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, JOHN and JANE 
DOES I-XX, individual defendants in 
their private capacities, 
Defendants. 
DECISION 
Case: 980905386 
Judge: W. Brent West 
Clerk: Pamela Allen 
There are a number of motions and issues that need to be addressed. Even though there 
may be some overlap, the Court will address each motion and each issue separately. 
The first and most important motions to address are the Plaintiffs' and Defendant Pleasant 
View's, mutual Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The first issue, in both motions, is the Plaintiffs' request for the issuance of two building 
permits. Since the Defendant has agreed to issue the requested building permits, that issue is now 
moot. 
The second issue, in both motions, is the Plaintiffs' claim that their constitutional rights 
have been violated. The Court agrees with the Defendant and finds that the statute of limitations 
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and 'laches' are applicable and these causes of action are barred. See Section 10-9-1001 and 
Section 78-12-25(3) Utah Code Annotated. In particular, the Plaintiffs' had thirty days, after any 
adverse decision, to appeal that adverse decision and they failed to do so. In addition, the Court 
finds that the constitutional claims are premature and have no factual or legal basis to support 
them. 
The third issue, related to the above constitutional issue and found only in the Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, is the alleged violation of the Plaintiff Dennis V. Spencer's 
constitutional right of free speech. The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiffs freedom 
of speech was not infringed upon. At a public meeting, relating to the issuance of the above 
discussed building permits, the Plaintiff spoke. He was not prohibited from speaking or voicing 
his opinion. Apparently, the Plaintiffs comments irritated and angered some of the public officials 
who were present at the meeting. Those public officials, who disagreed with the content of the 
Plaintiffs comments, voiced their disagreement. Some even requested that the Plaintiff be 
censured for his comments. 
Freedom of speech works both ways. People who express opinions, at a public meeting, 
should expect that those who disagree with those opinions, will also be allowed to express their 
disapproval. That is what occurred here. 
The fourth issue, found only in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, is that the 
Plaintiffs' causes of action for false arrest and malicious prosecution are barred. The Court agrees. 
These claims are barred by governmental immunity. See Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-1, 
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et seq. In particular, the Defendant has not been given the statutory notice of claim required to be 
given, before one can file a lawsuit against a governmental entity. 
The fifth issue, again, found only in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, is that 
there is no private cause of action or property right created by the Municipal Ethics Act, the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, or Article XI Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. The Court agrees. 
The sixth issue, found only in the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, is that the 
Plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment has not been established. Again, the Court agrees. The 
Plaintiffs have not established all the elements of unjust enrichment. 
The seventh issue, common to both Motions for Summary Judgment, is Plaintiffs' claim 
for slander of title. The Court finds, for several reasons, that no slander of title exists. First, 
slander of title is barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. Again, see Utah Code Annotated 
Section 63-30-1, et seq. Second, no factual or legal basis for slander of title has been established, 
by the Plaintiffs. Finally, the property, at issue, involves an easement, not title to any real 
property. No slander of title can occur when there is no title. 
The eighth issue, raised in Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, is that the Plaintiffs 
were inappropriately required to pay $1,260.00 in attorneys fees on behalf of the Defendant. The 
Defendant, although critical of Plaintiffs' scarcity of proof on the issue of payment and receipts, 
has agreed to reimburse the Plaintiffs the $1,260.00. Therefore, the issue is moot. 
The next motion addressed, is the Plaintiffs initial Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The issues raised in that motion were later merged with the Plaintiffs second, more general, 
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Motion for Summary Judgment. Since those issues were addressed above, the Court will not 
address the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment separately. 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery has not been addressed by either party and so the 
Court also declines to address the issue. 
In light of the above Rulings, the Defendant's Motion for a Discovery Protective Order, 
the Defendant's Motion for a Stay of the Protective Order and a Renewal of that Protective Order 
and the Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dennis Spencer are all rendered moot and 
will not be addressed by the Court. 
Defense counsel for Pleasant View will please prepare Findings of Facts, Conclusions of 
Law and a Judgment consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this 2nd day of October, 2000. 
Judge W. Brent West 
Second District Court 
JODY K BURNETT (A0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant Pleasant View City 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Phone (801) 521-5678 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS V SPENCER AND LINDA S. 
SPENCER, 
Plaintiffs, 
CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, a Utah 
municipality, CHERRYWOOD MANOR, 
INC., a Utah corporation, CHERRYWOOD 
MANOR HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-XX, individual defendants in their 
private capacities, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL, 
Civil No. 980905386PR 
Judge W Brent West 
This matter came before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable W Brent West 
presiding, for consideration of various pending motions including defendant Pleasant View 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
defendant Pleasant View City's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dennis Spencer, plaintiffs' 
Motion to Compel Discovery and various motions by defendant Pleasant View City 
regarding protective orders. The Court heard oral argument on July 12, 2000. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Matthew Hilton. Defendant Pleasant View City was represented by 
Jody K Burnett and defendants Cherrywood Manor, Inc. and Cherrywood Manor Home 
Owners Association, Inc. were represented by Joe Cartwright. 
Following the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement, and having reviewed the legal memoranda, affidavits and exhibits submitted 
by the parties and having considered the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised, 
issued its Decision dated October 2, 2000, granting defendant Pleasant View City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to that Decision, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Pleasant View City's Motion for Summary Judgment on all of the 
remaining claims or theories asserted against it in the plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby 
granted for the reasons more fully set forth in the Court's Decision of October 2, 2000. 
2. The plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied for the 
reasons more fully set forth in the Court's Decision of October 2, 2000. 
3. Based on the Decision and disposition of the other motions as set forth 
above, the plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery, defendant Pleasant View City's various 
motions with respect to protective orders and defendant Pleasant View City's Motion to 
Strike Affidavit of Dennis Spencer are all rendered moot, and it is not necessary for the 
Court to further address those issues. 
4. Plaintiffs' Complaint, including all of the claims and legal theories asserted 
therein against defendant Pleasant View City, is hereby dismissed as against defendant 
Pleasant View City, with prejudice and upon the merits. 
5. The plaintiffs' claims against defendants Cherrywood Manor, Inc. and 
Cherrywood Manor Home Owners Association, Inc. remain pending and are unaffected 
by this order. 
DATED this <31 -" day of iVjftvl U ^ \ , J ^ 2000. 
83547.1 
BY THE COURT: 
to. 
W Brent West 
Distria Court Judge / 
0 < A ^ i^\\W 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVBSE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Beverly Purswell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law offices of 
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendant Pleasant View City herein; that she served the 
attached proposed SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL in Case 
No. 980905386PR before the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of 
Utah, upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope addressed to: 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
Matthew Hilton 
5152 N. Edgewood Drive, SuitelOO 
Provo, UT 84604-5681 
Also By Facsimile 
Counsel for Defendant Cherrywood Manor, Inc. and 
Cherrywood Manor Home Owners Association 
Lowell V Smith 
SMITH & GLAUSER, PC. 
Parkview Plaza 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the 12th day of 
October, 2000. 
Beverly Pursw&fl 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 12th day of October, 2000. 
HAWCWAftDELL 
WIWPUBUC'STAIZotUW 
»7E20088TE30e 
•ALTLAKECITYUrwIII Notary Public 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS V. SPENCER and 
LINDA S. SPENCER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
DECISION 
CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, a 
Utah municipality, CHERRYWOOD 
MANOR, INC., a Utah corporation, 
CHERRYWOOD MANOR HOME 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a 
Utah corporation, JOHN and JANE 
DOES I-XX, individual defendants in 
their private capacities, 
Defendants. 
Case: 980905386 
Judge: W. Brent West 
Clerk: Pamela Allen 
The plaintiffs have filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 59(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, asking the Court to "reconsider" its previous ruling on the parties' cross motions for 
summary judgment. The plaintiffs raise several issues and the Court will address each one 
separately. 
Spackman v. Board of Education Analysis 
First, the plaintiffs allege that subsequent to oral argument, but prior to memorializing the 
Court's decision, the Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion in Spackman v. Board of Education 
of Box Elder County. 16 P3d 533, 2000 UTAH LEXIS 148 (Utah 2000) that provides further 
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clarification about when constitutional claims can be brought under the Utah Constitution. 
However, as pointed out by the defendant, City of Pleasant View, the Spademan decision adds 
nothing new and is not material to this Court's ruling on the constitutional claims. "The crux of 
the Spademan decision is that the Due Process and Open Education clauses of the Utah 
Constitution are self executing. Spademan sections 5, 14, 16 P.3d 536." The defendant did not 
argue that the Due Process clause was not self executing and the Court did not base its decision 
on that principle of law. This Court reviewed the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments on their 
merits and concluded that there was no "factual or legal basis to support them." (See this Court's 
previous decision at page 2.) 
In addition, the denial of due process and the denial of equal protection claims made by 
the plaintiffs, arose out of the City of Pleasant View's refusal to issue building permits to the 
plaintiffs. In its earlier opinion, this Court also stated that with the issuance of the building 
permits, the plaintiffs' constitutional claims were now premature. (Again, see this Court's 
previous decision at page 2). Since the City of Pleasant View offered to issue the permits to the 
plaintiffs, there was no evidence alleged that would support a finding that the plaintiffs had been 
otherwise damaged. 
Finally, the plaintiffs sought, among other remedies, equitable relief. They wanted the 
Court to order the defendant to issue the building permits. They claimed that the defendant was 
denying them due process and equal protection by refusing to issue those permits. Once those 
permits were issued, those claims became moot. 
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The plaintiffs now argue that they specifically plead and argued that their due process 
rights were violated, a provision that the Utah Supreme Court, in Spackman. found to be self-
executing and merited damages in the event equitable relief was not applicable. This argument has 
merit and needs to be addressed. 
As stated by the plaintiffs, on page three of their memorandum, under the Spademan 
decision, in order to establish a claim for damages under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution dealing with the due process clause, three criteria must be met. 
First, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a 'flagrant' 
violation of his or her constitutional rights. . . . In essence, this means that a 
defendant must have violated 'clearly established* constitutional rights 'of which 
a reasonable person would have known. \ . . To be considered clearly established, 
'the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'. . . The requirement 
that the unconstitutional conduct be 'flagrant' ensures that a government 
employee is allowed the ordinary 'human frailties offorgetfulness, distractability, 
or misjudgment without rendering [him or her]self liable for a constitutional 
violation.' 
In reviewing all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the City of Pleasant View's 
refusal to issue the building permits, the evidence, as submitted, simply doesn't rise to the level of 
being a 'flagrant' violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. There were legitimate legal and 
practical concerns about the issuance of the permits, (e.g. the plaintiffs had to obtain variances on 
the property before the permits could be issued.) The fact that there was a legitimate issue over 
the issuance of the permits, that both parties dug in their heels and took hard line positions, and 
that the City of Pleasant View later relented and issued the permits does not mean that the 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights were 'flagrantly' violated. 
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Second, a plaintiff must establish that equitable remedies do not address 
his or her injuries. 
In this instance, equitable remedies addressed the plaintiffs' injuries. The permits were 
obtained. There is nothing, submitted to the Court, in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, 
that establishes that the plaintiffs suffered any economic damage as a result of the delay in issuing 
the permits. 
Third, a plaintiff must establish that equitable relief such as an 
injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect plaintiffs rights or redress his 
or her injuries. 
Finally, there has been no showing of this criterion, by the plaintiffs. 
Even if the Spademan case is considered and applied, it does not change the Court's 
original ruling. 
Other related Spademan issues that were raised and need to be addressed, include the fact 
that the City of Pleasant View did argue that the plaintiffs did not have a private cause of action 
under the Supremacy clause Article VI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution because that clause is 
not self-executing. See Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 58 P.2d 1 (Utah 1936). The 
Spademan decision does not alter this Court's previous holding. 
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that there is no governmental immunity for constitutional 
violations. The City of Pleasant View did not raise governmental immunity as a defense to the 
plaintiffs' alleged constitutional violations. However, ordinary false arrest and malicious 
prosecution are common law claims, not constitutional claims, and are barred by governmental 
immunity as this Court previously held. 
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Thirty Day Ordinance to Appeal. Statute of Limitations fe Laches 
The second issue raised by the plaintiffs concerns the interpretation of the provision in 
state law that sets out a thirty-day period to appeal any adverse decision made by the city council 
or city planning commission. See Section 10-9-1001 Utah Code Annotated. The defendant, City 
of Pleasant View has analyzed this issue correctly. The four-year statute of limitation contained in 
Section 78-12-25(3) Utah Code Annotated applied to all claims arising four or more years prior 
to the initiation of the action. The thirty-day limitation contained in Section 10-9-1001 Utah Code 
Annotated applied to the decisions of the City of Pleasant View that were complained about by 
the plaintiffs. Finally, laches applied to the other claims of plaintiffs. This Court did not apply the 
thirty-day limitation to the plaintiffs constitutional claims. It doesn't apply. 
Part of the difficulty with plaintiffs claim is that many of their complaints would be barred 
by the above restrictive statutes. For whatever reasons, the plaintiffs sat on their rights. They did 
not appeal decisions that, at one time, were readily appealable and could be addressed at a level 
other than at a constitutional level. Instead, they have tried to couch their complaints in 
constitutional terms to avoid application of the above limiting statutes. 
In the above context, the thirty-day restriction is not unreasonable or unconstitutional. The 
statute simply provides that people who feel that they are aggrieved by decisions of a municipality 
have thirty days to appeal those decisions to a Court of law. Failure to file a timely appeal usually 
results in an end to the litigation. The record, here, reflects that there are instances where the City 
of Pleasant View made decisions that were not timely appealed by the plaintiffs. This Court held 
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that these statutes barred the applicable claims that were not of a constitutional nature. 
Plaintiffs' Claims for False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution 
The plaintiffs' claims that they are asserting constitutional claims for false arrest and 
malicious are legally unsupported. They are unsupported for several reasons. First, there is 
nothing in the complaint that supports a constitutional claim for these alleged wrongs. Ordinary 
false arrest and malicious prosecution are common law claims, not constitutional claims. Keeton, 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, (5 ed. 1984) Section 11 at 47 (false arrest is a "lineal 
descendant of the old action of trespass"); Section 119 at 885 ("Malicious prosecution is closely 
related to a number of claims, both common law and statutory . . .") 
Second, the plaintiffs did not name or serve Chief Cragun or any other City employee as a 
party to this action. The defendant City of Pleasant View cannot be liable under a Section 1983 
claim on a theory of respondeat superior for injuries allegedly inflicted by its agents or employees. 
Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.611 (1978). 
Accord, Bd. Of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown. 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 
1388, 127 L.Ed. 626 (1997) ("We have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a 
theory of respondeat superior.") 
Finally, the plaintiffs' constitutional claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution can 
only be established by an adequate showing of a policy or custom of the City which caused the 
alleged constitutional violation. There is no such allegation in the plaintiffs' complaint. These two 
claims are barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
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Claims Regarding Alleged Variances 
The plaintiffs also allege that this Court failed to address, in its first decision, the impact of 
the statutory protections, applicable to the variances, issued to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs refer to 
this as a "core issue." (See plaintiffs' memorandum, page 8.) The applicability of those variances 
was mooted by the City's issuance of the permits. (Again, see this Court' previous decision page 
1.) This Court also ruled that there was no factual or legal basis to support plaintiffs' 
constitutional claims and thus there were no constitutional claims to be addressed that arose from 
the variance issues. Finally, Article XI, Section 5 is not self-executing and provides no remedy for 
the alleged statutory violation. These issues do not need to be addressed again. 
Plaintiffs Attorneys Fees Pursuant to Section 1983 or 1988 
The plaintiffs claim for attorney's fee is denied for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs are not 
the prevailing party. See Harper v. Summit County. 2001 UT 10, paragraph 34, 414 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 21. Second, the "catalyst theory," upon which they rely, was specifically rejected by the 
United States Supreme Court in the case of Buckhannon Bd. And Care Home. Inc. et al v. West 
Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, et al 2001 WL 567728 (U.S.)(2001). 
Defense counsel will please prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this 28th day of September 2001. 
Judge W. Brent West 
Second District Court 
teQ: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision to the parties as 
follows: 
Jody K. Burnett 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84145-5678 
Matthew Hilton 
1220 North Main Street #5A 
P.O. Box 781 
Springville, Ut 84663 
Dated this 28th day of September, 2001. 
"Deputy Clerk 
/ft'il. 
TODY K BURNETT (A0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant Pleasant View City 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Phone: (801) 521-5678 
Fax: (801) 364-4500 
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SECOND. DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS V SPENCER AND LINDA S. 
SPENCER, 
Plaintifis, 
CITY OF PLEASANT VIEW, a Utah 
municipality, CHERRYWOOD MANOR, 
INC., a Utah corporation, CHERRYWOOD 
MANOR HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN AND JANE 
DOES I-XX, individual defendants in their 
private capacities, 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER 
Civil No. 980905386PR 
Judge W Brent West 
This matter came before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable W. Brent West 
presiding, for consideration of plaintifiV Motion to Revise Summary Judgment Granted in 
Favor of City of Pleasant View, which was styled as a request under Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the trial court to reconsider its prior ruling on the 
parries' cross-morions for summary judgment. 
A Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal was signed on November 27, 2000, 
and filed with the Court on November 28, 2000, dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint as 
. f - J-__ ni . \r.„*, rinr with nreiudice and upon the merits. At that time, 
the plaintiffs' claims against defendants Chcrrywood Manor, Inc. and Cherrywood Manor 
Home Owners Association remained pending and were unaffected by that Order. 
By stipulation and motion of all parties, axi Order of Dismissal With Prejudice of 
Claims Against Cherrywood Manor, Inc. and Cherrywood Manor Home Owners 
Association, Inc was signed on March 26, 2001, and entered with the Court on 
March 27, 2001. 
A Notice to Submit was filed with the Court on the plaintiffs' motion to revise 
summary judgment, and none of the parties requested oral argument* Having reviewed 
the legal memoranda and materials submitted by the parties, and being fully advised, the 
Court issued its Decision dated September 28, 2001, in which it separately addressed each 
of the issues raised by the plaintiffs and denied the plaintiffs5 motion to reconsider. 
Pursuant to that Decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs* Motion to Revise Summary Judgment Granted in Favor of City of 
Pleasant View is hereby denied for the rtasons more fully set forth in the Court's Decision 
of September 28, 2001. 
2. With the entry of the Order dismissing the plaintiffs' claims against 
Cherrywood Manoc, Inc. and Chcrrywood Manor Home Owners Association, Inc, this 
constitutes the final order of the Court adjudicating and disposing of all of the claims and 
rights and liabilities of all of the parties. 
DATED this \9^ day of Q i n ^ 2001. 
BY THE GO 
v O * 
W Brent West 
District Court J] 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH .) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Beverly PursweiL, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in die law offices of 
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendant Pleasant View City herein; that she served the 
attached proposed FINAL ORDBSL in Case No. 980905386PR before the Second Judicial 
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, upon the parties listed below by placing a 
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
Matthew Hilton 
P. O. Box 781 
Springville, UT 84663 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the _4* day of October, 
2001. 
Beverly Purswqjf 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this _4^_ day of October, 2001. 
Notary Public 
NOTAfcrruBUC 
PENNTLEDWAADS 
257E.300So.#fQ0 
S.UL.VT M i l l _ . 
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